Training, time and personalities. Iraqis, like all human beings, learn by being exposed to new things and doing, and the most important new things that they are exposed to are their American advisors. This is why, despite the focus on the troop surge, I've come to believe that the best way to win the military aspect* of Iraq is the "go long" strategy centered around American advisorship, with the caveat that Americans take back greater authority over or at least influence with some of the broken bureaucratic paradigms that have been prematurely handed over to often dysfunctional Iraqi management. American advisors should have input on hiring and firing Iraqi leadership and ensuring that pay and supplies are accounted for, at least until the insular "attitude [is] ... trained out of them" and functioning systems are in place to limit inefficiency and corruption.

The cultural challenges are steep, but that's where "personalities" - naturally overlooked in strategic talk of troop levels and policy - can have such a revolutionary impact. Examples:

1. Xenophobic Fallujan cops who harbor distrust for their American advisors start to come around after extended exposure to embedded PiTT Marines. These interactions - from Navy corpsmen who treat wounded police and their families, to IP leadership working with PiTT leadership, to junior marines giving IPs affectionate nicknames - can cause a change in relationships that influences a passive institutional culture ... slowly and frustratingly at times, but incrementally.

2. A U.S. Army Captain can wield enough diplomatic skill to win an honorary tribal title and a police station posthumously named in his honor. Concurrently, a local sheik can step up to lead his people against the insurgents.

3. Facilitated by American advisorship and certain Iraqi leaders, local Fallujan police and the Iraqi Army have begun to get over their historical mistrust and work well together, with the relationship solidified by a series of successful joint raids on a common enemy. This cooperation and the raids themselves were a direct result of encouragement from MiTT and PiTT members and US Special Forces involved in both training and establishing the methods of communication.

Many, many more examples are taking place in Iraq right now.

Overcoming cultural, historical and institutional obstacles while training Iraqi security forces is daunting - I think that my coverage has probably underplayed both the challenge and the extreme level of frustration among Americans trying to accomplish a mission while dealing with an alien and often less "effective" culture. But I think it's probably doable.

And the flaws in this effort - ceding American authority to influence broken equations being the most significant error - are undoubtedly a direct result of the strategy's acceleration in light of domestic political pressure.

Contingent upon political frame of reference, the situation in Iraq is often so much more positive, negative and complex than either side of the aisle tends to characterize it.

More on this later.

* Please note that "the military aspect of Iraq" exclusively deals with establishing effective and sustainable security forces and is a distinct issue from the political issues facing Iraq's central government.

Mohaned F: "Two years, one month. I'm from far away, Nasiriyah."

Jabbar: "Two years, four months."

Mohaned N: "Three years."

INDC: What motivated you to become a soldier?

Mohaned F: "I want to prevent terrorist activity here. I want to build my country."

Jabbar: "I want to help my country."

Mohaned N: "I also want to help my country, and I need the money. I have to support my family."

INDC: Who do you think the terrorists are, the insurgents who are fighting you?

Mohaned F: "The terrorists want to damage my country and I want to bring my country back to the years long ago, before Saddam Hussein."

INDC: But why are they fighting? Who are they?

Mohaned F: "The terrorist wants control of the government, he wants the power."

INDC: And how can the insurgency be stopped, in Fallujah, specifically?

Mohaned F: "I am a soldier, I have many duties. We guard the base here, go on patrols and raid houses; we catch the terrorists and prevent them from putting down IEDs. This is my job here, to prevent terrorist activity."

INDC: So you think the Iraqi Army can do it?

Mohaned F: "Yes. But we need time."

INDC: How much time?

Mohaned F: "Maybe by next year. But we need more staff. New weapons and more staff."

INDC: What do you guys think about the Iraqi police in Fallujah?

Jabbar: "In the past, we didn't work together with the police. But now, something is different - we work with the police. The terrorists are attacking both of us, the police and the Iraqi Army. So we are the same. And now the police works with the Army and they sometimes give us good information. So, we work together well now."

INDC: How long has that trust and cooperation been going on?

Jabbar: "(Since) a month ago. We have the same target and we both want to build the future of my country."

INDC: I've also heard that some local Fallujans distrust the Iraqi Army because you guys are from different parts of Iraq and many of you are Shia. Does that hamper your ability to operate in the city?

Mohaned F: "If we don't trust another we'll lose battles ..."

INDC: If you don't mind me asking, are you guys Shia, Sunni, what?

[All are Shia]

Mohaned F: "But some of our guys are Sunni, but they are on leave right now."

INDC: "Does that cause any tension with the local Sunni population in Fallujah? I've heard about the tension between the two ...

Mohaned N: "Everybody here is Iraqi. We don't like the state of affairs here (with terrorism and insecurity), so there is no difference between the Shia and Sunni."

INDC: So once again, who do you think the terrorist insurgents are? Are they locals, are they from other countries?

Jabbar: "He has just one target, he wants to attack everyone. So he does not care whether you are Sunni or Shia."

INDC: Yes, but that's their target; who are the insurgents?

Mohaned F: "We don't know who. The terrorist is very strong: he has mortars but we don't have the mortars to shoot him back. Another thing, when we leave to go home we don't have the military convoy. He has the power."

INDC: Speaking of challenges, I've heard that the Iraqi Army has had some issues with pay, with Jundi not getting paid. Some have quit. Have you personally had problems getting paid?

Mohaned F: "We don't know anything about that. You need to ask the Ministry of Defense in Baghdad."

INDC: But have you personally received paychecks? Are you getting paid right now?

Mohaned N: "We've met with the Division commander when he visited here two months ago, and he promised that he would fix it. And we wait."

INDC: Does it hurt your motivation to go so long without pay?

Mohaned N: "The Commander of the Division said he would fix it for everyone who did not get their pay. And we'll wait. He's fixed the pay of people who have gone the most time without pay, others he has not."

INDC: Do you think you have enough troops to patrol the city and provide security? Are you full strength?

Mohaned F: "We don't have enough soldiers to send regular patrols out here. So it's a very dangerous area and we need more soldiers, more patrols. We don't have enough manpower to conduct patrols every day. We have few."

INDC: What do you think of the American presence here? How do you feel about the Americans, and has this feeling changed over time?

Mohaned F: "We work well with them. The MiTT team teaches my soldiers something new every day. We have classes with them."

Mohaned N: "I wish to keep the US here because it is good for us. We can learn new things every day, and if we work together a long time, it will be good for the Iraqi Army."

Jabbar: "I want the US to stay a long time. We need weapons, we need training we want to work with the Americans for a very long time."

INDC: How do you view Iraq's future? What do you think is going to happen here?

Jabbar: "We have a good future."

Mohaned N: "It will be good."

INDC: OK, let me ask one more time: do you have any idea who the insurgents are? Who are the people you are fighting?

Mohaned N: "In the past, some people work for Saddam Hussein, like his intelligence service or the Fedayeen Saddam. These people hate the new army because they can't join the new army. But we are different than them - we hate the terrorists, we hate these people. And we want to build our country."

INDC: How did you feel about the execution of Saddam Hussein?

Mohaned N: "He's been in custody for years so this was a long time coming. He hurt a lot of people."

INDC: What would you tell the American people if you could tell them anything?

Mohaned N: "Tell the American people we need the US Army here. We want to work with them for a longer time. And in the future we can say that we have built the Iraqi Army together."

The others nodded approval.

***


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I joined the fight because it occurred to me that many modern day "humanists" who claim to possess a genuine concern for human beings throughout the world are in fact quite content to allow their fellow "global citizens" to suffer under the most hideous state apparatuses and conditions. Their excuses used to be my excuses. When asked why we shouldn't confront the Ba'ath party, the Taliban or the various other tyrannies throughout this world, my answers would allude to vague notions of cultural tolerance (forcing women to wear a veil and stay indoors is such a quaint cultural tradition), the sanctity of national sovereignty (how eager we internationalists are to throw up borders to defend dictatorships!) or even a creeping suspicion of America's intentions. When all else failed, I would retreat to my fragile moral ecosystem that years of living in peace and liberty had provided me. I would write off war because civilian casualties were guaranteed, or temporary alliances with illiberal forces would be made, or tank fuel was toxic for the environment. My fellow "humanists" and I would relish contently in our self righteous declaration of opposition against all military campaigns against dictatorships, congratulating one another for refusing to taint that aforementioned fragile moral ecosystem that many still cradle with all the revolutionary tenacity of the members of Rage Against the Machine and Greenday. Others would point to America's historical support of Saddam Hussein, sighting it as hypocritical that we would now vilify him as a thug and a tyrant. Upon explaining that we did so to ward off the fiercely Islamist Iran, which was correctly identified as the greater threat at the time, eyes are rolled and hypocrisy is declared. Forgetting that America sided with Stalin to defeat Hitler, who was promptly confronted once the Nazis were destroyed, America's initial engagement with Saddam and other regional actors is identified as the ultimate argument against America's moral crusade.

And maybe it is. Maybe the reality of politics makes all political action inherently crude and immoral. Or maybe it is these adventures in philosophical masturbation that prevent people from ever taking any kind of effective action against men like Saddam Hussein. One thing is for certain, as disagreeable or as confusing as my decision to enter the fray may be, consider what peace vigils against genocide have accomplished lately. Consider that there are 19 year old soldiers from the Midwest who have never touched a college campus or a protest who have done more to uphold the universal legitimacy of representative government and individual rights by placing themselves between Iraqi voting lines and homicidal religious fanatics. Often times it is less about how clean your actions are and more about how pure your intentions are.

Read the whole thing.

International Police Liaison Officer (IPLO) Tom Gorman was a very tough, competent dude who patiently entertained gripes, jokes and questions from a not-so-tough blogger.

Anybody home?: PiTT marines visit Weapons Company marines manning an outer OP. It's a good idea to knock.

The other IPLO was Jody Martinez of Leadville, CO. Jody's a funny dude who's plenty tough and just a little bit crazy. The good brand of crazy, though. I think.

Rear Security: Lance Corporal Thomas Hauk looks back from patrol formation as PiTT members return to the police station with new recruits.

The view from an Iraqi Police outpost on the perimeter of the station. These posts are regularly targeted by sniper fire and drive-by shootings.

Remains of the Day: aftermath of a shot IP saved by Navy Corpsmen and marines.

A wounded IP is treated by marines, corpsmen and other IP's.

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Americans call this the "Twin Towers Mosque," here viewed through a gap in sniper camo on the roof of the Police station.

"Yankees, Go Home ... but Not Yet:" A Fallujah police recruit waits to be processed. To a man, the Iraqis I spoke to didn't want the Americans to leave yet, as they believe quick US withdrawal will preface a bloodbath.

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Pay Attention: Iraqi Army recruits learn how to handle their weapons during a morning firearms class at Habbaniyah.

Itching: Despite begging, the marines refused to let me squeeze off a few rounds in front of a CAG base. (No, not really.)

Jundi (Iraqi Army soldiers) pal around after a successful night raid. These guys aggressively but good-naturedly swarmed me, grabbing the camera and insisting I take pictures.

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Mutton for Punishment: Ok, that picture title was just b-a-a-a-a-d. A shepard tends his flock on the side of MSR Mobile, as seen from the hatch of an Amtrak.

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Businesses in Fallujah seem to sell only three things: food, cell phones and auto parts, the latter evidenced here on Route 10.

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Fallujan engineers voice concerns to contractors and American Civil Affairs officers at the Fallujah Development Center, a central point of interaction between citizens, Americans and the local government.

CAG Captain Michael Bennett owes me a "good scotch" for dragging me on one last convoy through Indian Country.

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Ghosts: On our raid with the Iraqi Army, Lt. Col. Fisher wondered how tanks could provide stealthy cordon security on a night operation. Another marine told Fisher that he'd be surprised, and he was right: as we were driving to a new target, the tanks would seemingly materialize out of nowhere. Shown above are dormant tanks parked at Camp Fallujah.

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Iraqi drill officers observe new recruits at the Army training facility in Habbaniyah.

Labyrinth: Forward Operating Base Castle looked like an MC Escher painting.

A ride awaits.

***


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Semon: "When we started, it was very slow. We did take the lead, which we never should have done. So what we do now, is when we go on a mission, we're always in the back; the Iraqi Army battalion takes the front. Operational-wise they're very good that way. And the planning, we don't plan too much with them, they plan it and they brief us. And we help by making suggestions - 'do you wanna do this or do that?' We give them some options to help improve their operations."

INDC: I've heard from Police Transition Team Members that the advisory role has put them in a frustrating position, because sometimes they can't get their cops to plan, they can't motivate them like their own leadership could and should if it was stronger. Have you had that same problem with the Iraqi Army?

Semon: "Yes and no. It kind of depends. There's a number of officers that are go-getters, 'go get em', and there are a couple that are just collecting a paycheck. But overall, once we start talking and working with them, then they're able to do the planning."

INDC: What's the quality of the Iraqi soldier, do you think?

Semon: "I think they're very good. They're like any other soldiers - you give them good leaders, and they will do exactly what they're told to do. But it's when some of the leaders are not that well or motivated - let me phrase it this way: they are a reflection of their leaders."

INDC: So give me the good points about them and the bad points about them, if forced to categorize that way.

Semon: "The good point is they want to be trained like US soldiers and they're very motivated by that. But the bad part is when they see their leaders aren't doing anything, then they're not going to do anything."

INDC: I went to Habbaniyah and saw the Iraqi basic training; it's only 5 weeks and a lot of them are illiterate, a lot of them are sloppy and the American as well as Iraqi drill sergeants had a lot of frustration because 5 weeks isn't enough. Is Habbaniyah putting out a lower quality soldier?

Semon:"I can't comment on their basic training because I haven't seen it."

INDC: But when you get them ...

Semon: "But when we get them they seem to be integrated pretty well. Within a matter of a couple of weeks they're fully trained anyway because they're almost, they're thrown into that position. And they become very competent."

INDC: And do they have good esprit de corps?

Semon: "Oh, absolutely."

INDC: I went on a raid the other night with some Iraqi Army units and another MiTT, and they were very aggressive, they were "go-getters" like you said, but they had a tendency to charge down the street after a new target without coordinating with the Americans or their heavy weapons elements. Have you had these problems with your soldiers?

Semon: "Yes, we have, but let me justify that: they're interested in going and getting the targets. They want to do it fast and expedient, and sometimes they don't think about everything that needs to go with them. So that's just more of training issue that we deal with more than anything else."

INDC: You think that's something you can overcome?

Semon: "Absolutely. Absolutely. In fact, we've seen progress over the last 6 months we've been here. We've seen a lot of progress."

INDC: Overall, how do you think the mission is progressing? What do you think you need to get these guys up to speed?

Semon: "Our biggest challenge with the army is logistics, but operationally, they're pretty proficient. So that's what we're trying to concentrate on, how to forecast, how to request supplies that they're going to need on a daily basis. Like every Monday they need to order so much food for the next week, or every fifth Wednesday they need to order so much fuel, so many days out. That's the type of thinking that we need them to go ahead and do."

INDC: What about the pay issue, with officers and MOD bureaucrats pocketing pay and Jundi not getting paid?

Semon: "Yeah that goes on. I can't lie about that, that's just going to be a tough nut to crack. I don't have any solution for that, but we just keep monitoring it and report up everything we see."

INDC: To what extent is the pay issue de-motivating Iraqi soldiers? I've heard that some of them quit, some quit and came back and some of them don't leave because they've got square meals and a cot and nowhere else to go - what's going on?

Semon: "Actually it's a mix of all three. There's some that are motivated because they want to see things get better, so they'll stay even though they're not paid. We have a lieutenant who hasn't been paid in 9 months; he's still there because he believes in what he's doing."

"We had some of the Jundi quit because they have to feed their families, but they want to come back and the whole idea was, once they got on the rolls and started getting paid, they'd come back. They want to be here, they see good things coming out of this. Although it may be a little slow, but they do see."

INDC: Do you think al-Anbar and Fallujah in particular are winnable?

Semon: "Yes, but I think it will probably be a little longer than the rest of the country, just because of the history of al-Anbar and particularly Fallujah itself. It was a rough spot from the beginning of the war, so you've got that going for it, everything from the Blackwater Bridge incident. And with that type of mentality it's going to take some time to win the people over."

INDC: So how would you characterize the attitude of the people in Fallujah towards Americans?

Semon: "It's a completely mixed bag. We've gone on operations where people invite you for breakfast, invite you for Chai, to 'we don't want you here,' so we run the whole gamut. On missions we go to some stores where they are happy to serve us and others where they say, 'No we cannot serve Americans or we'll be shot.'"

INDC: A Fallujan [civil servant] explained to me how the insurgents operate like the mafia out here ...

Semon: "I'm not surprised by that."

INDC: So part of that is a military problem and part of it is a political problem. Do you think that what you guys are doing can ever address that? How do you think this political problem can be solved?

Semon: "More Iraqi Army and police. It's going to be a joint effort between the police and the Iraqi Army, and I've seen more police out on the street. But again, it's a cultural thing, and it's going to take some time."

INDC: How would you assess the state of your mission? And in a perfect world, if you could have everything that you wanted, additional resources, whatever, what would it be?

Semon: "I think it would be more logistic and personnel advisors and influencers, because that's the biggest stumbling block, is how to get supplies down from the MOD (Ministry of Defense) to the battalion. That's the biggest thing: how to account for personnel. They don't see those as priorities and we need to stress that - if you don't have personnel, you can't do a mission. If you don't have fuel or chow, you cant do a mission. And how to properly forecast that instead of all of a sudden, 'we're out of food!' So that would be ideal."

"We've been here for 6 months. And we have seen a lot of success in all the areas. It's slow, but it's a mindset. We're not going to correct this - or I should say 'improve this' - right away; it's going to take some time, and there are all kinds of issues, from incompetence to general mismanagement to stealing. We need to overcome those for it to be successful. And again, I have seen a lot of successes and I think we'll continue to improve."

***

UPDATE: Link added and syntax changed in sentence about the defensive posture of the Iraqi police.

***


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The Mission

Major Lippo states that his primary mission is to bring his "Marines home safe and sound." Beyond that, the Police Transition Team (PiTT) mission is "to mentor, train and advise the Iraqi police (IP) service in Fallujah."

In early 2007, this advisory role manifests itself in many ways: marines man the Joint Communications Center (a sort of a 9-11 dispatch for the city), oversee training programs for the Iraqi police, set up and assist with logistics, advise on operations, serve as diplomats between the police and the Iraqi Army, organize prisoner transfers, run recruiting drives and influence many other day-to-day activities. The Americans advise the Iraqi police on almost every aspect of their job, though their influence is finite - I was surprised by the extent to which Americans lacked ability to command events, from ensuring Iraqi procurement of local fuel supplies to compelling patrols by police officers. The PiTT members are truly in an advisory role; they assist but take a backseat to Iraqi operational command.

PiTT members set up processing stations prior to a recent recruiting drive.

"A lot of what we are doing now is just advising, helping them get the training that they need, among other things," said International Police Liaison Officer (IPLO) Tom Gorman, a civilian police officer and advisor from Stark, FL. "I think being embedded in the police station like we are here, you're able to build relationships, able to make a difference and show them what we do back home. These marines that come out here and live with these guys day in and day out, that makes a big difference."

"You come to know these people (the Iraqis) ... and you start building relationships with 'em, nicknames for them. So it becomes a lot easier after a while," said Lance Corporal Michael Rickard.

Captain Tad Scott coordinates the defense of another police station with an Iraqi officer. The other station was attacked by insurgents who placed large IEDs around the perimeter in an attempt to blow up the building. IPs mounted a successful defense, killing 3 insurgents. Map and face blurred for security reasons.

Added PiTT Executive Officer Captain Tad Scott, "As far as technical capabilities, before they just had a radio, that's all they had, and that was up until just last month. So I teach them a lot of things on how to find locations, how to communicate to the Iraqi Army on grids and how to communicate with us."

Marine and Army Police Transition Team members move out from the FIPS. View larger image

The Team

The PiTT is made up of six Marine advisors who are reservists with civilian law enforcement experience, two International Police Liaison Officer (IPLOs) advisors - civilian law enforcement officers contracted by the State Department - and a detachment of young Marines who assist with operations and provide security for the team.

LCPL Michael Baker, CAPT Tad Scott, MAJ Lippo, LCPL Thomas Hauck and LCPL Michael Rickard.

"The concept is, you take a bunch of reservists, and there is a subculture in law enforcement where you have a bunch of cops who used to be marines ... so the Marine Corps figured they'd get more bang for the buck and take reservists who are cops, bring them back into the fold and send them to Iraq to teach the police how to be policemen," said Lippo. "The junior marines who exist to run the convoys, they're our security element. But there is so much going on here, such a need for advisors, that we've had to plug them in to the mission as well."

GSGT Jason Lawson, CAPT Tad Scott and MAJ Brian Lippo sit in the JCC.

The Joint Communications Center (JCC)

Manned 24 hours a day, the JCC is a sort of 9-1-1 dispatch and communications hub for security forces and civil services in the city of Fallujah.

"Basically (we take in) any info that comes in from the fire department, the traffic police, even ... the facility protection service, anything that comes from any Coalition unit, the Iraqi Army, the Iraqi police. There are also a lot of sources that will call in - it gives us a pulse on the city. If shops start closing down, I'll know about it. If there's a rumor of an IED, I'll know about it. If there's a problem within the city, I'll know about it. It's the one organization that ties all the other organizations together," explained Capt. Scott.

Marines manning the JCC apply that information, oftentimes acting as diplomats between mistrustful Iraqi security elements.

"It's the 9-1-1 center; it's also the social work center. I kind of smooth things over between the Iraqi Army and the police," said Scott. "The police come to me and I tell them, did you tell the Iraqi Army? Most of the time, the answer is 'no.' Sometimes they surprise me; sometimes they pass information about IEDs to the Iraqi Army. And then I'll find out later. Which is what I want more and more to happen - cross communication between the Iraqi Army and the police. But there is a lack of trust between the IA leadership and this (the police) leadership. Many times, I find myself in the middle."

Iraqi Police (IPs) muster for morning duty.

The Fallujan PD, Past and Present

The police in Iraq and Fallujah particularly have a spotty history. Under Saddam Hussein's regime, average cops were considered lowly civil servants compared to more prestigious positions in the Iraqi Army, intelligence services or secret police. This cultural memory has had a hand in driving better quality recruits into other Iraqi security forces. But in Fallujah, locals are particularly xenophobic and there is a resistance to joining the Army because of the likelihood that a soldier will be stationed far from home. Thus, the local police department offers the only employment option in the security forces that guarantees local work and residence.

Pictures of martyrs hang on the wall of the station. Due to a lack of photos, this collage doesn't come close to documenting the actual number of slain cops.

After the Marine invasion of the city in 2004, Fallujan civil services disintegrated; there was no police department. Several attempts to reconstitute the police force failed, as poor quality recruits and a successfully murderous campaign of intimidation by insurgents prevented cops from gaining traction and maintaining numbers.

"We lost over half our police force last year. The height of it was late July through early September, and it really affected the police force in Fallujah. We had 140-something die or quit, and for about a month 2-3 per night were getting wounded or killed. They received threats at home and at the mosque. And even now, if the insurgents know who they are, they kill their families," said Gorman.

IP's man a guard post.

Despite the difficulty, the latest reconstitution of the police force seems to have gained momentum, as 700 officers currently serve in and around the city, and another 102 recruits are training at a police academy in Jordan. This momentum is a result of months of hands-on American involvement in Fallujah's security, new equipment, weapons and buildings provided to the police department, mounting local dislike of the insurgency and - most importantly - steady, good salaries paid to police officers.

"This place has changed a lot ... we did this probably two years ago, maybe, did the same exact thing in this same exact place. It didn't go very well. I'm just hoping this one goes a lot smoother, I'm thinking we've got a bit more preparation on this one ... making sure that they're set," said Lance Corporal Daniel Mast.

That said, the police are mainly in a defensive posture. As hunted locals who fear for their families' safety, and with limited American influence over daily operations, the Fallujan cops hide their identities and resist patrolling the streets. The bulk of officers man police stations, weathering persistent IED, small arms and sniper threats from insurgents intent on destroying any manifestation of civil order in Fallujah.

Corpsmen and marines treat an IP who was shot on the perimeter of the station.

"Being a cop in Philadelphia and Tennessee is a lot different than being a cop in Fallujah. These guys are definitely paramilitary; they're not going to bank robbery jobs, car stops, writing parking tickets or auto accidents - the traditional law enforcement we do in America. These guys are hunted and they go out in a very limited capacity to look for an IED, or to pick up a victim that's been shot on the street. They're not in police patrol mode like in the American sense," said Lippo.

There are two exceptions to this defensive posture:

The Major Crimes Unit

"Major Crimes" is a misnomer, as the Fallujan version bears little resemblance to the mission or tactics of such a department back in the United States. These cops are housed in a separate structure, have much less of a relationship with the American advisors and focus on "middle of the night stuff;" it's suspected that they cling to some of the same tactics historically used by secret police under Saddam Hussein.

"I will tell you they are the hardest working arm of the IPs. Our biggest challenge is finding time to spend with them in order to teach them that criminal cases are more than just forced confessions. We've had the FBI come to Fallujah to teach them a gentler form of interrogation, to introduce them to physical evidence collection and crime scene photography. We're trying to get them to add these skills to their routine. It's a tough battle - we're just too busy with other aspects of the PTT mission and can't spend all that time with Major Crimes," said Lippo.

The Marines have limited influence on and knowledge about Major Crimes operations, but note that they are obviously proving effective, as the insurgents concentrate the bulk of indirect artillery fire on their headquarters.

"They didn't take much in the way of indirect fire before ... but their pick up in their aggressiveness, picking people up off the streets, related immediately to them taking indirect fire. And I think that's like everything else - where the insurgency sees their challenge, that's where they target," explains Gorman.

Members of the Fallujah PD "Special Missions Group" clear their weapons after a successful raid.

The Special Missions Group (SMG)

Founded by a Marine advisor with SWAT experience and advised by Marines and US Special Forces, the SMG is the current American bid to get the IPs back on the offensive in Fallujah. The SMG is comprised of a number of cops specially selected for their aggressiveness, fitness, experience, responsibility and ability to conduct SWAT-team like raids in the city.

"We've given them highly specialized training, new uniforms, new weapons, high-speed gear ... a lot of weapons training, training in close quarters battle, fire discipline, first-aid ... day and nighttime operations," said Lippo.

In addition to the SMG's direct role in capturing or killing insurgents, there is also a hope that the team will inspire regular Fallujan cops to get more aggressive and conduct patrols, something Lippo feels is key to a successful police force and mission:

"Hopefully the other IPs see this and it gives them something to look up to, and maybe they see these guys out there kicking in doors and taking it to the bad guys, hopefully it empowers them to do patrolling, just the basic fundamentals of being a cop. That's driving around the streets in your white police car, showing the flag and letting the bad guys know that 'hey I have to get off this street corner.'"

An IP motivational poster.

As of this writing, the SMG had completed a handful of very successful missions, netting scores of suspected insurgents in nighttime raids.

View from the station's jail wing.

Broken Courts and Corrections

The local criminal justice system is dysfunctional to non-existent. There are no local prisons, and the Fallujah PD jail is not large enough to house prisoners swept up in recent raids.

"The next step in the criminal justice system is broken; the judicial system is compromised," says Lippo, "You've got judges here who are afraid to take criminal cases because of threats to their lives. You don't even have a local prison to hold them, if (the Iraqi Police) wanted to make more arrests, they have nowhere to hold these guys."

Right now when a suspect is captured, he's held in the jail until the police can gather evidence and present it to an investigative judge. The investigative judge reviews the case and can sign an order to hold the prisoner for 15 days. During this window, the cops must transport the suspect to the Baghdad corrections and court system. Previously this function was fulfilled by US Military convoys, but now the Iraqis are trying to work out a system of their own.

The jails are overcrowded, as the hanging clothes in the bathroom indicate.

"When they make an arrest they take them down to the jail, they process them, they build a case on them, mostly based on what they confess to or what interviews they have. They do have cameras, they do have recording devices, they do have video cameras, fingerprinting kits, they have all those things. But for the last how many years, that is not their system. We did just have a good investigative class, put on a good class for them, teaching them evidence-taking to build good cases," explained CAPT Scott.

"So they put the cases together, they present them in front of an investigative judge, reportedly - I know the investigative judge writes in green, but I've never met him. Once that order is written, that detainment order is good for 15 days to get (a suspect) detained at a prison in Baghdad. But ... to get him there seems a logistical nightmare, because there are only certain neighborhoods that these guys (Sunni police from Fallujah) feel comfortable going to in Baghdad. So I'm trying to get the info for all the district courts in Baghdad that the ... prison corrections IPs will go to."

"Before, the coalition forces basically transported (the prisoners), got them all the way there. On one occasion, four of them went last summer, and right now they just started trial. Once we get them there it will be a while before they get trial. But they need to get them there, or this will never work. Otherwise, we need a functioning court and local prison here."

The remains of patrol vehicles hit by IEDs litter the compound.

Other Negative Factors

The effectiveness of the IPs is almost totally contingent upon strong leadership, and Fallujan PD leadership is poor to inconsistent, directly responsible for the lack of an offensive posture in the city. In addition, corruption and administrative incompetence among local leaders and the bureaucrats at the Ministry of the Interior in Baghdad severely hamper effectiveness. The Marines are trying to work with these flaws, but the current American disengagement strategy ties the PiTT's hands. The impotence of the advisory role is possibly the single biggest impediment to mission success.

"I think ... if this is the key to eventually sending everybody home, to stand up the Iraqi Army and Iraqi police, then right now they're doing a pretty good job with the Iraqi Army, but the Iraqi police are not where they should be right now. We need to pour more resources into the problem. Not supplies - we've given the them all that they need to succeed - rather, right now we need more advisors to come out here and more interpreters. Without them we can't get anything done," said Lippo.

"I also think we need a larger role in hiring and firing the leadership here. We're letting the Iraqis do it all and we're not at that stage yet. The Americans need to take more of a leadership role in running the police department here instead of sitting back and letting the Iraqis do it."

An IP guard post.

Positive Factors

Though they apparently lack the security and initiative required to conduct regular patrols, the Fallujan cops are still considered brave and resilient in the face of intimidation and violence. IPs are regularly shot or blown up both on the street as well as in and around the guard posts manning the perimeter of the stations. Some cops quit after being injured, but many return to work, often after remarkably short recovery periods. One can levy many criticisms of the Fallujan officers, but lack of toughness isn't one of them.

"Would people back home come back to work the next day after being shot in the head?" asks Gorman. "If we faced what these guys face back in the states, it would be a national crisis. And they do it every day, so there is a lot to be said for that."

In addition, as locals, they know the city and are thus uniquely capable of cultivating intelligence that will root out the insurgency. It's believed that if and when the Iraqi government and American forces can win over the local populace and the tribes to choose sides and actively fight the insurgents, the police will be the security outlet that benefits most from the support and added manpower.

Finally, a series of successful raids by the SMG in conjunction with the Iraqi Army have recently led to a surprising level of cooperation between the Fallujan cops and the soldiers, two groups that mistrust each other because of the Army's status as outsiders and the traditionally lower status of the cops in Iraqi civil service. Whether this esprit de corps will last is anyone's guess, but it's a good sign, as this cooperation is considered a requisite to securing the city.

CPL John Szafranski searches a new police recruit.

Outlook

Like so many other aspects of Iraq, the outlook for the Fallujan police shows signs of both promise and despair. The political and cultural impediments to the formation of an effective police force are steep: Fallujah is not a city with a strong tradition of altruistic civil service, and the insurgents more casually wield violence, the most important currency in Iraq. American advisors are charged with teaching Fallujan cops Western standards of law enforcement, when in reality the IPs are fighting an insurgency, not crime. It's a bit ironic that restrictive rules of engagement and Western standards of policing are compelled on the American mission by a watchful western media and political leadership, when our own standards would undoubtedly evaporate in the face of the violence that the Fallujans are facing. Specific examples:

1. In addition to the cops themselves, their families are targeted. If this ever happened in the West on a massive scale, the reaction would be quite a bit more severe than permitted by our current standards of jurisprudence.

2. The insurgents use particularly violent mafia tactics to establish power and fund themselves. I asked a civil affairs officer why locals complain about the intimidation but don't report the insurgents to the police or Americans, and he told me that the Fallujans have no guarantee that the reported individual won't be released for lack of evidence or administrative reasons. Thus, when the choice is to fear an insurgent threatening them with decapitation vs. trusting the nascent Iraqi and American law enforcement system, the locals often opt to keep their mouths shut. It's not an irrational choice.

In contrast, hopeful signs include a boost in police recruitment, recent police cooperation with the Iraqi Army, and a string of successful offensive raids and defensive actions against insurgents. In my view, to read the above piece and definitively assert an opinion about the prospects of the Fallujah PD would be a mistake, as it could go either way.

"We're on the baby steps right now. We've finally got 'em to where they're halfway doing their job, going out there and doing their job, but if we pull out right now, they're still halfway depending on us. If we pull out right now, let's just say things will go straight back to where they were. There's been a lot of progress here," said Lance Corporal Nathan Yeager.

Said IPLO Gorman: "You're trying to advise on a democratic way of policing, and it's a big difference from the way the Iraqi police worked in the past, it's a process. People tend to expect this to happen overnight, to change from what it was to a democratic way of policing. And it didn't happen overnight in the states either. It takes time."

***


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View larger image: SSG Thomas Smith briefs Marines of the Second Brigade First Iraqi Army Division Military Transition Team. From L to R: CAPT Daniel Good, LCPL Jason Navarro, LCPL Tyler Mortimer, LCPL Daniel Fricke, MAJ Christopher Marise, SSG Lucius Francis, SSG Ricardo Feliciano, MAJ Joel Poudrier, LCPL Carlos Castillo

The Marine Military Transition Team (MiTT) mission kicked off hours earlier with a preliminary briefing in the late afternoon, a weapons test fire at the range and a convoy to a downtown staging area with elements of the 3rd Battalion, 2nd Brigade, 1st Division of the Iraqi Army.

On the ride over, we received small arms fire but didn't positively identify the shooters. Believed to emanate from a mosque, one marine remarked that "someone probably got his prayer on and decided to sling a few shots." The up-armored Humvees pressed forward, the marines ignoring the bullets.

Mission leader 1LT Kim briefs 3rd Battalion, 2nd Brigade, 1st Division MiTT Commander MAJ Adam Kubicki on the night's plan.

The MiTT advisors attached to the Iraqi Brigade were led by Lt. Col. Clayton Fisher and briefed by Marines embedded down at the Iraqi Battalion level. Marine First Lt. Christopher Kim was the mission's commander for our detachment from the Iraqi First Company, responsible for advising the Iraqis on the raid's plan and coordinating security and support from American elements.

The risk on such a mission is two-fold: insurgents pose typical threats with small arms, IEDs and snipers, plus the danger of friendly fire accidents and collateral damage increases with such a conglomeration of heavily-armed Iraqi and American elements converging on the same target area in the middle of the night. The inferior weapons discipline of the Iraqis sometimes results in what's termed an "Iraqi death blossom," a descriptive analogy for police and soldiers returning fire with brightly colored tracers up, down and in 360 degrees.

"It's a 3-dimensional battlespace, and sometimes their survival instinct kicks in and they shoot back in all directions," commented Fisher.

MiTT Marines relax and watch TV prior to the raid.

After a second briefing, we spent a few hours of downtime: PB&J sandwiches, coffee and "Starsky and Hutch" on the TV.

Lt. Col Fisher and MAJ Joel Poudrier suit up before the mission.

Sometime after midnight, the mission began.

An Iraqi Army solider searches a stack of grain outside of a target house.

The Humvees drove to the first house, the IA's dismounted, charged and swept the residence: an old sheik was quietly apprehended. The second target was empty - a "dry hole." A raid on a third residence met with high-pitched complaints from the women inside, who swore that a rack of bunk beds was usually occupied by girls who were away, despite the male clothes scattered about the room. The Iraqi soldiers thought it likely that the suspects had heard the raid coming and quickly fled the house. They searched the place thoroughly and quietly, but found nothing.

Jundi guard a doorway during a house search.

A fifth stop was another dry hole, but occupants told the IAs that the house of the man they were looking for was a block away, so the soldiers immediately splashed down a sewage-filled side street on foot, leaving the cordon, the convoy and its crew-served heavy weapons behind. We chased them down the darkened alley, Lt. Kim struggling to communicate with them about the ad hoc plan of action. The move was poorly planned but ultimately successful, as the suspect was quickly apprehended, blindfolded and led from the newly targeted house with no shots fired.

This chaotic initiative highlights one of the strengths and weaknesses of the fledgling Iraqi security forces in Fallujah, particularly the Iraqi Army. Their aggression bordering on recklessness signals problems with command and control: planning, coordinated execution and battlefield communication. The marines think that this proclivity signals a need for more training, as well as results from cultural differences - one American remarked that "when your entire life has been spent fearing death, your concept of planning and self-preservation is a bit different."

"Insh'allah," as they say: "if God wills it."

On the plus side, they're motivated and brave. Lt. Col. Fisher believes that aggression is a good problem to have, citing the old Marine saying, "it's better to have to reel them in than have to push them out the door."

Mission Leader 1LT Christopher Kim

Lt. Kim offered his assessment:

"Definitely some more coordination needs to take place between the Iraqis and us. We need to be a little more spun into the plan, as far as what house they're going to go into, how they're going to handle it. A lot of stuff they briefed never happened on site and I understand that not everything is going to go as planned, but they still need to adhere to the basic principles of security with the cordon."

Marines noted that other Iraqi Army operations have been planned and executed more smoothly; while many IA's are motivated and aggressive, there is a variety of skill among different units with different leadership and levels of experience.

The chaotic night wound down in the early morning hours. Our Iraqi company netted one suspected insurgent (the old sheik had been released), while other Iraqi Army units and the police wrapped up at least another score. Once captured, the IAs brought the man back to headquarters, where he was put in a corner and quietly interrogated by two officers.

I slipped into the room, observed for a few minutes and eventually snapped pictures. I asked Fisher if this relatively humane treatment was typical and/or if it was merely a symptom of having the Americans around.

"You've got a lot of work to do if you want to change a mindset that's been forged in their collective memory over half a century. You don't change that in two years with a couple nice hand outs and a Dale Carnegie course. But when they (the Iraqi Army interrogators) see (humane treatment) works, that's what sells the product. You can give them brochures and hand outs and well meaning people coming in and talking to them about human rights, but until they see the tangible product that 'boy this does work, they actually told us what we wanted to know,' until they see it, they don't believe it. And that is very much how this country works."

"And the (Iraqi Army soldiers) have seen that; our methodology pays dividends."

Army and Marine Police Transition Team members wait to process suspects.

All prisoners were then transferred to police headquarters, where US PiTT members and Iraqi police processed, interrogated and incarcerated them. The Iraqis will present evidence to an investigative judge who can order the individuals held for 15 days. From there, they enter the Baghdad court system.

With no Iraqi or American casualties, and suspects in custody, the mission was deemed a success. The insurgents captured by Iraqi police and soldiers yielded intelligence that led to successful raids on subsequent nights.

In the very early morning hours, the "Jundi" (Iraqi privates) mobbed me and demanded I take their picture as they celebrated.

***


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UPDATE: Certain elements of the post updated for accuracy.