March 30, 2007
Reconciling Insurgents
Posted by Bill
A must-read post over at Acute Politics:
I'll try to keep writing about the winds here in Al-Anbar. I'll go out on a little bit of a limb and say that the insurgency is quickly approaching a tipping point. If things continue as they are right now, our military won't need a surge to chase the terrorists out of Anbar- the citizens will do it for us, which is as it should be. It's beginning to show already: more local tips, more police recruits (far more than anticipated), and sadly- in bigger and more desperate Al-Qaeda attacks.
At this point, a reconciled insurgent is better than a captured one, and a captured one is better than a dead one.
That is a hard fact for the military to accept.
Some are irreconcilable, having been irretrievably integrated into radical cells. But there are various brands of insurgent in Anbar, with the majority of foot soldiers recruited from the pool of local 15-24 year-old males that aim to prove their manhood in the regional tradition: by picking up kalashnikovs instead of joining football teams. Teflon Don is right: any successful strategy ultimately relies on defusing this population, which includes many insurgents switching sides as the local forces of law and order become the strong horse.
No foot soldiers and the money men - religious radical, Syrian provocateur and aspiring local capo alike - will be forced to join the better business bureau, blow town, or be ridden out on a rail.
As a regional side note: I've heard that the "Awakening" of Sunni tribes against al Qaeda has spread to Fallujah from the Ramadi area. When I was in Fallujah, the tribes were characterized as "two-faced," by several Iraqis: actively helping the insurgents while putting on a good show for the local government and Americans. At a later point during the course of my stay, I was informed that they had staked out a new position of legitimate neutrality. And now, apparently the hope of the civil servant who I interviewed has come to fruition, and the tribes are moving to the side of the police.
One caveat: tribes in Fallujah are less representative of the local population than in other parts of al-Anbar. Thus, this shift is good news, but may be of a slightly different impact and character than in Ramadi or rural areas surrounding Fallujah. That said, given that the insurgency is less animated in Fallujah because of its post-2004 status as a gated community, the allegiance of the tribes might be enough. Due to my limited knowledge of day-to-day Fallujan public opinion, I can't authoritatively predict the outcome.
"The USMC/Iraqi team was sluggin' it out side by side." (Chlorine Gas Attack Update)
Posted by Bill
Lt. Col. Clayton Fisher, commander of Military Transition Team (MiTT) 6 at the brigade level (and my chaperone on an IA mission) was injured in Wednesday's chlorine truck bomb attack on the Fallujah Government Center and left this comment:
We wanted you to know that your Marine MITTs and IA [Iraqi Army -- ED] came out OK and did great, even after 2 SVBIEDs [Suicide Vehicle-Borne IEDs] , mortars, complex attack etc. Most walking wounded, but hey, we're walking! A few of us were medevac'd to the outskirts of Baghdad, but should come out fine in a few days. Chlorine gas, concussions, some shrapnel, cuts, bruises. Not too bad.
As for the IAs, they proved themselves. The jundi did a great job and pretty much stopped the initial attack as the insurgents were trying to shoot/ram their way inside. The IA and IP [Iraqi Police] figured it out and opened up on them, causing them to set off at the gates or just outside the buildings, vice inside where it would have been worse. Still too close than most would like, but it will do. After all "shook it off," we got most of us out of the rubble and the gas, did a head-count, realized there were still some back in. All rubble, smoke and chlorine gas, hard to see what was what, and of course you can't breathe. So of course, we ran back in it. Got to find those guys. It was not pretty but, we got them all out, to include a few guys you know. They are good now. We then got a US/IA triage and casualty system working. The chlorine thing is a whole other conversation.
And then those of us still standing, most wounded and gassed, ran back in again, slugged it out and fended off the counter attacks and any exploitation the insurgents were trying to get started. Many refused to be medevac'd during the fight. The USMC/Iraqi team was sluggin' it out side by side. Something to see. US Marines and Jundi still gasping for air, fighting side by side. Some jundi still in their sleeping sweats or shower sandals refusing to be evacuated, fighting back with their AKs and PKCs into enemy positions. Yes, some of these jundi got what it takes.
I'd like to say "Bill, you should have been there!" but no, I'd prefer you were not this time. After things settled down a bit, we built the defense back up, got most the wounded out, US and IA reinforcements came in to shore things up. After all was on the mend, the endorphins and adrenaline finally wore off, we realized we were a bit of a mess, our work was done for now and finally agreed to be medevac'd out also. Walked out carrying our shield, not on it.
Well that's kind of it. Everyone is OK as can be. Marines and Jundi alike did well. I thought folks in the USA should know.
Major Christopher Marise, Lt. Col. Clay Fisher and Major Joel Poudrier of MiTT 6 at the Fallujah Government Center prior to going on a raid back in January.
During Wednesday's attack, Marise and Fisher went back into the gas and rubble and retrieved Poudrier, who was initially knocked out in the blast. All are ok, though hospitalized and recuperating.
March 28, 2007
Chlorine Truck Bomb Attack on CMOC (UPDATED again)
Posted by Bill
Today a chemical attack took place on the compound (sometimes called the Civil Military Operations Center or Fallujah Government Center) which houses Fallujah Police Headquarters and the Fallujah Police Transition Team, as well as IAs, a MiTT and various government offices. The Fourth Rail:
Today, Al Qaeda conducted yet another chlorine gas suicide bombing, this time directed at the Fallujah government center, in the very heart of the city of Fallujah. The attack was coordinated; Multinational Forces West described it as "complex." The two suicide truck bombs and small arms fire was preceded by mortar fire, which likely was designed to distract the guards at the gates.
"The attack began at 6:33 a.m. with mortar fire, followed by two truck bombs and small arms fire. Iraqi Police identified the first suicide attacker and fired on the truck, causing it to detonate before reaching the compound," according to the Multinational Forces West press release. "Iraqi Army soldiers spotted the second suicide truck approaching the gate and engaged it with small arms fire, causing it to also detonate near the entrance of the compound."
Fifteen Iraqi soldiers, police and U.S. advisers stationed at the government center were injured in the blast, while "numerous Iraqi Soldiers and Policemen are being treated for symptoms such as labored breathing, nausea, skin irritation and vomiting that are synonymous with chlorine inhalation"
Just awful. Thankfully the IAs and IPs nailed the trucks before they breached far into the compound. That said, people were still poisoned. I'm fervently hoping the PiTT & MiTT members, IAs and IPs are not seriously injured.
More from Roggio.
A release from MNF-West:
No Iraqi or Coalition Forces were killed in the attack.
And more contextual detail on the FGC as an insurgent target, the Iraqi Police and the PiTT mission from my embed coverage.
UPDATE: Via e-mails from PTT personnel and a family member of an injured MTT marine: "Minor injuries" to IPs, IAs and several members of the MiTT. "Shaken (literally)" but ok.
Apparently the crude method of dispersing the gas in a via blowing up canisters renders the poison less widespread and lethal. From an LA Times story about a February attack:
Chemists said that exploding high-pressure canisters are at best a crude way to disperse the green gas. Some would burn off, and the rest of the gas, which is heavier than air, would be unlikely to spread much beyond the blast zone.
Stephen Bradforth, a chemistry professor at USC, suggested that the most serious damage could be psychological.
An explosion "would launch a cloud of gas that is colored and highly corrosive and would lead to panic and more injuries," he said. "It's the chemical equivalent of a nail bomb."
UPDATE: PiTT Commander Major Brian Lippo e-mails:
We're all OK...just a little shaken (literally) from the blast. Marines had a few headaches from the chlorine, but nobody needed to be evaced. There was a lot of mortars and small arms that preceeded the SVBIEDs and we had 6 IPs injured from the mortars (they're all going to be OK).
Clarification: no PiTT members were evac'ed.
March 27, 2007
Last Personal Anecdotes and Impressions, Embed
Posted by Bill
Care Packages
Military families and folks from organizations like Soldiers' Angels and Operation Gratitude should feel confident that their care packages are appreciated and everywhere in Fallujah. From Camp Fallujah to Iraqi Police Headquarters to the Forward Operating Bases outside the wire, one can't help stumbling across endless boxes of soap, baby wipes, beef jerky, pop tarts, beef jerky, soup and beef jerky. Between the packages, fancy chow halls at larger bases and good communications, servicemembers are certainly more connected and probably better taken care of than during any other war in US history. Internet communication with family especially blunts the stress, discomfort and broken relationships traditionally suffered during wartime service.
That said, I'll NEVER eat beef jerky again.
Melting Days
During all embeds I was surprised at the hours worked by US personnel; for most there are no weekends, many have no official quitting times. Sure, there slow stretches, and young marines attached to a unit's security element find time to play video games, kick each other in the ass or competitively eat themselves sick, but it's a long, irregular schedule and they're always on call, with stretches of lazy boredom interrupted by dangerous convoys, administrative tasks, mortar attacks and the rare (and for many, highly coveted) gunfight.
Another day at the office.
And as one moves up the chain of command, the days stay long and the gaps between work fill up rapidly - many of the senior NCO's and officers work 12-16 hour days.
For my part, all sense of time dissolved in Iraq. I never knew what day of the week it was, and my sleep-wake schedule would follow bizarre patterns of 20 hours up, 6 asleep, 30 up, 12 down, 7 up, 3 down, etc. Occasionally cursed by insomnia at home, I worried about suffering sleepless nights due to discomfort, but it's surprising how soundly you can sleep on a hard, sheetless rack still wearing boots and a flight suit coated in dirt and sewage; when the body needs to shut down, it just shuts down.
Equality of Right
Perhaps cliche to note, but it's ironic that some of the most natural expression of racial and cultural equality is found in a traditionally insensitive and conservative military culture. In my experience, marines and soldiers don't care where you're from, they don't care what color you are and they (mostly) don't care if you've got annoying habits or speak with a funny accent.
If a team member pulls his weight, they'll accept and protect him as only (particularly well-armed) family can ... while good-naturedly eviscerating him for all of the above traits.
Dimly Looking Out for Armageddon (Responsible Journalism)
The sounds of small arms fire and explosions became tolerable by my second week. I awoke one morning at Military Transition Team (MiTT) 6 headquarters - a pretty safe spot "inside the wire" - to the loud beat of a helicoptor rotor and heavy machine gun and rifle fire. I listened in a daze, ears tuned in, one eye half-opened:
Read More »
"Is that a firing range ... or is it just possible that armageddon is going down?"
Whapwhapwhapwhap!
"It's gotta be a firing range." Eyes closed.
Snap, crackle, crackle, crackle! ... Whapwhapwhap!
"But on the off chance it is armageddon ... I should probably get up ...
WHAP. WHAP. WHAP.
"... and cover that ..."
"Nah."
WHAP!
"..."
WHAP. WHAP.
"..."
WHAP.
"Damn, I better get up and make sure."
Yeah, it was the firing range. What a noob.
A .50 cal cuts loose on the range.
A Nighttime Raid with the Iraqi Army: Blooper Reel
My tag-along on a nighttime raid with the Iraqis may sound like exciting, "high-speed s***," and it certainly was in my frame of reference, but Major Joel Poudrier joked that all he remembers is "walking around in s*** at night, lighting up dogs with [his] PEC II and NVGs."
At least he had NVGs. The only night vision gear in my possession was a manually-focused monacle duct-taped to the front of my camcorder, which rendered stumbling around the pitch-black streets and back-alleys of Fallujah a blindly comical, additionally perilous endeavor. I'd trip, land ankle deep in sewage and mud and once even face-planted into a wall at a jog. Thanks to blessed ballistic goggles and kevlar, I simply bounced off like a pinball, reoriented myself and kept on going.
All that was missing was a Benny Hill soundtrack.
Fallujah alley aftermath: if only you could smell it.
One Reason I Enjoy Hanging Out with Marines
Almost all of the marines I met share an extremely active, often juvenile sense of humor.
I'd love to go into detail, but this web site would wind up blocked by most internet obscenity filters.
'Nuff said.
Members of the Fallujah Police Transition Team (PiTT) share a laugh.
On Fear
There were times in Iraq when I felt fear, when thoughts descended into a sticky cycle of analysis of a particular setting and my own vulnerability. Being downtown in an unfriendly city housing snipers, mortars, small arms fire and potential Vehicle-Borne IEDs. Traveling in convoys subject to regular IEDs, occasional bombs big enough to totally obliterate an armored humvee, others laden with fuel accelerant intended to burn you alive. The fear constantly lurked in the background and waited for an opportunity to ride shotgun, and me being me, there were a couple of times when I let it. I'd get talkative, joke more than usual and ask annoying questions of the calm folks surrounding me. But then I'd club the feeling over the head and shove it down somewhere low and out of sight, using a tool box of motivational tricks and tactics.
Bundled up in flame-resistent Nomex while convoying.
Foremost among them is perspective: the death and casualty rate here is like nothing an insulated American like me is used to, but it's not Stalingrad, Carthage, Bastogne or al-Fajr. This is a low-level insurgency fought by ultraviolent yet unfocused guerillas cowed into indirect attacks by the training and technology of the Americans. Statistics were my friend: being a blogging war tourist who spends merely days at a time in exposed locations is a reasonable bet. During my embed, others got hit. The sister IED patrol was hit by roadside bombs. The Iraqi Police were shot at the perimeter of the station. The Army MiTT officer was killed up the street. The Weapons Company Marine was shot in the neck outside the Fallujah Government Center. The 12 year-old Iraqi boy and the local welder were hit by mortars. The violence swirled around but never touched me. It's frightening and terribly sad, but the insulation of warriors and walls and fearfully inaccurate shooting by insurgents dimmed the chaos to bloody background music, a grating but tolerable soundtrack of war.
Once perspective is established, fatalism helps. If your number comes up, it comes up. Almost - but not quite - as silly as the sentiment that "it will happen to me," is the idea that "it can never happen to me." A bunch of maniacs shooting RPG's, sniping, slinging mortars, triggering bombs and loosing machine guns are bound to hit something. And they do. But if you take reasonable precautions, keep your eyes open and do what you're told by people with experience, the overwhelming odds are, you'll be fine. And if you do get hit, at least you did everything prudent to avoid it.
A civil affairs officer holds a piece of the World Trade Center that we rubbed for luck prior to a convoy. The standard pre-convoy briefing by this CAG team seemed especially serious and tense compared to other briefings. When I noted this to a MiTT officer, he said, "Yeah, they've been hit a couple of times, taken some casualties."
My coping process ended by looking at the people around me. Thinking, "Some of these guys are out here, in exposed living conditions or constant missions, for months to over a year at a time."
And that's where their character is truly tested. By my fourth week as an embed, I confess that I was looking forward to a hotel in Kuwait. As the list of folks hit by IEDs during my stay got longer, I started getting itchy about convoys, and wanted to avoid trips unneccessary to my coverage.
The marines, corpsmen and soldiers don't have that option.
Leftover graffiti from prior residents marks the door of a gutted building that serves as an OP in the Fallujah Government Center.
Among the military personnel in Fallujah, there are degrees of risk, varying from the safety enjoyed by marines stationed 24 hours-a-day at Camp Fallujah to Weapons Company grunts patrolling the streets, looking for fights, finding them, and taking 16 casualties in little over a month. But every single individual who operates outside the wire - whether one lives there permanently like many MiTT and PiTT members, leaves for IED patrols, or simply moves around in convoys - takes on a degree of personal risk radically foreign to those of us who live such casual daily lives in the States. And to take on this risk for months at a time, day after day, merits respect.
Politics & Why Some Fight
By the second week, my patience for politics - already at an ebb - hit an all-time low. I'd see the comments at blogs linking to my post quickly devolve into finger-pointing policy arguments centered around political identity and like vs. dislike for the Bush Administration. Seemingly buried in a majority of discussion were attempts at unbiased analysis of what was best for the conduct of the war, best for the Iraqi people, best for US personnel fighting the war and best for all those of good intent struggling to do the right thing.
Even the generically welcome "let's support the troops" mantra rang hollow from many quarters, because, in reality, what were most folks actually doing for the conflict? Many offer support on a superficial level, but interest in even sacrificing a few minutes reading about Iraq is on the wane.
And when interest is mustered, it often centers around that political argument: a battle over your worldview vs. their worldview. My exposure to those bearing the true stress of the war - Iraqis and Americans fighting and dying - rendered many of these arguments distasteful, even if I logically understand the necessity of political scuffles in determining policy. But when I heard the lament, "America isn't fighting this war, the US military is fighting this war," twice during my embed, all I could do was nod.
Additionally and specifically, I lost patience for the "let's just kick more ass" meme that fails to acknowledge the intricately humane elements required to fight a successful counterinsurgency campaign. Many of the marines and soldiers I met display a significant level of tolerance and compassion for the Iraqis around them, and this should not be regarded as a weakness.
But if I had to choose, the political argument that grated most of all came from those haughtily advocating "calling it a debacle and getting out" from a 30,000-foot perch, either ostensibly in the name of what's best for the Iraqis, or without even a logical head-nod to the consequences of that decision, both realpolitikal and humanitarian.
Look ...
... there are tons of negative angles to Iraq. It's a terribly imperfect struggle being waged within the framework of an alien, ultraviolent culture often at odds with our own. It is quite easy and situationally rational to go to Iraq and come to the conclusion that we should throw up our hands and leave that country to its fate. Frustration abounds.
But I kept coming back to the idea that this ignores positive aspects, realistic and evolving foreign policy interest, our responsibility as enablers of the current situation and, to no small extent, our duty to fellow human beings.
Major Joel Poudrier of the Fallujah MiTT 6 took this fantastic picture on a convoy.
The fear that I mentioned earlier would morph into exhaustion on convoys. Bizarrely, the acute tension of waiting to take an explosion made me yawn once en route. But on one of my last convoys of the trip, we passed by a group of children playing in littered streets. When they spotted Americans, they began running with the humvees, smiling and waving excitedly for a short burst. And, schmaltzy as it sounds, I achieved a moment of clarity looking at one kid's face. The exhaustion evaporated and my opinion on the war swung ever so slightly in its ongoing pendulum between cynical exasperation and hopeful resolve.
The smiling faces of those kids, coupled with the countless assessments from Americans and Iraqis who told me Fallujah would dissolve into blood-soaked anarchy if the US precipitously withdraws, spurred rigorous examination of the conflict's worth and workability. And in the end I think it's both worth it and workable, if we define realistic endpoints and muster requisite political will. To be clear, these are big "ifs."
At the very least, we have an obligation to leave behind Iraqi security that can run their own city and sustain a fight against the worst extremists within their midst. It may be hard to find straight-up "good guys" in Fallujah, but there's certainly a number of truly evil actors in need of extermination. And if you find moral arguments "immature and illogical," as one INDC Journal commenter characterized them, consider the previous realpolitikal ramifications of little American involvement in Fallujah, something that might repeat itself in the event of withdrawal before nascent security forces can sustain themselves: In 2003, the city was overrun by Islamic radicals who murdered, purged and dominated initially welcoming locals who refused their brand of ideological purity. They wanted to start the new Islamic Caliphate from the city, establishing a staging area for regional terrorist attacks.
Thus, the fight in Fallujah and al-Anbar is a slightly less confusing paradigm than the Shia-Sunni divide and the politics of the central government in Baghdad; American interest is clearly served by crushing al Qaeda and the splintered terrorist groups and lawless gangs waging insurgency in the West.
Looking at kids clarified this aspect of the struggle. That - whether it's well-timed withdrawal with advisorship or continuing an active American role in the fight - the US has a responsibility to shun political expediency and honestly analyze and execute what is best for these people and what is best for our national interest, because in this case, to some degree, they intersect. The Saddam Hussein era was its own brand of terror, but we've altered Iraq and promised its citizens a shot at something better. Thus, to leave innocent Iraqis to the whim of the worst gangsters vying for power before they acquire the mojo to sustain a fight for stability ... well, let's just say that seems like a pretty tough call to me.
For myself and some of the marines and soldiers I met, the look on the face of an Iraqi kid can lend a moment of clarity to war's sacrifice.
***
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March 22, 2007
"The Fight for Iraq: A Regional Powerplay"
Posted by Bill
NBC's Richard Engel narrates a reasonably interesting (if basic) primer on the larger factions in Iraq, as well as the interests of Iraq's neighbors. A good link for well-intentioned beginners, the aggressively ignorant and those advocating precipitous withdrawal. It does skip over the influence of local gangsters and criminals in the mix, as well as genuine religious radicals.
For the graduate course, scroll Roggio every day.
March 19, 2007
Iraq Not (Quite) a Civil War? (UPDATED)
Posted by Bill
Allahpundit digs into the internals of a poll that reveals "49% of [Iraqis] questioned preferred life under Nouri al-Maliki the prime minister, to living under Saddam", and that "only 27% believed they were caught up in a civil war."
When I was in Baghdad and Fallujah, conversations with Iraqis, as well as exposure to (some) Shiites and Sunnis intermingling without incident (admittedly anecdotal), led me to suspect that while bloody sectarian conflict is now significant, it's not an accurate overall description of Iraqi society. Essentially, relevant minorities waging attacks over Islamic identity don't necessarily represent the sentiment of the broader population in Baghdad, as many haven't historically and still don't nurse grudges against the other sect of Islam. In addition, it was a fairly popular Iraqi belief that outsiders - Iran, Syria and others - were staging and funding attacks to foment a religious war in Iraqi society, both to expel the US and to "destroy Iraq."
As Allahpundit's analysis of the poll's particulars suggest, the Sunni-Shia identification is less common in cosmopolitan Baghdad and more prevalent in traditionally insular areas like the Shia-dominated south and, to a lesser extent, the Sunni-Arab-dominated west:
Pages 71-74 break down the sample by ethnicity and sect, so pay closest attention to them. The good news is that 61% of Iraqis still identify as "Muslim." Not "Sunni Muslim" or "Shia Muslim," just "Muslim." More surprisingly, among Arabs, Shiites were much more likely to identify by sect: 29% versus only 7% for Sunnis. Even in a mixed city like Baghdad, where you'd expect sectarian consciousness to be sky high, only 8% of the sample is identifying as "Sunni Muslim." I'm not sure how many Sunnis are still there these days, but my sense is even the remnants are quite a bit more than 8% of the population. So there's some reason for optimism: identification by sect is still a fringe thing - among Sunnis. Compare, however, the numbers on page 72 for "Sunni Muslims" in Anbar to "Shiite Muslims" in the south of the country. Both of those regions are homogeneous by sect, but there are huge differences: only 16% call themselves Sunni in the Sunni community but more than 50% in some southern provinces call themselves Shiite.
One thing that's probably influencing the numbers; there has been a mass migration of Sunnis from Baghdad to al-Anbar to escape the violence.
But as noted by Bryan Preston's write-up on the nature of "civil war," as well as my comments on Pundit Review and Mary Madigan's assessment of gangsterism in the larger war on terror, the popular perception of an Islamic civil war in Iraq is partially correct but incomplete, as there are major swaths of Iraqi society that aren't taking sides. In addition to outside players simply looking to sow chaos and destabilize Iraq to expedite an end to American involvement, much of the current violence is best described as splintered gangs vying to fill the power vacuum left after Saddam's deposal. Religion is often either besides the point, or used as a convenient demarcation.
This is an important point to remember when politicians advocating withdrawal characterize the Iraqis as "needing to work out their own problems." It's possible to arrive at this position intelligently, but if it's simply based on the idea that we have no business mediating a broad civil war over Islamic identity, then the view overgeneralizes and is based on incomplete information.
That said, as other portions of the poll suggest, it's possible that sectarian-based conflict is on the verge of becoming more prevalent, and Iraq could slip into a de facto "civil war" with wider participation. This possibility is widely believed to be a strategy of outside players looking to destabilize and/or eventually partition the country, of course. And the surge is specifically designed to stop it.
Also check out this video that documents the successful execution of the Patriquin Plan in the Ramadi area:
"A few months ago, if you joined the police here, you'd be signing your death warrant. All that's changed."
Video also via Hot Air, where Allahpundit is consistently providing some of the best link round-ups and analysis of Iraq.
UPDATE: More numbers from Allahpundit.
March 16, 2007
Interview with JD Johannes
Posted by Bill
Filmmaker, former Marine and past and upcoming embed JD Johannes is interviewed by Hot Air.
His comments about how long it really takes to get a feel for an area of Iraq are spot-on. As I mentioned when deciding to stay in Fallujah instead of moving on to Ramadi:
I've come to the conclusion that to have an idea of what's going on in either city, you need to spend at least two to three solid weeks, ideally four, in each. Compounding the complexity is that the two cities and regions surrounding them are vastly different. All this makes the concept of authoritatively writing about either from Baghdad or DC, as some are inclined to do, all the more unrealistic. It's perhaps possible with a wealth of contacts, but access to first-hand local perspectives is pretty helpful.
As Johannes mentions, 48-hour reporting drive-bys aren't quite useless, but they don't grant much time to get acquainted with an area, especially if the story stems from a "predetermined" narrative.
His web site featuring footage from his documentary is here.
March 14, 2007
What it's Like to be a Cop in Fallujah, UPDATE
Posted by Bill
Last Tuesday, I published an e-mail from Fallujah Police Transition Team officer Captain Tad Scott regarding an Iraqi Police officer who suffered a horrific insurgent attack on his family. To recap:
The insurgents attacked his home, shot his wife, his mother in law, his cousin, and also tried to set his 4 year-old boy on fire in front of him. Reportedly his 12 year-old niece was being carried away by insurgents when his cousin was shooting at the bad guys that were attempting to take her away. He told me his cousin also attempted to shoot her rather than have her suffer bad things they were going to do to her. Amazingly, she was unharmed. When it was all done, his cousin was shot five times - he was critical but survived and lost his leg. His wife was shot in the back but is okay now. His mother-in-law received a pretty serious GSW to her arm. She is okay too.The Army PTT upon request took [the Iraqi officer] and his family to the airport. He had everyone but me believing he was coming back. When he got to the airport, he gave his identifications minus his passport to the army and said, give this to Capt Scott. I'm happy for him and I actually hope he doesn't come back. He is a good man and if he chose his family over this madness, I'll have even more respect for him. How can you tell a man that has nearly witnessed his 4 year-old son be lit on fire to come back and and continue on with this? That's not advising, that's impossible.
This morning I received a surprising follow-up e-mail from Captain Scott:
I can hardly believe it [the Iraqi officer] came back. His family is well hidden far from here. He is a true patriot. The real stuff. He held probably the best operation I've seen yet last night. The yield was high.
"Yield" refers to captured suspected insurgents.
March 11, 2007
UPI's Pamela Hess on Iraq
Posted by Bill
"That was fairy profound for me ... and I don't think Americans understand the incredible savagery and the violence that American military officers are seeing every day over there, and I think that is really centrally the key to why they are so confident and so determined and so optimistic."
...
"This is what these people outside of the green zone are seeing and dealing with every day, it's real evil, and that's a hard word I think for people here to hear because it's been co-opted by the political process ... "
Hear the rest for context; the video excerpt is at the very last link in this post. Her descriptions of the power vacuum and new humanitarian rationale for fighting the war among some US personnel are very accurate.
March 09, 2007
"The Fallujan people are gonna have to stand up on their own and tell these people, 'get out, we're done.'"
An Interview with a Civil Affairs Marine
Posted by Bill
Marine Staff Sergeant Tyler Belshe has a hard job.
In addition to the natural difficulty of winning hearts and minds in a xenophobic city iconic among Arabs for resistance to occupation - the birthplace of insurgency in Iraq - he navigates bureaucratic hurdles regarding what types of reconstruction money are authorized to be spent on what, works with a constantly evolving mission, limited manpower, residents unaccustomed to doing for themselves, poorly functioning provincial and national Iraqi governments, language and cultural difficulties, and more challenges ... all while insurgents try to kill him.
My exposure to the Civil Affairs and reconstruction missions in Fallujah is limited compared to my knowledge of the Police and Military Transition Teams, so I'll mostly let Belsche's answers speak for themselves. But my general impression is that civil affairs is a vital component of the counterinsurgency strategy in Anbar that is currently underrepresented, especially by civilian agencies (State Department, NGOs, etc.) naturally suited to the mission. Belshe and other marines and soldiers were nearly unanimous on the assertion that the Fallujans need to stand up en masse to void the insurgency from their midst and build a successful city. That said, insurgent groups wield violence so casually and effectively that many locals are afraid to stick their necks out and pick sides.
In light of these challenges, Civil Affairs personnel in Fallujah embrace the Marine philosophy of "Improvise, Adapt and Overcome."
Belshe is a 28 year-old from Denver, Colorado. He serves with the 1-2-4 Civil Affairs Group as the team's project manager and contracting official and has been a Marine for seven years.
INDC: First, can you explain what "civil affairs" means?
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Belshe: "I think every team takes a different approach with it, but with civil affairs we're here to take a softer approach to helping solve the conflict in this area. Whether that's through key leader engagement, projects, all sorts of different things.
INDC: How's that mission manifesting itself in Fallujah generally and specifically with your unit?
Belshe: "In Fallujah itself, different areas are more receptive than others. Obviously, everybody likes projects. They like seeing things built and fixed. But what this area really needs is strengthening the key leaders in the community ... because a lot of them have left for various reasons - (they've) either been threatened or they've actually been killed. The leaders who are here are kinda young as far as being leaders for communities and they just need to be strengthened. And that's a good thing we're here for. We can help give them that strength, whether it's through helping their communities have water and electricity, but the community sees it as coming from their leader. That kind of gives them that strength that they need to actually stand up as leaders."
INDC: What else do you do?
Belshe: "Everything. We do everything from school engagements where we go and we talk to the students, find out what's going on in the neighborhood, to what they see as kids - what's life like in Fallujah? What's the most popular music group? At that point, we can find out from the schoolmasters what needs to go on in their school. Whether they need power, etc."
"We also sit down with the sheik's council. We try to engage the local leaders ... to find out what their neighborhoods need. The main thing in the city right now from what we hear is the basics - it's gonna be the propane, the fuels ... clean water, and electricity."
INDC: What is the local sheik's council. Who are they?
Belshe: "It's the wise men of the neighborhood come together. Some are more influential than others."
INDC: So, these aren't official government positions ...
Belshe: "I believe they're cultural positions. And they just provide us with information about what's going on the neighborhoods and we try to engage their concerns. And, again, their concerns are the same as the rest of the city."
INDC: Anything else you do?
Belshe: "There's a bunch of different meetings we go to. We try to approach it from a bunch of different angles. The meeting here today is the Fallujah Reconstruction Council. It's the engineers of the city. They get together. They're thinking long-term, big-scale type projects. Every Wednesday we meet with the contractors. They come into the Fallujah Development Center (a hub of interaction between Americans, Fallujan citizens, contractors and the Fallujan government). And we engage the contractors not only to issue contracts and to issue payment, but we ask them ... their ideas of what needs to be done. We tried starting a school board. The DJ of education isn't all that receptive to it, for whatever reason, I'm not sure."
INDC: Is Civil Affairs responsible for dispersing all funds and contracts that come through here from the coalition?
Belshe: "Not all. We're just a small portion of it. (The funding) comes through a program called CERP. It's a fund that's intended for the commanders of the area to help give quick positive influences on the community."
INDC: What's your budget?
Belshe: "You can be effective with any budget you receive. If you get more money, you can spend more money. Less money, you learn how to make due. The budget we have, we're being very effective with the budget that we've got."
INDC: What's your brightest spot with the projects?
Belshe: "There's been a few. The one that comes to mind (is) an old cemetery that was in the center of the Jolan district, very notorious for being a very harsh neighborhood. During a few of the pushes, it was the heart of insurgency, I'd say. But we came in there, and we noticed that the walls looked like they'd been run over by tanks. There had probably been some mortar attacks in the area. The walls were just riddled with gunfire."
"And, that was a project, we decided. At first it was just, 'let's build this wall around here, brighten up the neighborhood a little bit.' The impact of that project ... the second and third effects were incredible. The contract was issued. The contractor started getting on site, started taking down the wall, started to build a new one. The word got out that they were doing that and people were showing up to volunteer their time to help build it."
INDC: So, the site was culturally significant?
Belshe: "Yeah, it's the old cemetery, where great-great-great grandfathers and great-grandmothers are buried. Our interpreter, actually, his grandparents are buried there. I guess it's just known as that. So, they saw this beautiful wall going up. Three-meter wall. It's gorgeous. And, there's actually a mosque attached to the cemetery. And, just as a donation from the contractor, he re-tiled the entire mosque courtyard, fixed their bathrooms, things like that. And the neighborhood's very receptive - now every time we roll through there, the neighbors come out, are very friendly, smile, where before you used to get harsh looks, like "Why are you here?" And, everybody knows where the funding came from, where the project developed, even though the contractor tried to keep an Iraqi face to it, they kinda know where it came from and they're O.K. with that."
INDC: What else?
Belshe: "Some of the long-term projects that we hope to see completed are all the water and sewage projects that the Army Corps of Engineers are going through. Those are some really good projects."
"As far as ourselves, some of the stuff that we're doing ... another really good project that we have that's been so effective (is) the development of generators for the cement plant. Right now, the cement plant is pretty much stagnant. They're not receiving power. The kennels have to be on for so long and they only receive power for half that time. So, they're hurting their product more than they're developing it. They're not able to produce much cement.
"It's a big political issue as far as the power coming in, so we've developed a project to bring in a 6 megawatt generators and they've already got an (agreement) to get fuel from the Ministry of Oil to support the production of electricity out of those generators. And it will reemploy 600 people. We've also got a letter of agreement from the cement plant to hire on an additional 100 due to the production of cement that'll be coming out. That's how many more jobs will probably be opened up. Now, where these men are in the city, you'll be able to reemploy them, get money back into the market, and allow the city to again come back to life."
INDC: Can you outline the most significant challenges and failures?
Belshe: "If the terrorists or the insurgents or the militants - there's so many different opposing groups out there, whether they oppose us or oppose each other, they hinder progress quite a bit, because there's a lot of tension, I guess you could say. And, it's not all directed towards the coalition forces. A lot of people misconstrue and say 'everybody hates the coalition' ... but we're just one. There are a lot of different groups out there that are causing (other groups) problems."
"So, when you're trying to develop something in a neighborhood - when you're trying to get a good engagement in a community, they say one bad apple ruins the bunch. You get one bad event that happens in that neighborhood and work that you've been trying to do for the past two months might go down the drain."
"There are different projects that we think are going to be very effective, bringing the industrial area back to life. As you work on that, there's a lot of bad people that operate down in the industrial area, and they threaten and run off all your contractors so progress in certain key areas can't happen. And, what we find out is that the opposing forces - they know exactly what is key for the city to get back on its feet, and they don't want that to happen, so they oppose those different projects or efforts."
INDC: I interviewed a Fallujan [civil servant] and he said the insurgents control most of the contracts in the area - some guy comes here to do a contract, even an American contract. They show up, get supplies together, and insurgents show up and say, "Guess what? You're gonna give us half your money or we're going to kill you." Do you agree that that's happening?
Belshe: "I've seen that actually, with some of our contractors. If they don't pay, they get kidnapped. Right now we have five contractors that have been kidnapped. The weird thing is, usually a ransom comes out right away. With these, there isn't a ransom that's come out, so it's kind of a new tactic that's going through. They're more or less eliminating those that aren't paying (extortion money). Still, no bodies turned up."
INDC: What do you mean eliminating those who won't pay?
Belshe: "Those who refuse to give the money they're supposedly due. Fortunately, we saw this in our own country - in the United States as we were a young country and up-and-coming. You saw the same type of corruption we see. I think it just comes with a growing democratic society - I don't know if you want to put that much of a name on it. At some point, the Fallujan people are gonna have to stand up on their own and tell these people, 'get out. we're done.' You know, (that) they want their freedoms and they're tired of these people operating in their city."
"I tell the contractors that all the time. They're locals. They're the ones, they live out there with their families. Because they always tell us, 'security's bad. Why don't you do anything about it?' At some point we can't handle it because we don't know where they are. 'You guys live out there. You know exactly where they're at. You know who's approaching you for money. We don't know. You won't tell us. At some point, you as a community - you as a Fallujan people - are gonna have to stand up and squeeze them out of your own city. It seems impossible right now, but the day will come when you'll have to do that or nothing will get done in the city.'"
INDC: So, you don't think there's anything more the coalition forces can do?
Belshe: "I'm not at that level to make those big decisions, but as far as what we do on our team level, I know we spend countless hours trying to refine our tactics and trying to be the most effective with what we've got, so I'm sure forces-wide they try to do the best as well."
INDC: You just distribute those CERP funds. And who's doing the other reconstruction?
Belshe: "There's a bunch of different groups. There's DFI funds. It comes from the Iraqi government. I'm not sure. There's ... USAID. I just met with them last week. They're coming in with some money, which is good because we're not allowed to - (with) CERP funding ... you can't do anything on the private market. So, if you want to get that private fuel plant or fuel factory up and running, CERP funds can't do it because it's privately owned, but USAID, they can't do anything government, so when you work hand-in-hand, you pretty much accomplish all the projects you want to. And, so we're pretty excited because we have a lot of privately owned stuff that we've been wanting to get funding for ... (and) now USAID's gonna come in."
INDC: I've spent some time out in Fallujah and it's a pretty dangerous city. How do you do your job as far as going out into the city when there's the constant threat of snipers and IEDs?
Belshe: "Post-January 4 - that's when the whole transition came over, when the (Marines) kinda pulled back, turned the city over to the (Iraqi Army) - before that, we just had free reign. As a team, we were pretty aggressive in our tactics. We'd go anywhere. Not carelessly. I mean, we have great navigators and intel and we'd get through the city pretty well. If we wanted to go somewhere, we'd go there. We oversaw the projects. We escorted a lot of the Army Corps of Engineers out to the projects. We got to know the city really well the first four-and-a half-months. (Then) the transition happened, so now we're sittin' here. There's not a (Marine Quick Reaction Force within the city). There's not a lot of different response elements when you come into those neighborhoods."
"So, what we've done is we've now started to turn it over to the (Iraqi Police) and the (Iraqi Army), because they're still patrolling those neighborhoods. So, we meet with those MiTT teams, and the PiTT teams (to accomplish projects), and we have an Iraqi rep for each one of the battalions in the Joint Communications Center."
"We meet with them once a week and we say, 'O.K., go out into your neighborhood. There's these projects going on. Just be aware of them. Let us know if progress is going on in those different areas.' Then we also ask them to meet with the locals - just the exact same things we would do: meet with the local officials in the neighborhoods - the wise men, the sheiks or the imams, the guys that have lived there the longest - and find out what their neighborhoods need. Maybe not just need, but what can we do to help them."
INDC: You think the Iraqi Police and Iraqi Army are capable as far as that goes?
Belshe: "So far with the IAs it's been very successful. We had some success today. We're gonna be going up to the MiTT team up at FOB Castle. And, our last meeting, the Lt. was right on key. Without any coaching he came up with three projects that were right in line with what we would consider to be valuable projects - things that could be very helpful in the community, both from a military stance as well as a development stance. We'll see today. I asked him to go back and find a contractor and develop a scope of work for these projects. So, it's in the beginning phases, but we're seeing progress with that."
"With the PiTT (Police Transition) teams, it's a little slower. They just went through a recruiting drive, so personnel might get freed up, they might get a better idea for it. (The police chief) is really into it. He likes the idea, obviously. And so, we have a couple projects that they're gonna oversee. But again, it's in the development phases."
INDC: So, give me the general idea of how you think Fallujans view the coalition, Americans, insurgents.
Belshe: "If you go into a school and you ask them the same question, they would say that they think the Americans should leave - they should get out of the city. It's been a direct response that we've gotten from them. It doesn't matter where in the city you ask them, boy or girl, they say we should leave. They loved us when we first got here, but they didn't expect us to stay this long, so now it's like, 'why are you here?' So, that's how they respond."
"You talk to the adults, you get the same response. But, at that point, they're adults and they don't want to offend you, so they're more friendly - 'Oh, we love you. We want you to stay here.' But the undertone is, I think, since they see us, since we're in the city, that's why the attacks are there. That's why they're targeting us. So, there wouldn't be any IEDs if there weren't any Americans in the city. The insurgents wouldn't be here if we weren't in the city."
"But at the same time ... they say it'll get worse if we leave."
INDC: That's what I've heard over and over and over, is that they want you to leave, but they don't want you to leave yet.
Belshe: Because it's gonna get worse, yeah. And, we ask 'em, 'do you like the IAs (Iraqi Army)?' (They say) 'No.'"
"Do you like the IPs (Iraqi Police)?' 'Yes.'"
"I think that's kinda like the answer that just comes out because the IAs, they're ... the people from outside the city. The IPs are the brothers, the uncles, people who live around the area."
INDC: Why is the insurgency still able to operate if the locals don't like them?
Belshe: "I think it's just a movement that's going on through the city. I don't know if they're just not standing up to them. I mean, you ask them ... from the contract standpoint. A contractor comes in, 'I was threatened yesterday.'
'Who threatened you?'
'I can't tell you.'
That's ... the best answer (to) ... why (the insurgents are) still there."
INDC: Is that frustrating?
Belshe: "A little bit, yeah. Not to the point that I wanna go out and kill bad guys, but it's frustrating. I'm more frustrated for them, because they'll never see progress if they don't stand up."
INDC: Is that your ultimate solution for the insurgency, for the people of Fallujah? That Fallujans need to stand up?
Belshe: "Personally, from Tyler Belshe? Yes, without them standing up and pushing them back, then they'll never see progress. If they don't, it's gonna take a lot longer."
INDC: There are those who say that the Civil Affairs mission is being too easy on these people ... that we need to go out and kick some more ass, get more aggressive with military actions. Do you think that CA mission actually has an impact on shaping the nature of the war?
Belshe: "I think if somebody comes into this area with a civil affairs group to build schools and they measure their progress by how much money they spent, they've done worse for the community than if they never would have spent a dollar. I think if a civil affairs group or whatever group comes in here - whether it be USAID, Army Corps of Engineers - if you come in here and every project has a purpose, it's a something-for-something project: if you're builing a school and (you say) 'we're not just gonna build you a school. The school's going to come because we want you to employ teachers.'"
"If it's a something-for-something, then it's a very effective program. But if you're just coming in here and spending money, then it's not effective at all."
INDC: Is that what you're doing?
Belshe: "It's a something-for-something. That's the approach that we've taken. We just don't do a project to do a project. We're not just gonna pave a street because it needs to be paved. We're not just gonna go put up power because they need power. Those are valued causes to do it, but in order to see progress in the community, there has to be some sort of check and balance."
"If the community just sees people coming in a dumping money in the community, then it weakens them in a way because they're not standing up on their own and doing something. But if you require something of them, they say, 'O.K., O.K., I gotta do something here.' And then they see progress and then ... they start to doing it on their own. And, so just by dumping money into the community it weakens them, but if you require something of them, just like in our own lives, if we're challenged. That's the only way we find growth is through challenging them."
INDC: So, overall how do you assess the state of your mission. Have you made progress? Where you at? What's your opinion of Fallujah?
Belshe: "My opinion of Fallujah?" (laughs)
"As far as progress - I can only speak for my little team out here - I think we've seen some good progress. We set pretty lofty goals when we got here, not fully understanding what's going on in the city and not being able to foresee some of the events that have unfolded."
"But I think we've been pretty effective, as far as what we have. Have we had failures? Yeah, we've had failures along the way. But it's those little projects. When you go in and you talk to students and just giving them that 15-20 minutes to stand up and speak their minds. And a lot of times you'll ask them. You'll sit there and say, 'go ahead, tell us anything. We don't care. This is what it's about to have freedom of speech. You can stand up and say anything.'"
"And, the teachers will try to control them and say, 'no, don't say that, don't say that,' but our interpreter's pretty good about telling them, 'Hey, back down. This is what we want. We want them to engage with us. We don't care if they spit in our face, they yell at us. We want them to start exercising that.' And just to have one girl stand up and really express herself, or one small boy or one adult finally express himself ... I think that's worth the seven months I've been here."
"We don't measure our success by the money we've spent. Our measure of success is whether or not peoples' lives are affected in a positive way."
INDC: But if you could nail it down, if we had to quantify ... are you making small difference around the edges or are you helping engineer a sea change in the way they view the coalition?
Belshe: "Are we just nibbling at the problem? We do a little bit of both. We're trying to attack the propane problem head-on. But at a local government level, it's a provincial problem, so until the provincial government is willing to work, there's nothing we can do. Locally, we nail it down. We attack the problems at our level head-on. Is there complete cooperation with all levels of Iraqi government? No, there's not."
"As far as at our level, we've got a good handle on the city. We know what needs to be done and we report that constantly. The changes that are going on. Again, the changes come with the people. If they don't want to accept the change, if they don't want to move forward, it's not gonna happen."
INDC: How do you evaluate the prospects for Fallujah? Of becoming a successful city with a much lower-level insurgency?
Belshe: "It has great potential. There's great people here. It has all the ingredients. They just need to come together. It has all the ingredients to become a success, but they just need to stand up. That's what I say in my mind: they just need to stand up. Just reading history in our own country - and I know it's not the U.S. - but at one point, there were a bunch of people in the ... United States that said 'we're standing up. This is what we want,' and they put it in a document and they lived behind it. I mean, we're constantly rewriting our Constitution. Every amendment's a new rewriting of it. So, these people need to decide as a people 'This is what we want' and stand up and just go forward and commit to that."
***
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UPDATE: AIAO line added to piece.
« Close It
March 07, 2007
Note: Material Delayed (Plus Gangsterism in the GWoT)
Posted by Bill
I'm receiving new information that will influence this week's promised posts.
In the meantime, in her resignation from Dean's World, Mary Madigan makes a good point about the Global War on Terror:
I think we're fighting a bunch of gangsters. Why do they ('they' defined as the military and financial infrastructure of the billion dollar underground terrorist network - not Islam) hate us? Because they're greedy pigs who resent anyone who has more money, power and influence than they do, and they're willing to manipulate and kill people to get it. The fact that they're using morality and religion as their cover makes them even more vile than most who have gone before them, but that shouldn't change our focus. We can't fight gangsters with philosophy, religious outreach programs and political correctness.
We also can't fight them by classifying everyone who is in their religious group, or everyone who has kissed the Don's hand, as the focus of the problem. Both the Islamophobes and the Islamophobe-watchers do that. This leads to poorly conceived, poorly planned strategy. If we refrained from shutting down the Mafia because we were afraid that doing so would offend all Italians, Gotti would be president and Gambini would be head of state. If we fought the Mafia by arresting everyone in Little Italy, pulling over every olive oil truck and raiding Arthur Avenue, the result might have been the same.
March 06, 2007
What it's Like to be a Cop in Fallujah
Posted by Bill
Captain Tad Scott of the Fallujah Police Transition Team e-mailed regarding an attack on an Iraqi police officer I'd met during my embed:
The insurgents attacked his home, shot his wife, his mother in law, his cousin, and also tried to set his 4 year-old boy on fire in front of him. Reportedly his 12 year-old niece was being carried away by insurgents when his cousin was shooting at the bad guys that were attempting to take her away. He told me his cousin also attempted to shoot her rather than have her suffer bad things they were going to do to her. Amazingly, she was unharmed. When it was all done, his cousin was shot five times - he was critical but survived and lost his leg. His wife was shot in the back but is okay now. His mother-in-law received a pretty serious GSW to her arm. She is okay too.The Army PTT upon request took [the officer] and his family to the airport. He had everyone but me believing he was coming back. When he got to the airport, he gave his identifications minus his passport to the army and said, give this to Capt Scott. I'm happy for him and I actually hope he doesn't come back. He is a good man and if he chose his family over this madness, I'll have even more respect for him. How can you tell a man that has nearly witnessed his 4 year-old son be lit on fire to come back and and continue on with this? That's not advising, that's impossible.
Just a grim slice of life for IPs in Fallujah. Events like this are a major reason that I have limited patience for those who glorify the insurgents as "justified resistance to occupation."
March 01, 2007
Programming Note
Posted by Bill
I'm simultaneously working on three posts that should round out my embed coverage. I expect that they'll be up by Monday. Thanks for your patience.
