"What's the most important thing Americans need to know about Iraq that they don't currently know?" I said.
"That we're fighting Al Qaeda," he said without hesitation. "[Abu Musab al] Zarqawi invented Al Qaeda in Iraq. The top leadership outside Iraq squawked and thought it was a bad idea. Then he blew up the Samarra mosque, triggered a civil war, and got the whole world's attention. Then the Al Qaeda leadership outside dumped huge amounts of money and people and arms into Anbar Province. They poured everything they had into this place. The battle against Americans in Anbar became their most important fight in the world. And they lost."
"[W]e shall fight on, insh'allah, as Mulazam Manion would want, and would do."
Rest in Peace, 1LT Travis Manion
Posted by Bill
1LT Travis Manion (center) shares a laugh with fellow Marines prior to an evening mission in January. (View larger image)
On a Sunday afternoon in late April, 1st Lt. Travis Manion spoke to his father via satellite phone from a dusty Iraqi Army barracks in downtown Fallujah. Manion and his fellow Marines with Military Transition Team (MiTT) 30 - advisors to the 3-2-1 Iraqi Army - had recently watched a DVD of the movie "300," and it made an impression. He told his dad that for the Spartans, there was "no greater honor" than to die fighting for one's country and its freedoms. He expressed frustration that many Americans didn't understand that's what he and his Marines were doing in Iraq. The satellite phone kept cutting out and, unusually, Travis kept calling his father back. He lingered on the phone. He spoke of the importance of honor, strength and courage. He expressed kinship with the Spartans.
A week later, Travis Manion died a Spartan's death.
In the days and weeks that followed, mourning friends, strangers and brothers-in-arms paid their respects with stories of how Manion lived up to the ideals he admired.
A childhood friend named Steve Brown said, "Travis was the first person to ever really stick up for me," after they had just met in the 5th grade. Manion had lectured a racist store clerk who ignored Brown because he was black, insisting that his new friend was served first. Another spoke of an incident a few years later, when Manion shot across a lacrosse field to tackle a temperamental high school teammate who was poised to blind-side a referee after an unfavorable call. This act probably saved a man from hospitalization and an angry kid from jail.
Midshipman Manion at the Naval Academy, left. With parents Tom and Janet Manion at a wrestling meet. (Photos via the Manion family)
Such early glimmers of moral and physical character presaged enrollment in the United States Naval Academy, a career as a nationally ranked Division I-A wrestler, a decision to follow in his father's Marine Corps. footsteps, openness with Iraqi Army compatriots and Manion's ultimate bravery in the restive city of Fallujah.
***
There was the time that Manion and his team were struck by an improvised explosive device (IED) while conducting a mounted patrol. After absorbing the blast and verifying that no one was seriously injured, he saw the glint of a "command wire" that sometimes leads to a bomb's owner. Jumping from the safety of the armored vehicle, Manion spotted and charged after the triggerman fleeing the scene. Though wearing 80+ pounds of "battle rattle" - armor, equipment and ammunition - Manion won the footrace against the small, wiry man, cornering and capturing his terrified prey in a building. As fellow MiTT Marine Maj Joel Poudrier put it, "He just stormed in and knocked a bunch of boxes the guy was hiding behind out of the way, flexi-cuffed him and dragged him out. That kid was a stud."
On March 28, his unit was hit with two suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (SVBIEDs): dump trucks loaded with explosives and chlorine gas. Just before dawn, heavy incoming mortars followed by small-arms fire woke the Marines and Iraqi soldiers (IAs) sleeping in their barracks in the Fallujah Government Center. One truck charged the front gate but was fired upon and detonated before it could penetrate the compound. As the Marines put on their gear and began to assemble, another exploded in an alley adjacent to the barracks, ripping open the entire western side of the building and blanketing the Marines and IAs in a chalky plume of poison gas. Manion ran up an exposed staircase through gas and the rattle of small-arms fire to recon and defend from the roof, maneuvering sandbags to create firing positions until a quick reaction force and medevac could arrive to remove the wounded.
Manion in 2005, left. Posing with an IA in 2007. (Photos via the Manion family).
***
On April 29, 2007, Travis and fellow advisors were conducting a combined Iraqi and Marine patrol in one of the most difficult sections of Fallujah. 3-2-1 MiTT Commander Maj. Adam Kubicki described that day in a letter to the Manion family:
"We departed our Combat Outpost in vehicles, but the actual conduct of the patrol was on foot, with vehicles in support. Travis was in the vehicle with me, and when on foot we moved together. We moved through the market section of the city with the Iraqi Army in the lead and we Marines providing guidance and direction."
"We had conducted the majority of our patrol uneventfully and were approaching the vehicles again when we were attacked ... our corpsman was struck by a sniper, critically injuring him. Travis and I pulled the corpsman to a covered position and attempted to locate the position of the sniper. Two more Marines rushed from our other vehicle to assist ... [and] a second Marine was struck by the sniper, critically injuring him as well. Travis and I again pulled the injured man to cover and realized that we must immediately establish security of our area."
"Travis selflessly moved from behind the covered position and began to engage the source of enemy fire. At that time, additional enemy forces appeared and began to engage us with a large amount of rifle and machine-gun fire. Travis, the Marine from the other vehicle and I took up firing positions to engage the enemy. I very clearly recall Travis firing his grenade launcher, keeping the insurgents from moving any closer, and his rifle."
"Our Iraqi counterparts were a short distance away at their vehicles. Travis's fire allowed them to remount and attempt to maneuver around to the flank. Our Marine vehicles provided cover and suppressive fire for us. Travis's only concern was the safety of our wounded and his fellow Marines and Iraqi soldiers. He continued to fire his weapon and maintain his position, even when additional insurgents appeared on the rooftops to our sides, firing down into us. [He] maintained his fire into the group of insurgents with the sniper."
"Our Iraqi counterparts maneuvering two blocks to the side encountered an IED and were stopped. I believe Travis was reloading his grenade launcher when the sniper next fired. [He] was struck directly in the side, just above the armor plate. The bullet severed the main vein from his heart and exited the other side. The other Marine and I, the only uninjured personnel on the ground, moved to Travis and pulled him back to a covered position. We alternated, one of us attempting to provide first aid ... while the other continued to engage the enemy. We continued to fight and provide first aid for several minutes. Travis died at 1525 Iraqi time (0725 east coast) on 29 April 2007."
"The fight continued for several more minutes, until a Marine quick reaction force arrived."
***
In addition to his fellow Marines, many Iraqis who served with the young lieutenant were distraught at Manion's passing.
"The American people must know we too lost a close friend and brother this day," said Iraqi Army Col. Ali Jafar, Commanding Officer of the 3rd Battalion, 2nd Iraqi Brigade, who previously spoke at Manion's memorial service. "May his family know we too lost family, and we share their loss, our loss."
Iraqi soldiers have since named a combat outpost after Manion.
"The advisors on a MiTT team are very different from the other American forces in Iraq. They are choosing to live with us, in our ways, share the same hardships and dangers, and choose to fight alongside of us. Many days. Every day," said Jafar. "Their blood is spilled alongside of ours on the battlefield. It mixes with ours. This is why Mulazam (lieutenant) Manion was, and will always be, our brother."
"I was impressed with the leadership in such a young guy," added Eric Greitens, a Navy SEAL who served with Manion. "[In combat] Travis maintained a very calm, mission-oriented presence that the Iraqis responded to."
***
I met Travis Manion prior to a night mission on January 15th, mere days after his team had deployed to the Iraqi Army barracks in the Fallujah Government Center. I struck up a conversation with him about wrestling when I noticed his cauliflower ears, and soon learned of his attendance at the Naval Academy. We spoke about college, his love for the Marines and his mission. Travis was reticent at first, wisely treating a prying reporter with polite circumspection, but he soon warmed up and always made it a point to speak to me or say hello in the weeks that followed.
One thing I noticed about Travis and his teammates: they had an edge. It wasn't simple fear exactly, but the men on that team - stationed as they were in an extremely exposed location, in an extremely violent city - felt that they were in for a rough deployment. They were right.
"When we first arrived in Iraq, one of the other Military Transition Teams in the city had a member killed. Our team was obviously affected, and we conducted a team meeting after his memorial service," wrote Kubicki. "Travis spoke at length, easing the minds of many team members. He was very proud of being a warrior, and the warrior spirit. I remember him saying that it would dishonor a man as a warrior if you did not continue the fight, despite the pain and loss. We have turned back to his words to help us through this time."
Despite the dangerous, difficult work, Manion later made plans to join his old Recon unit and continue working in Fallujah past his MiTT rotation. He believed in his Marines and mission. I wish he could have lived to see Fallujah now - a newly hopeful city, comparatively pacified to no small extent by the efforts of the Iraqi Army and their American advisors.
We had a brief acquaintance, but I was specifically inspired by Travis Manion when we met that chilly evening in January. Here was a young man - ridiculously athletic, smart and good-looking - who could have enjoyed a life of ease with the world at his feet, yet instead chose one of the most difficult paths imaginable. His subsequent actions and ultimate passing have inspired me even more, and continue to inspire others.
"Let all know too, we shall fight on, insh'allah (as God wills), as Mulazam Manion would want, and would do," said Col. Garza.
*****
Please consider donating to the following Memorial fund set up in Travis Manion's name. It will be used to support families of fallen heroes and also to establish an annual scholarship at LaSalle College High School, given to a student who exhibits the qualities of courage and leadership exemplified by the award's namesake.
From L to R: Me, "Rocky" (mascot for the 3rd Infantry Division) and Bill Roggio hang out after our video conference with President Bush. Rocky and Roggio are clearly some sort of kin.
I've made it to DC and am back at the day job. Significant pieces are on deck, including analysis of the Fallujah Police Department and an overall look at counterinsurgency progress in the city. For now, I'd like to thank Bill Roggio for PMI's sponsorship and accreditation of my embed, as well as his advice and friendship. I'd also like to thank the helpful Public Affairs Officers - especially the excellent folks at Camp Fallujah - for their professional assistance. More thanks and material from my embed to follow. Stay tuned.
Military Transition Team Captain Theodore "Teddy" J. Folsome was tired but dryly funny, with a nametag that read "Elvis Presley." When a passing Lt. Colonel chaplain saw it and asked him how "that all [came] about," he responded:
"Well sir, I'd have to say it all started in 1977. My friend Jimmy and I were out riding bikes when a car pulled up and his mom yelled, 'Jimmy, get in the car! The King is dead.' He dropped his bike and left me alone on the side of the road. So I went home and did some research to find out what all the fuss was about. And the hooks were in."
A local gas station. Fuel is doubly important in Fallujah, as it drives generators that supplement city power in addition to vehicles. Unfortunately, fuel shipments are often compromised by drivers either getting hijacked or stopping on the side of the road to sell portions of the cargo to black market profiteers. Given the risk of driving the tankers, this corruption is considered a premium for undertaking such a dangerous job.
Scarred City: residual damage from shrapnel, RPGs, small arms and other tools of war are almost everywhere in Fallujah. One marine remarked that the unrestrictive rules of engagement during al-Fajr (the second invasion of the city) were "like setting a fat kid loose in a candy store."
Looking at violence fossilized in walls always makes me consider what these weapons do to flesh. Immediately opposite the above damage ...
Artillery rounds of various shapes and sizes are stored after being confiscated by the Iraqi Police. Iraq is awash in munitions that are used in improvised explosive devices (IEDs), as well as for their original purpose.
The Jolan Precinct sits on the northwestern edge of Fallujah. Long considered a difficult neighborhood, Jolan is where Abu Musab al Zarqawi was headquartered and has hosted some of the fiercest fighting of the war.
The PSF is mostly comprised of tribesmen who police the areas outside of the major population centers in Anbar Province. Some criticize that arming PSF is "empowering militias," but the criticism is only valid to the extent "militia" is considered a dirty word. As with many things, the devil is in the details, notably the degree to which PSFs work with the Iraqi Army and Police, their effectiveness and their allegiance to the Iraqi government.
Reflections: A soldier scans mirrors for threats on the RINO bus as it takes me to Camp Victory in Baghdad. A bit later, while waiting in a parking lot, I heard the sounds of ambush: a large volume of small arms fire, return fire, and a large IED explosion outside the base.
SSgt Lucius "Big Sexy" Francis (left) jokes with Major Joel "P-Funk" Poudrier. Both are members of Military Transition Team 6 (MTT), which advises the 3-2-1 Iraqi Army. I embedded with MTT 6 in January and several members were subsequently injured by a Suicide Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device (SVBIED) loaded with chlorine gas in March. Poudrier was the most seriously wounded and was medevac'ed to the states, having suffered a traumatic brain injury and chlorine gas inhalation. He recovered and insisted on redeploying with his unit a couple of months ago, despite having the option to stay home.
Whither USMC?: Perhaps the most disturbing thing I saw in Iraq was this DVD of Saved by the Bell Season 5 owned by young Marines stationed in downtown Fallujah.
No Mere Pawns: Marines with the 5/10 CAG's security element pass the time by playing chess. I joked that "some of the Army guys I know told me that Marines couldn't read, much less play chess." One response: "Oh, &%@* them."
SSgt Francis fires off "hammer pair" drills near Camp Fallujah. On this embed I needed to be at a firing range to hear any considerable volume of small arms fire in Fallujah.
President Bush meets with bloggers in the Roosevelt Room of the White House and via video conference from Baghdad. At this moment, I believe he was telling Bill Roggio and I that it was "nice of you to dress up for us."
Photo by Joyce N. Boghosian courtesy of the White House.
"I find it interesting that [I] would be sitting down with bloggers."
A Meeting with President Bush
Posted by Bill
President Bush met with a group of bloggers today in an almost hour-long discussion of the war on terror. Eight individuals attended the meeting at the White House, while Bill Roggio and I video conferenced in from Camp Victory in Baghdad. Bush commenced the event with his oft-stated thoughts on the overall importance and strategies in various fronts of the war, with a focus on Iraq and Afghanistan, and then opened up the format to questions and discussion. My question focused on how national political reconciliation will affect progress in the Anbar Province and Fallujah specifically, and the President's answer honestly surprised me in its length, level of detail and grasp of events on the ground.
When one examines the challenges facing Iraq from the lowest level - via the perspective of Iraqis, junior enlisted, NCOs and officers in the conflict - it can often seem that any dysfunction might be abetted by American personnel at higher levels not being aware of, much less addressing, many of the problems. Given that the President of the United States had awareness of specifics about the strategy in al Anbar, I obtained a feeling that folks at higher levels are indeed taking a crack at these issues.
My question and Bush's somewhat paraphrased answer follows. The meeting was on the record, but notes took the place of recording devices due to the sensitive nature of the video conference's surroundings:
INDC: Mr. President, first I'd like to let you know that I was in Fallujah for the month of January and returned to compare the situation this month, and security progress in Fallujah specifically and Anbar as a whole is somewhat remarkable and heartening. But a key to maintaining security momentum in the province is for the Iraqi government at the national level to pick up where US support leaves off, by providing funds to support reconstruction and logistics to local security forces. What influence or leverage is being applied with the national Iraqi government to ensure that such assistance is delivered to the province? And note that the desire for support is tempered by the local belief - incorrect or correct to whatever degree - that the central Iraqi government under Maliki is compromised by Iranian interests.
"The military can only do so much. There has to be follow-up with jobs and hope," said Bush. "We recognize that the man on the street needs to feel like his government cares about him."
He then mentioned the death of Sheik Abdul Sitar Abu-Risha, and wondered if his demise would stall the process, or, as he suspects, would cause like-minded individuals to redouble their efforts. He cited the example of his meeting with the governing council of Anbar on his recent trip to the area. "We had this meeting with the governing council. The head of the provincial council was like the governor and the local sheiks were like mayors." He said that each link in the chain requested more help from the next higher position, "the sheiks requested help from the governor and the governor said 'we need help from [Maliki].'"
"By putting them at the table it made it abundantly clear that they needed assistance ... so [the federal Iraqi government] went out there with $120 million to begin with and [more funds] to follow."
President Bush noted that he "thought the governor of the province was a courageous guy," followed by a caveat about not truly knowing an individual's intentions, perhaps preempting comparative criticism regarding his previous assessments of Vladimir Putin. "But his words were good." He then cited his awareness of the difficulty of funds making the trip from the central Iraqi government to the provincial capital in Ramadi and on to cities like Fallujah, a systemic problem repeated to me by commanders on the ground at various levels.
Bush talked about how developing these working bureaucratic processes were the growing pains "that this society needs to go through" to achieve stability. "We shouldn't expect instant results with a society that was brutalized by Saddam Hussein." Many of the courageous leaders, "the Mandelas ... are all dead," as Hussein killed anyone who tried to make a positive difference, Bush asserted. He explained that the establishment of working bureaucratic systems will take time, that he is "trying to be realistic about what is possible, how fast."
"The question is," Bush continued, "is this a nationalistic society or one more focused on religious differences. I happen to believe it is a nationalistic society." [I'll interject to note that most Iraqis I've spoken with agree]
With regard to Maliki, Bush said that he expressed to him that "a murderer is an evil person no matter which religion. Are you willing to go after murderers?", a reference to efforts against fellow Shiites who are members of militias causing chaos in Baghdad. "The answer was, he decided to go after murderers of any stripe."
Bush noted that "$2.6 billion was distributed to the province ... in '06," though some of that money remains unspent. He cited provincial elections as a key to political engagement of Sunni blocks, and that "a proper balance of power between the central government and the provinces is still an issue they are wrestling with," that it is America's job to "gently help them find the right balance."
Bush then mentioned "realistic" assessments by generals about whether the money was filtering into Anbar and cited other efforts, like reeducation camps at Camp Cropper and Abu Ghraib which rehabilitate tractable young insurgents with the help of imams and vocational training designed to create money-making options besides insurgency-for-hire. Bush then cited distribution of projects through the region's sheiks and a specific request to rebuild homes in Fallujah damaged because of Coalition or insurgent activity. He assured me that he would "check on Fallujah."
"A chunk of money last year and this year is making it into the hands of the locals. Now, this is never as robust as the locals want, but ... this cannot be won by military actions alone. Ryan Crocker and the diplomatic team in Baghdad, and the Provincial Reconstruction Teams" who provide him with "regular briefings" are applying due influence to set up working processes, said Bush.
"But we're dealing with a fragile [Iraqi] psychology. "They wonder if we're committed" to sticking around and helping the reconstruction of their society. Bush finished his answer by stating that "as long as I'm President" America will remain committed.
*****
My impressions: as noted above, I was surprised by Bush's command of details in Anbar and his recognition of certain problems. This leads me to believe that subordinates down the chain of command are working to address the issues. I agreed with much of his assessment about Iraq's fragile political psyche, the need for patience to create working bureaucracies in a vacuum and his belief that average Iraqis, by-and-large, are interested in keeping Iraq whole rather than bowing to outside interests or enacting partition.
Maliki's commitment to going after any and all destabilizing militias remains a question, though this has certainly improved; as an example, Maliki hasn't complained about US forces conducting missions in Sadr City for some time, and the operational tempo in that area has increased dramatically since the surge. Perception on the ground in Anbar remains unfavorable towards his government, however.
I'll have more perspective on the challenges and opportunities in Anbar in forthcoming pieces. I still have serious concerns about the Federal Iraqi government's follow-through on support for reconstruction and security forces in the province, but Bush's answer in an informal meeting at least reinforces the idea that US strategy has taken such problems into consideration as the security situation in Western Iraq has improved. Only time will tell if actions match assurances.
EVIL MARINE MAKES IRAQI CHILD CRY. Just kidding, this isn't an Agence France Presse caption. Some Marines are bored with civil affairs missions, some embrace them. This fellow loved interacting with kids, and picked up this crying child to comfort him. Unfortunately ...
Complaint Department: young Marines had scratched out messages in the roof of a Humvee. One of the worst things about being an enlisted Marine in Iraq is waiting for hours while pulling security on a vehicle. The vics are air-conditioned, but that might bring the temperature down to 105 from 125 while wearing body armor in the summer months.
Iraqi Policemen pose for a picture at the Nazaal Precinct. During my last visit, they hid from my camera to protect their families from being attacked. Now, with greater numbers and rising confidence, they ask me to take pictures.
Irony, Alive and Well in Iraq: this shirt - "Road Block Cafe, Fallujah" - was worn by a young Fallujan interpreter who spoke English like a kid from New York.
Dance, Dance, Revolution? As soon as I pointed my camera at him, this kid started up a funky arabic shimmy and shake. I'd move the camera away, he'd stop. Back, he'd start. Away, stop. Etc.
"Make My Day, Ameriki:" In addition to some bad-ass earrings, the little one on the left sported a tough stare. His(?) sister gives the game away, however.
Fallujah Police Officers eat lunch at the Jolan Precinct.
I've returned from my Police Transition Team embed and have a couple of pieces on deck. In the meantime, please read Michael Totten's "Anbar Awakens Part I: The Battle of Ramadi":
"Al Qaeda struck out three times," said Major Peters. "Strike One: They killed a Sheikh and held his body for four days. Strike Two: They executed young people in public. Strike Three: They attacked the compound of another sheikh. The people here said enough. They aligned with us because they realized Al Qaeda was the real enemy. They didn't like Al Qaeda's version of Islam at all."
Credit for purging Ramadi of Al Qaeda must go to Iraqis themselves at least as much as to the American military. The Americans wouldn't have been able to do it without the cooperation of the people who live there, and the Iraqis wouldn't have been able to do it, at least not so easily, without help from the American military.
Ramadi and Fallujah are very different cities, but in that aspect they are much the same.
Fortunately, everyone had gone in easy and not blown doors off with explosives. Those mistakes also happen sometimes. Sometimes our own guys blow down doors to the wrong homes. Back in the early days of the war, this might have seemed like an innocent "Oh well that’s war" type mistake, but after spending all this time with Iraqis I now see that it was in part actions like that which also blew open the door in Iraq for al Qaeda to come in.
Counterinsurgency is all about perception. Perception is how reality gets interpreted by people. It can be shaped, cajoled, hardened or distorted by innumerable influences.
I'm holding a Russian shoulder-fired surface-to-air-missile (SAM), part of a weapons cache found by IPs and brought back to Fallujah Police Headquarters today. At my feet are fuses, detonators, an anti-personnel mine and a French anti-tank missile launcher. Out back were mortars and other artillery rounds of all shapes and sizes, often used for IEDs. One IP casually strolled into the station carrying an immense, fused artillery shell. The Marines yelled at him to "get it the hell outside," though I was already high-tailing it up the stairs before they could finish the instruction.
One piece of information to caveat my initial positive impressions of Fallujah: a significant reason the city is so peaceful is a ban on non-commercial vehicle traffic instituted at the request of the police a couple of months ago, after a suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (SVBIED) killed and maimed Fallujans attending the funeral of a slain cop. This vehicle ban has assisted the security situation and given breathing space for the marines and IPs to finish Operation Alljah, described here. A test of Fallujah's new security gains may come when the ban is lifted. As the recent cordon off of neighborhoods prevents insurgents from escaping if they stage an attack, this, in conjunction with a large increase in tips from the populace and a smaller pool of local insurgents, should severely curtail activity from troublemakers who want to live.
Radical mujahadeen only interested in making a one-way trip will test access into the city, however. Time will tell.
This factor does not invalidate the immense gains made by the Iraqi Police and overall security in Fallujah since my last visit. Much more detail to follow.
Commenced on May 29 and ending last week, Operation Alljah was the latest and most successful bid to achieve security in the former insurgent stronghold of Fallujah, marrying projection of force with aggressive civil affairs outreach. During the operation, the city was subdivided into 10 neighborhoods in efforts dubbed "the swarm," a coordinated series of counterinsurgency components: US troops and Iraqi Security Forces rolled into a neighborhood and established security, cordoned it off with concrete barrier checkpoints, created a local police precinct, recruited a neighborhood watch, provided employment for day laborers, conducted an information campaign to inform the citizenry of the operation, arbitrated any claims against Iraqi or US forces, distributed food and began meetings with neighborhood leaders to address infrastructure concerns.
From left to right: Chief Warrant Officer Steve Townsley, Staff Sgt. Mauricio Piedrahita, and Sgt. Giovanni Roman of the 5/10 CAG at Camp Baharia.(View larger image)
"The thing that's going to stop the insurgency is the will of the people. Once the people are fed up with it, tired of it, the insurgency is going to stop," said Civil Affairs Chief Warrant Officer Steve Townsley. "Now we're totally focused on essential services. Trying to help out ... as much as possible. The whole persona of the 2/6 [Marines], the way they're running operations, is to provide for the citizens. The IPs [Iraqi Police] are like that too, they're out there engaging the people. They [used to get] attacked so much that they were a military force, doing military-type operations. When they showed up, they showed up hard. Now it's more 'Hey what's going on? How are you doing? What can we do for you?' It's yielded huge gains."
From left to right: 5/10 CAG Marines Sgt. Maxuel Cabasag, Cpl. Paul Webster, Cpl. Daniel Orozco, Sgt. Craig Provens, and Lance Cpl. Jose Gomez. (View larger image)
Over the past few days, I shadowed Townsley's 5/10 Civil Affairs Group (CAG) out of Camp Baharia during the 10th and final stage of the operation.
At about 6 AM, the 5/10 CAG conducted a briefing for the day's event: the establishment of the local police precinct in the Mualimeen District in the heart of downtown Fallujah.
Heading into downtown on Fran -- the main thoroughfare that bisects the city -- was a drastically different experience than it was during my last visit in January. More folks were out and about, new solar-powered streetlights lined the way, the barriers along the road were freshly painted, and the Marines were alert but loose, lacking the palpable tension that used to accompany a trip down this historically explosive stretch of highway.
The CAG Marines arrived at the newly established precinct, a building that formerly housed a preparatory school in the Fallujah Government Center, the walled government compound in the center of the city.
By 8 AM, recruits for the district's neighborhood watch -- called "Fallujah Protectors" -- were lined up for evaluation and processing.
"At each precinct we establish, we get approximately 200 neighborhood watch. Essentially volunteers in the area, but they do get paid," said Capt. Mark Cameron, assistant operations officer with Marine Task Force 2/6.
"We give them three specific tasks. [First,] wear your uniform in the line of duty, which is big, a show of presence, a little show of community within each neighborhood. [The] second task is to obey the orders of the IP. They essentially work for the IP. They're not IP-trained, in the sense that they haven't gone to the [police] academy in Jordan, but they're more or less a junior team for the IP, and many aspire to eventually become police. And the third task they're responsible for is to treat the citizens of Fallujah with dignity and respect, and be able to represent them how they would want to be represented, as a big brother, a role model within the city."
LCPL Kevin Mummey of the Fallujah Police Transiion Team (PTT) lines up recruits for the neighborhood watch.(View larger image)
"They're paid $150 a month for a two-month period and after those two months they're assessed on their ability to accomplish those three tasks, by the IP in conjunction with a Marine liaison," continued Cameron. "They do get checked for medical problems. Usually what we'll see is injuries from past kinetic events, like from the Iraq-Iran war in some of the older guys, but as long as they can pull their body weight and do a push-up we'll let them go through if they've got the heart and are willing to do it."
In addition to providing local security and needed employment, a benefit of the neighborhood watch is the sublimation of the recruiting pool for local insurgency. Besides hard-core jihadists, a large portion of insurgent activity was a result of Fallujans trying to make money in a city with little-to-no prospects for employment: Last January, men would get paid as little as $20 to plant improvised explosive devices (IEDs) against Coalition forces.
When asked about how security had changed so drastically, what they think of Americans and IPs, and why so many Fallujans had formerly backed the insurgency, one volunteer had this to say: "I want to be neighborhood watch to protect the city and 150 dinars is good pay, and I want to {become an] IP. And when I become an IP, I'll have 750 dinar. Like you said, four, five, seven months ago, the city was not good. But the reason the city is now good is because of us, we protect the city, because we're from this city; we know who's the good guy, we know who's the bad guy. So, the bad guy? To jail or get out [of] my city. The good guy? You're welcome, you can stay here."
All of the neighborhood watch volunteers I spoke with cited this desire for increased security and good pay.
Asked why it took so long for Fallujans to switch sides or rise up against the insurgency, another volunteer said, "Before, we had the terrorists, they controlled the city, so they had the power to do what they wanted to do. But you can say we woke up right now, we were asleep. We woke up to move the bad guy, to push him out, to kill him or to put him in jail. We were waiting for help from the government."
Several volunteers expressed that the key to building security momentum was the empowerment of the Iraqi Police with cover from Marine firepower. Their opinion of US troops has changed:
"At first, Americans were not doing a good job, because if they were attacked, they would kill [civilians] in the surrounding area, but now they are good to the people and trying to help. They are going out sooner or later, and it is a good gesture of them to try to help us before they leave."
On al Qaeda, one volunteer said: "It was very bad. They were targeting everyone: American, policeman, civilian. There was no difference between a target and another target. They were killing and kidnapping and planting bombs on the side of the roads, and targeting everyone, [not just] American forces. They were bombing the mosques and targeting the imams who spoke out against al Qaeda."
"Now we start to know what is right and what is wrong," said another recruit. "The picture is so clear now. When things started and the [initial] invasion came to Fallujah, we said, 'It's OK for civilians to [take up arms] and fight the invasion and throw [the Americans] out from Fallujah.' We said, 'OK, they are the enemy and that's our friend.' But things were confused, and the enemy has become the friend and the friend became the enemy."
Another element of Operation Alljah is the engagement of the "Muktars," local community representatives who arbitrate and advocate for community interests.
"When we got here, there was a sheik's council. But in [the actual city of)] Fallujah, you can't have a sheik's council, because they have [Muktars, who are] like city sheiks. Fallujah is not divided by tribes, like in Ramadi. So when we were doing the sheik's council, we were going nowhere, because the sheiks didn't know the people ... until we started noticing the Muktars. They were like, 'What about us? How come nobody's talking to us?'" explained 5/10 CAG Staff Sergeant Mauricio Piedrahita.
"So we started talking to them. They are like block captains who go back to the Saddam days. He's in charge of a neighborhood. He knows everyone inside that neighborhood. They're official positions appointed by the government. We do contracting for projects through them, because they know who to employ, because they know 'Hey, I'm not gonna employ this guy because he's from another district, he needs to be employed by his own (neighborhood).' So this way we ensure that everyone is getting a fair amount of contracts and the projects and jobs are being distributed around the district."
Engaging Muktars and backing their authority has succeeded where past civil affairs strategies have failed. Projects are now more in line with the needs of the community, and the decentralization of contracting has mitigated serious problems with corruption. During these meetings, the Muktars outline the most pressing infrastructure needs for the district: power (generators), fuel, water and sewage.
The marines picked up food bags, soccer balls and jerseys from a storage depot, loaded them into trucks and convoyed to meet the Iraq police officers who would distribute the packages to the neighborhood. Americans let the Iraqis take the lead to put a local face on the effort and empower the IPs.
The most important items are food bags containing basics like flour, chai and seasoning. Fallujans have traditionally received food rations from the central government, but the flow has dwindled since the initial invasion. Whereas before they received rations with 15 elements, they now sometimes receive as few as 3.
"It's not that they're starving. But prior to the war, they had government pricing for food and fuel. Like a liter of fuel was 250 Iraqi dinars. There's a lot of black market and private enterprise now, and it's like 1250 per liter for fuel. So (they complain) 'This is black market!' And it's not illegal, but they have a socialist kind of view, and a limited knowledge of other types of governance. Even the food was 50 Iraqi dinar for a bag of flour, and every citizen had their just right ration of flour, sugar, chai, etc.," said CWO Townsley.
Some marines complain about the "boring" nature of the civil affairs focus, while others embrace it.
"It's a change," said SSG Piedrahita. "But like they say, we're marines, we adapt to anything. We're always going to do the job as best we can. Like these guys, the 2/6, are all grunts, all infantrymen. They get trained to kill, in combat, and then we get this and we adapt to it and do the best we can. In a way, it's good. We're not getting Marines killed out here."
Jerseys were also a big hit. As in most countries of the world, soccer is immensely popular. Iraq's victory in the championship game of the Asia Cup was broadcast over the city's PA system, and the place went wild. Celebratory small arms fire (SAF) reminded Americans of the old days, when the rattle of AK-47s were daily background noise.
The Marine security element kept constant watch while other marines and the IPs moved casually through the streets. The atmosphere was so relaxed that it was easy to forget potential threats. As I cleaned my dusty camera lens, one Marine reminded me to "never stay still" in order to avoid accurate sniper fire. But the day was peaceful. The children were almost universally friendly, and the looks from adults varied from friendly to wary to projected apathy to a sort of interested surprise. Americans say that there is variation by neighborhood in such "atmospherics" (Mualimeen is not the friendliest section of the city, though not the unfriendliest), but that the overall positive change in local opinion has been significant.
"[The Marines and IP] are not kicking down doors, they knock on the door, they give them time for the women and children to go into a room, they'll talk to the man of the house, so it's a different attitude," said SSG Piedrahita. "(The civilians) know they can approach us now. Before they couldn't run towards a convoy saying 'hey there's an IED' because they knew they might get shot. Now, they see they can approach us, they can talk to us, because 85% of our operations are out on the street, we're actually walking the street, talking to the people so that they can see us. They know we're not some kind of devil."
The food distribution ended in the late morning hours and the CAG team returned to base as other marines continued a second day of recruitment for the neighborhood watch. The security impact of Alljah, among other factors, has reaped objective benefits. Attacks within the city during August numbered a little more than 70, down from a historic peak of over 750 in March of 2007.
Townsley summed up Alljah with a popular counterinsurgency saying: "Stay soft, 'till you have to go hard."
*****
Please consider a tax deductible donation to support independent journalism. Mark the subject line with "INDC Journal," if you are so inclined.
Senator Chuck Schumer's (spoken) statement on the Anbar Awakening against al Qaeda:
"And let me be clear, the violence in Anbar has gone down despite the surge, not because of the surge. The inability of American soldiers to protect these tribes from al Qaeda said to these tribes we have to fight al Qaeda ourselves. It wasn't that the surge brought peace here. It was that the warlords took peace here, created a temporary peace here. And that is because there was no one else there protecting."
This assessment differs from the opinion expressed to me by a volunteer for the "Fallujah Protectors," the city's new neighborhood watch:
"Before [the Iraqi Police] did not have enough cover to hold their city. But right now, they got cover, like what you see: every single IP station has marines with them, to give them support every time the IP want it. Another thing? They didn't have weapons, but right now they have weapons, so they can do the right thing, kill the terrorists and survive."
And the opinion of a Fallujan interpreter, on the change that empowered the local police to improve the security situation:
"I think, what made (the) change, (is) the American support, the USA support to the IPs (Iraqi Police) and ... support to all the western region, and that's what's different from now and then."
I'll showcase more Fallujan perspective on the Awakening in forthcoming posts.
*****
Please consider a tax deductible donation to support independent journalism. Mark the subject line with "INDC Journal," if you are so inclined.
I was interviewed by Uncle J from Blackfive via phone yesterday. Audio is a bit low, but if you crank up the speakers you should be able to make out what I'm saying. The Quicktime podcast version seems a bit more audible.
One note: I misspoke regarding the number of attacks in Fallujah during December 06, January 07 and now - the rough figures quoted were monthly. The following graph tells the story:
I'm still in the middle of my Civil Affairs (CAG) embed, and the ongoing missions plus intermittent power and internet access in my current billet make writing difficult. Polished commentary will be a few days out. But a quick teaser: the positive change in Fallujah since my January visit is astounding.
I've attended a Fallujah City Council meeting, a recruiting day for the "Fallujah Protectors" (neighborhood watch), the establishment of the city's last police precinct and a meeting of "muktars," traditional cultural leaders of specific neighborhoods who work with Marines to improve infrastructure. Tomorrow, my CAG unit will distribute food bags downtown. Almost none of this access or interaction was possible in January, and the cooperation with American personnel is widespread and animated.
The surreality of the change can be summed up by this afternoon. I sat chit-chatting in a downtown precinct with Iraqi cops and newly-minted neighborhood watchmen, junior security officials drawn from the same labor pool that previously drove the insurgency. As was the case last visit, the Iraqis assume that I'm an Arab when they first see me, and express amused fascination when they discover I'm American. Apparently I look like a member of a tribe that lives northwest of the city, whose members sport full beards, lighter brown skin and light eyes. I always respond that there are plenty of Americans who look just like them, because America welcomes all races. Coupled with my prominent camera and status as "a journalist," I rate somewhere between a bemusing curiosity and a very minor celebrity.
Through a local interpreter, we talked about their changing opinion of Americans, Iraq's prospects, the misery of living under al Qaeda, the joys of kabob and favorite soccer teams. Their open and friendly nature is hard to reconcile with the violent history of American-Iraqi interaction in Fallujah, and many of them charitably chalk it up to a "misunderstanding."
Towards the end of a long conversation with one group, I said, "Well, I wish you luck. And I want you to know, besides the marines and soldiers that you meet here in the city, there are many civilians back in America who hope for Fallujah's success."
The afternoon's joking died down as the interpreter translated and each of them earnestly told me "shukran" ("thank you"). And one young guy blurted out in halting English, "We like you!"
Backatcha, buddy. Now I'm off to hit that kabob.
Extended commentary to follow.
UPDATE: Commenter Nathan brings up a good point about Iraqi motivation, and to clarify, this anecdote is not meant to paint the picture that all or most Fallujans love Americans. What it does do is showcase the stark difference in interaction from what it was in the past. Put simply, I wouldn't be shocked to learn that one of these fellas took a shot at me a short 7 months ago. Now we're rapping about kabob.
See my comment under the post for further detail.
*****
Please consider a tax deductible donation to support independent journalism. Mark the subject line with "INDC Journal," if you are so inclined.
