January 30, 2007
Ghost Soldiers Follow-Up: Backstory and Hopeful Signs of Accountability in Iraq
Posted by Bill
I'd learned about how ghost soldiers were bleeding manpower and pay from the Iraqi Army on the 17th of January, when an outgoing Military Transition Team (MiTT) member angrily complained about security operations compromised by thin Iraqi Army units that were purposefully undermanned to skim payroll. Within 24 hours, his gripe had been verified to me by several American and Iraqi sources, and it quickly became apparent that logistical and manpower difficulties partly stemming from corruption were a major impediment to the success of Iraqi Army units operating in Fallujah.
I was awakened late at night on the 18th by a marine corporal who informed me that Brigade MiTT Commander Lt. COL Clayton Fisher requested my presence as soon as possible. I walked over to Fisher's office and found the MiTT leadership in a state of slightly tense animation; the Lt. COL asked me to use my web research skills to find an article about Iraqi Army Second Brigade Commander General Khalid Juad Khadim that was apparently causing quite an uproar among the Iraqi soldiers, the Arab media and the general himself. Searching on the name of the former MiTT commander quoted in the piece, it wasn't long until I'd found Ned Parker's Times of London article exposing endemic corruption in the Iraqi Ministry of Defense and the Iraqi Army.
Having learned of the extent of this corruption in the days prior, I could see that the article was accurate except for one significant piece of information: the Iraqi general specifically accused of stealing payroll in Fallujah was not "ousted," as the article claimed, but was in fact still in command and sitting in an office 30 yards from me as I read the premature report of his professional demise. And boy, was he ticked off.
In between initially futile diplomatic missions to the general's office by the MiTT leadership, the marines staged their weapons in "Condition One" (loaded and ready) and moved me from my solo bunk to share a room with a marine; the coincidence that a journalist was embedded with the Iraqi Brigade on the same day that the Times story broke was not lost on the Americans nor the Iraqi Army officers, and the marines were prudently cautious about the potential for flaring tempers. In addition, the direct quotes in the Times article from former MiTT commander Lt. COL Teeples caused a rift of suspicion and distrust between the Khalid's staff and the current MiTT members. In my case, aside from receiving a few poisonous looks from members of Khalid's security detail, nothing came of the ill will.
Eventually the general calmed down enough to speak to the MiTT leadership, several senior officers and State Department officials. He denied all charges and demanded to file a complaint with the Marines and the US government, apparently misunderstanding the relationship between a free press and governmental entities in Western society. He vowed to fight the charges and went ahead with a planned trip to Habbaniyah the next morning. Over the next 24 hours he refused two of my interview requests, a group of men in civilian vehicles robbed his house of all valuables and the general lit a pyre of documents behind his office late at night. He then left for Baghdad early Monday morning, continuing to assert via telephone his intent to fight the charges and open the books to investigators.
On Tuesday, Iraqi First Division Maj. General Tariq Abdul Wahab Jasim announced that Khalid had been relieved.
And just this morning, I learned of the official appointment of his successor, a General Ali, who one marine describes thusly:
"He's got a great attitude and is a true leader. He's been shaking things up around here, chewing Iraqi butt like it's cool, getting the Jundi to PT and making the brigade staff ... work."
So what happened to the Iraqi Army in Fallujah?
To some extent, General Khalid was scapegoated. While he was certainly guilty of corruption given his position's authority over the Brigade payroll, he's far from the only one; skimming is so common in the Iraqi Army and Ministry of Defense, I'd bet that you'd be hard pressed to find a senior officer without a hand in the pot. But that said, the Times article called out Khalid by name. From there, the Arab media picked up the story and ran with it, which caused quite a stir among the general's staff as well as other Iraqi Army, marine and American civilian officials. I added a very minor contribution, and within several days, the general had been relieved and replaced.
Thus begin stirrings of accountability in the Arab world.
It would be naive to think that such an event will stop corruption in the Iraqi bureacracy, but it may help curtail it; General Khalid's demise could serve as a cautionary tale to his successor and other general officers and bureacrats up the line. Instead of misreporting and skimming 50% of the pay intended for the Jundi, they might skim 20%. Instead of selling half of the fuel budgeted for operations, they may cut back to a third. And so it goes. The more the media can specifically expose individuals who prioritize criminal activity and personal gain over the establishment of Iraq's security, the better chance Iraq has to build a working government, defeat the insurgency and find stability. And it's important to note that while the initial article appeared in a Western news outlet, it was the Arab media's repetition of the story that really generated heat among the IA officers.
Regionally, this is a pretty new paradigm: the exposure of and quick accountability for General Khalid's corruption were among the more encouraging things I saw during my time in Iraq.
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January 27, 2007
Radio Appearance
Posted by Bill
I'll be talking about Iraq on the Northern Alliance Radio network today at 3PM Eastern, assuming other guest Mitt Romney doesn't bump me with his erratic schedule.
You can listen online here or here, or at 1280 AM in the Twin Cities.
UPDATE: Apologies for any incoherence: jet lag.
***
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January 26, 2007
Random Pictures, Two
Posted by Bill
Loud, Bumpy, Fun: the view from the belly of a C-130.
More past the jump:
Read More »
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A mural depicting the massacre at Halabja in Kuwait's "Not to Forget" museum.
Everybody on the Horn: Fallujah Police Transition Team (PiTT) Marines key mics after a mortar attack begins.
Investigate: Corporal Jon Malone checks out a nook of the old Iraqi Police station. I wish I had video, as our terp gave us a guided tour of the scene of the al Qaeda massacre of Iraqi cops while haunting calls to prayer emanated from surrounding Mosques at dusk.
Beats: a Marine checks an Iraqi Police hopeful's resting heart rate before a PT test.
Stone Cold: Navy Corpsman Doc Watson stares down a glob of peanut butter during one of the Marines' downtime eating contests.
In addition to being respected for his medical skill, Doc Watson is feted by the PiTT marines for having done "high speed shit:" he's one of only four Navy corpsmen to ever complete Marine Scout Sniper school, serving on a sniper team in the mountains of Afghanistan after 9.11. He won the eating contest, btw.
IED Effect 3: The charred inside of an Iraqi Police patrol truck. Insurgents have taken to adding fuel accelerant to the bombs in the past year or so.
Powder SLAP: Lance Corporal Aimar Campbell metes out Doc J's punishment for losing an eating contest: a slap with a palm-full of footpowder. Lance Corporal Yeager observes.
Lineup: Iraqi Army recruits form up during basic training at Habbaniyah.
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Ready for PID: waiting for "positive identification" in the turret of a humvee.
You the Man Now, Dogg: SSGT Thomas "Smitty" Smith of Military Transition Team 6 teaches an Iraqi janitor how to shake hands, OG style.
The Iraqi maintenance guys would show up daily to chat and ask for food, soda and "freaky freaky," Iraqi-English slang for skin mags like Maxim.
Smitty gave them a soda, a fitness magazine and some granola bars that day, in addition to the lesson.
Chill: MiTT Marines Lance Corporal Jason Navarro and Corporal Carlos Castillo relax while waiting to convoy.
Fricke Suits Up: Lance Corporal Daniel Fricke is a quirky dude and respected turret gunner. I overheard two other MiTT Marines mentioning that they like having him up there because "Fricke is good to go on the .50."
No Flash Allowed: Jundi (IA soldiers) guard a doorway during a midnight raid and search of a Fallujan residence housing suspected insurgents.
It's a Great Day to Convoy: MSGT James Johnson strikes a pose.
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Bridge Over the River Sty: A quickly engineered footpath keeps most of the mud off of a marine's shoes at Forward Operating Base Castle in the NE part of the city proper.
Way Out: a doorway at FOB Castle.
Marked: it's hard to escape Iraq without acquiring one or more nicknames. The Marines and IPLOs at the PiTT branded me when I left my gear sitting around. A second nickname: "Scoop."
Fricke looks on as Lance Corporal Tyler Mortimer strums a guitar.
***
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January 24, 2007
Where in the ...
Posted by Bill
My month-long leave has flown by and I'm in transit back to the states. Intermittent and slow internet access and a hectic schedule of interviews and missions only enabled me to publish a fraction of the stories I've gathered, however.
The following pieces are in the works:
*** An assessment of the Police Transition Team mission in Fallujah.
*** An accounting of a nighttime raid with an Iraqi Army unit and their Marine advisors.
*** An assessment of the Military Transition Team mission in Fallujah.
*** An interview with a Military Transition Team commanding officer.
*** An interview with the Jundi (Iraqi Army soldiers)
*** An interview with a civil affairs non-commissioned officer and a review of the CAG mission in Fallujah.
*** An interview-based piece on the role of Islam in the insurgency and global jihad.
*** A look at the Iraqi Army training facility at Habbaniyah.
*** A piece on the Marines, how they work and play.
*** Thoughts on the media's coverage of the war and citizen journalism.
*** Personal anecdotes and impressions.
*** At least 2-3 more random pictorials, possibly more.
*** And a final assessment of the current and future state of Fallujah and the war in Iraq as a whole.
I'm sure that other random posts will come up as well, as I've gathered a ton of information, but those are my prioritized topics. I've also got video in need of an editor.
This trip has briefly exposed me to personal extremes of stress, humor, camaraderie, nobility, savagery, hope, despair, fear and excitement, either as an observer or participant. I've arrived at a better understanding of the chaos that stalks civilization and met a lot of inspiring folks who make me want to be a better human being. I wouldn't trade the experience for anything in the world.
For the moment, a down-comfortered hotel bed and full-night's sleep await. Please stay tuned for new material, and thank you sincerely for the support.
UPDATE:
Look Ma, No Snipers: AM view of Kuwait City.
***
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January 22, 2007
"Recruiting Day" (Pictorial Supplement)
Posted by Bill
Police recruits line up (faces blurred for their protection, as terrorists target them and their families).
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My third Examiner piece is up, an accounting of the recent recruiting drive for the Iraqi Police in Fallujah.
Not my preferred title on the article, by the way. I'm not sure that death and destruction, while present, are the lede.
Also, one quibble on an editor's text truncation that changed meaning: "help" in the third paragraph should be "helped," to specify what the PiTT did to advise the Iraqis on that specific day. Their overall mission helps the IP's in many more ways than those specified in the subsequent sentence.
More blog posts on the PiTT mission to follow.
Read the piece, then check out these pictures accompanying the story:
Read More »
Major Brian Lippo, the Marine Fallujah Police Transition Team (PiTT) commander. An energetic realist and occasional cynic, Lippo was happy with the day's result.
Falluja Marine PiTT executive officer Captain Tad Scott. "You as worried as I am, Bill?" My answer is unprintable.
Corporal Jonathan Malone conducts a briefing. Malone was responsible for organizing all aspects of the recruiting drive, from security to logistics.
Marine and Army PiTT members move out in formation.
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Members of the Army PiTT test a recruit's basic physical fitness with 4 laps.
Applicants were also tested with 20 push-ups. Fallujan push-ups, but close enough.
Iraqi police recruits are processed by the Marines.
Lance Corporal Avneesh Arora retinal scans an applicant.
A Marine scans for threats as mortars come in.
HN Jared "Doc J" Jurgensmier treats and comforts an Iraqi child injured in the mortar attack on the station.
Doc J had him smiling within an hour after the injury: a large chunk of his knee taken by shrapnel.
Lance Corporal Thomas Hauck, Lance Corporal Michael Rickard and Gunnery Sergeant Jason "Gunny" Lawson process and congratulate new Iraqi police recruits.
***
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"Ghost Soldiers" Compromise Operations, Endanger Iraqis and Americans
(UPDATE: Khalid "Relieved")
Posted by Bill
Members of General Khalid Juad Khadim's staff light a pyre in the late evening hours.
Something quite strange even for Fallujah happened here Saturday when the occupants of three civilian vehicles stopped at the home of Iraqi General Khalid Juad Khadim, then marched into the residence and stole weapons, money and gold. What made the theft especially odd is the fact Khalid's personal security detail of 15 armed soldiers stood by and watched, doing nothing.
The identity of the burglars is as yet a mystery, but the raid may have been linked to controversy swirling around Khalid after a British newspaper claimed he is the corrupt beneficiary of large-scale thefts of supplies intended for the Iraqi Army, including fuel and weapons, as well as the pay intended for "ghost soldiers," imaginary Iraqi soldiers listed on a military unit's roster.
The Times of London article claimed corruption throughout the Iraqi Army chain of command and accused Khalid, who was also described as having been "ousted" of having "suspected ties to Shia militias." The latter allegation has circulated before the Times article appeared and was voiced to this writer by an Iraqi civilian and a Marine officer with no prompting other than mentioning the general's name. Other marines caution that such allegations are common yet difficult to verify, often based on thin speculation.
Contrary to the Times account, Khalid was not removed and is still in command of the Iraqi Army's Second Brigade, currently stationed in the Iraqi Training Camp adjacent to Camp Fallujah. Khalid has vigorously denied the allegations, but American military officials contend that overall theft of supplies and ghost soldiers in the Iraqi Army are both real and in part responsible for the deaths of American and Iraqi soldiers.
Many American personnel, including former Military Transition Team (MiTT) members advising the Iraqi Army in Fallujah, vehemently complained about fuel, supplies, weapons and pay stolen by higher echelons of the Iraqi Second Brigade of the First Iraqi Army (IA) Division, as well as IA officials up the chain of command. Current members of the MiTT, however, declined to comment.
A former MiTTer described how "ghost soldiers" result in both American and Iraqi deaths by compromising security operations in Fallujah.
"Let's say there are 500 soldiers reported on staff; there will really be only 300, but someone up the line will report 500 and pocket the extra pay," said the former MiTT member who insisted on anonymity. Having fewer actual soldiers available for patrols and other missions exposes both Iraqi and U.S. soldiers to more lethal attacks by insurgents, he said. The reduced manpower allows insurgents "freedom of movement" to both stage attacks and plant Improvised Explosive Devices, the number one killer of U.S. and Iraqi soldiers and police.
"There's always some level of corruption going on, and that's one thing, but when it's getting people killed, it's unacceptable," he angrily explained.
Another Coalition officer not attached to a MiTT cited what he termed reliable intelligence on another Iraqi general at the Division level whose base pay is vastly exceeded by the $30,000 per month he makes from the corruption. The officer noted, however, that officials must sometimes recognize "the lesser of two evils" as the general in question is "effective and gets the job done."
But it's hard to see how effective a senior officer would have to be to justify such a level of embezzlement. Perhaps half of the Iraqi Army in Fallujah, primarily the "Jundi" soldiers at the bottom of the pay scale, haven't been paid in months. As a result, 160 soldiers in the Iraqi Third Battalion recently walked off the job because of missed salaries. The supposed number of soldiers in the battalion was about 700, yet the loss of 160 reduced the unit's real strength by half. Fuel and equipment shortages greatly influenced by corruption also hamper operations.
Asked who is responsible for stopping such corruption, U.S. officials here point to the Iraqi Ministry of Defense. Because U.S. control of the Iraqi government bureaucracy has been phased out to let locals take the lead, American military personnel working with the Iraqi military have little ability to resolve such pay issues.
Realistic American officials expect and tolerate some degree of corruption in the young bureaucracy, but the Iraqi Army embezzlement is so widespread that at least one active duty Marine officer, Lt. Col. James Teeples, went on the record in the Times' article. Before Jan. 8, Teeples commanded the Marine MiTT advising the Iraqi Army in Fallujah.
"I know there are problems with other division commanders and I know there are problems with folks up at the Ministry of Defense," Teeples told the Times. "So it's not simply just this one brigade commander. If it were an isolated instance like that, they [the army] would probably be doing much better in Iraq than they currently are."
The comments voiced immediately after his departure have spun the relationship between current MiTT team members and the Iraqi Army staff into chaos.
General Khalid refused an interview request and declined to provide a written statement. U.S. MiTT team members who requested anonymity said Khalid denies the charges and plans to file a formal complaint through the U.S. military and State Department.
Khalid and members of his staff lit an unusual pyre in a metal garbage can behind his quarters late Saturday; many assumed that he was burning documents. In a later twist, the general left Fallujah for Baghdad with a well-armed security detail early Sunday morning.
Despite the publicity and the general's stated intent to challenge the accusations, no officials from the Iraqi Army or Ministry of Defense have yet traveled to Fallujah to investigate the claims.
UPDATE: Iraqi First Division Maj. General Tariq Abdul Wahab Jasim today stated that he has "relieved" Khalid.
UPDATE: "Base pay" salary figure of Iraqi Army general officer redacted to ascertain accuracy.
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January 21, 2007
Bill Roggio is Back in Iraq
Posted by Bill
... and blogging from Habbaniyah.
I was there yesterday, but missed him. Check it out:
Habbaniyah and the 3/3-1 Snake Eaters
and
Patrolling with the Snake Eaters
Great stuff.
January 19, 2007
Where in the ...
Posted by Bill
Still in Fallujah, very busy. The publication of the third Examiner piece was delayed, but should run this weekend. A fourth documenting my tag-along on a nighttime raid by the Iraqi Army is on deck.
In the meantime, anti-war, pro-war, confused as Hell, please do me a favor and read this posting in full, at least to understand what animates the idealists willing to sacrifice their lives. It's sure given me a second wind to tell their side of the story.
What a heartbreaking loss. "Immortal words" indeed.
January 17, 2007
HA & MM in Iraq
Posted by Bill
Bryan Preston reports. One tiny fragment:
Calling Iraq a "civil war" misunderstands the nature of Iraq and the term "civil war." Most of Iraq's warring parties don't have any chance at taking over the entire country and don't seem interested in doing so. Most of them are reacting to the vaccuum of power since the iron grip of Saddam slipped off the country. Most of them are reacting to threats they perceive are either coming from the presence of foreign troops, or from the presence of Wahhabi-influence terrorists (al Qaeda) or from fellow Iraqis who belong to the other major sect of Islam, or from Iran. Most militia fighters would probably lay down their weapons if the overall environment improved, and by that I mean improvements in the basics: the economy and education as well as the security environment.
I have minor disagreements with maybe 2 percent of his long, comprehensive piece, but overall, it's simply brilliant.
And Malkin shares her first impressions here.
Here, a task force of brainy commanders, brawny patrol officers, courageous Arab-American interpreters, wizened trainers and intel gatherers, baby-faced convoy drivers, and grim-humored gunners attempts to put President Bush's "winning hearts and minds" idealism into daily practice.
Yes.
Where in the ... (Change of Plans)
Posted by Bill
Again emulating Bill Roggio, I'm dropping plans to go to Ramadi in favor of staying here in Fallujah.
With travel buffers, my schedule probably can't accommodate more than one embed in a Ramadi Military Transition Team (MTT) before the leave of absence from my day job is up, whereas if I stay here, I can accomplish a MTT, a civil affairs embed and probably a visit to Habbaniya. I also don't think I have the full story on Fallujah, not having interacted with the Iraqi Army, nor seen civil affairs or reconstruction efforts.
I've come to the conclusion that to have an idea of what's going on in either city, you need to spend at least two to three solid weeks, ideally four, in each. Compounding the complexity is that the two cities and regions surrounding them are vastly different. All this makes the concept of authoritatively writing about either from Baghdad or DC, as some are inclined to do, all the more unrealistic. It's perhaps possible with a wealth of contacts, but access to first-hand local perspectives is pretty helpful.
Today I'm headed back into the city to embed with the Iraqi Army and their Marine MTT, so posts may be spare. I'm still working on my overall review of the PTT mission, but transcriptions are taking a while. A piece for the Examiner covering last Wednesday's recruiting drive should run this Wednesday, so look out for it if I don't have the ability to link.
In the meantime, enjoy some pics.
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Random Pictures, One
Posted by Bill
Army PFC Ian Reeser of the Ferris and Ammeriyah Police Transition Team sits with a "leetle friend."
Many more after the jump:
Read More »
Walking the Persian Gulf, Kuwait.
Blinky and Inky, BFF: two Iraqi policemen break for a picture on recruiting day.
Anticipation.
Me, I'd rather be back in Kuwait.
IED Effect 1: an Iraqi patrol truck.
IED Effect 2:an Iraqi Policeman's ID, burned along with its owner in a fuel accelerant-laden IED attack.
Got everything you need? Fallujah Police Transition Team commander Major Brian Lippo (right): checks up on members of a Marine Military Transition Team and their Iraqi Army unit in the Fallujah Government Center.
Playing with Light #1: Marine Corporal Jonathan Malone.
Playing with Light #2: International Police Liaison Officer Tom Gorman.
Graffiti left by Iraqi Army units on the walls of the old police station.
Checking In: Lance Corporal Thomas Hauck keys his radio.
Keeping Warm: Marines from Weapons Company 1st BN/24th Mar gather around a fire at a security outpost, downtown Fallujah.
Scars: bullets and shrapnel mark the scene of the Fallujah "Valentine's Day Massacre," when al Qaeda in Iraq stormed the old station, killing 24 Iraqi policemen and one prisoner. Policemen were sleeping in this room when it was grenaded and sprayed with machine gun fire.
A sergeant from Weapons Company 1st BN/24th Mar discusses security with Major Lippo.
Profile: Marine Lance Corporal Michael Baker.
Moving Out: Army and Marine PTT members in patrol formation on recruiting day.
Lippo's Lucky Charms: on the left, a scapular and Mass card of St. Michael, the Patron Saint of Police Officers; the tokens kept Lippo's father safe in his 30+ years as a Philadelphia PD patrolman. On the right is a picture of Patrick J Brown, a firefighter killed on September 11th.
"Stay in School, Kids:" a turkish toilet in an Iraqi jail. I was assured that these were cleaner examples of the genre.
Scanning Rooftops: Marine Corporal Jonathan Malone looks out over downtown Fallujah.
On Guard: Iraqi Policemen man a security outpost at the police compound. IP's take regular casualties from snipers and small arms fire in and around these posts.
J's and a Dominican Cigar: Navy HN Jared "Doc J" Jurgensmier and "Jundi" bond on the roof.
Good to go.
Mine were Fake: this little deaf boy loves, loves, loves caddying around dad's weapon. And he had better trigger discipline than many of the Iraqi grown-ups around him.
Rock n' Roll: Lance Corporal Brian Desouza may be the only Marine in the Corps who smiles when he knows he's being photographed.
Buckle Up: A reminder to the IP's.
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January 15, 2007
"Because the language they use is killing:"
An Interview with a Fallujan Police Officer
Posted by Bill
The difficulty of obtaining this interview underscores the political and cultural complexities of the American effort in Fallujah. In order to get a few minutes of alone candor with an Iraqi patrolman, the Marines had to coordinate a task that excused his visit to the American wing of the station. Some Iraqi policeman - typically the ones who are in positions to work most closely with the Marines and civilian advisors - like the Americans, some tolerate the Americans, some dislike the Americans, and it's widely believed that a few actually (at least passively) work with insurgents. Paradoxically in most cases, the majority want Americans to leave, but not yet.
Two reasons: American firepower in and around Fallujah keeps the lid on chaos that waits to engulf the city, and the young Fallujan government still views itself as dependent on the Marines for everything from fuel to equipment to administrative savvy. One of the most frustrating tasks for the Police Transition Team is to wean locals off of this culture of dependency, a process reliant on them learning to work with and trust their central government, as well as do for themselves.
But Fallujans are remarkably insular; their local culture is famously mistrustful. A visitor from Ramadi or Baghdad is considered a foreigner. A Marine intelligence officer remarked to me that the first things Fallujans rebuilt after Operation al-Fajr were the gated walls surrounding their own houses. Another revealing anecdote was supplied by a Marine who cited a Western travel guide to Iraq circa the 1940's: it advised tourists in the region to steer clear of Fallujah, condemning the city as a notorious den of xenophobic smugglers and thieves.
Add decades of war and fealty to a Stalinist yet locally benevolent government to the mix, and you've got a difficult cultural stew of suspicion and missing initiative. Fallujans are proud and many are brave, but a number lack much will beyond the desire to personally prosper or just survive.
Broaching American politics for a moment: a simplistic left-wing interpretation might conclude that Americans are despised occupiers who need to leave Fallujans in peace, while a simplistic right-wing or populist interpretation relies on applying something like the golden rule to a multi-layered political situation: the idea that if Americans are there to help, Fallujans should simply go along and be grateful. The reality of the situation - and any successful expression of both Fallujan and American interest - is so much more complex than either of these views.
"Mohammed" is a young Iraqi with bright eyes and gentle demeanor. He immediately asked me for things: food, a soda and, at the conclusion of the interview, some shampoo. I was surprised by three aspects of his answers to my questions: his seeming openness, his intelligence sans education, and his political opinions about the nature of the insurgency. I can't read minds, but his presentation seemed sincere. I also felt great sympathy for the man. It certainly wasn't empathy, as I can barely fathom what it must be like to live his life.
Read More »
INDC: Why did you decide to join the police?
Mohammed: "Just to survive, because you can't make money anywhere else."
INDC: Is the pay good for you?
Mohammed: "Yes. Even I got hit before, I got shot. And that's (also) why I really hate those guys (the insurgents) and I came back to the police force again."
INDC: Where were you shot?
Mohammed: "Nearby the (a specific location in Fallujah). Actually Americans died and I got hurt."
INDC: And where were you shot on your body?
Mohammed: "In my hand and (motions to his side). It was a PKC ... and it was a Syrian guy who shot us."
INDC: How long did it take to recover?
Mohammed: "Two months. And I wished I were dead because it was so painful." (He smiled)
INDC: You mentioned that you hate the insurgents, is that just more now because you've been shot or did you have a different opinion of them before?
Mohammed: "They hit me and they also killed some of my family. Actually they killed my uncle who used to be an Iraqi Army soldier, and they killed him and burned his face. And then they actually started threatening us as well."
INDC: They burned his face?
Mohammed: "Yes. It's a substance called "tizar," it's like, acid. They put it in his face."
INDC: He was alive when they did this?
Mohammed: "Yes, he was alive. They burned him and stabbed him so many times, and also they shot him with bullets. And we found a note on him saying, 'The police and the army and the Americans are all the same.'
INDC: So they killed him because he was in the Iraqi Army?
Mohammed: "Yes. But we didn't tell any of these guys (the Iraqi police) around here (at the time) because they hated the Army as well."
INDC: So why do police hate the army?
Mohammed: "I think because the army actually liberated Fallujah, they work well, and they liberated Fallujah. And some of (the police) actually like (or liked) the insurgents."
"And the other thing would be because they are different (sects of Islam). But after the operations we started doing together, now we became like one and the same, we became like brothers."
INDC: The Iraqi police and the Iraqi Army?
Mohammed: "Yes. Now we became like brothers."
INDC: So how does the police work with the Iraqi Army when some of the police hate the IA's?
Mohammed: "Some bad guys used to be part of the police, but now they quit and ran to Syria. And actually in the JCC (American control room) they know (who) most of them (are)."
The rift between the IP's and IA's that Mohammed describes is accurate, as is the recent, though potentially transitory accord. After a recent set of operations where the Marines encouraged the police and army to work together, the Americans were surprised to find Shia IA's and Sunni IP's joking around with each other and hugging after a successful raid. As Gunnery Sergeant Jason Lawson put it, they were showing off captured insurgents "like kids comparing Halloween candy." Whether this amity will last is anyone's guess.
INDC: So who are the insurgents? Who are the people who are fighting stability? Are they locals?
Mohammed: "(Yes), almost all of them."
INDC: So why are local Fallujans fighting other Fallujans?
Mohammed: "Because the al Qaeda organization came to this city and controlled it so hard by killing. And some people here actually like killing and they liked Saddam Hussein as well, and I think the al Qaeda organization and Saddam Hussein are the same face."
INDC: What do you mean by "the same face," because Saddam was secular, he was not religious and al Qaeda is ...
Mohammed: "Because the language they use is killing. And the same people who used to be with Saddam, now they participate with the insurgency."
INDC: So their motivation for killing is what?
Mohammed: "Money and to be famous. And I think the first reason is to fight the American troops. They say, 'we can start from here and cross all the way to America to fight them.'"
INDC: What would happen if America left Iraq and Fallujah right now? What would happen?
Mohammed: "It's going to be a disaster."
INDC: How so?
Mohammed: "There will be revenge from everybody. And now they are trying to (form the) Islamic Emirate right here."
INDC: What do you think can be done to stop the insurgents?
Mohammed: "By fighting them back and killing them. Or reporting them to the troops."
INDC: But if the Iraqi police isn't doing patrolling, and the Iraqi Army isn't trusted, and the Americans won't be here forever, who is going to do the killing?
Mohammed: "What do you mean about 'no trust for the Iraqi Army?'"
INDC: Well, I've been told that the locals don't trust the IA's because they are from Baghdad and they are mostly Shia.
Mohammed: "No, no, no. Most people they actually hate the Mujahedeen. But they are scared, they're scared, they don't have power in their hands."
INDC: So how do they feel about the Iraqi Army?
Mohammed: "Most of the educated people actually like the Iraqi Army. But two displacements (two major evacuations and upheavals) have happened here in Fallujah, and if another one happens, everybody will die."
INDC: Tell me about the history of the Iraqi police, they've been sort of up and down, they've gone from zero to being massacred, to being reconstituted by the Americans ... where do you think they are now?
Mohammed: "I think only the Americans can (maintain order) with the Iraqi Army."
INDC: What about the police?
Mohammed: "I don't think they can, because they are easy targets. Most of the police get attacked at home and killed."
INDC: Right. Whereas the Iraqi Army and the Americans live in barracks and bases, and their families are elsewhere.
Mohammed: "Yes."
He then told me that a secret war is going on in Fallujah. That citizens, fed up with the insurgency, are tracking down insurgents and killing them. These vigilantes then blame the killing on other insurgent groups, to try and get the splintered mass of terrorists to start killing each other.
Mohammed: "Actually now the mujahadeen and the al Qaeda organizations are fighting each other. Hopefully that will ease things on the police and the Americans."
INDC: What about the tribes? Where are they in all of this?
Mohammed: "Only in Ramadi the tribes are fighting the insurgents. Here in Fallujah some actually support the insurgents because they are scared."
A day earlier, an American soldier told me that the tribes has just, within the past week, declared themselves neutral, intending to let the insurgents fight each other, the Iraqi Army, the police and the Americans. Previously they had been passively or actively working with insurgents or playing both sides of the fence.
INDC: What are your personal plans for the next few years? What do you see yourself doing?
Mohammed: "I think if the situation keeps going the same way, (with vigilantes) killing the insurgents the same way, it (the insurgency) will finish."
"Not to mention the operation that took place yesterday, by the Iraqi Army and the police (Special Missions Group). It actually shook (the insurgents) so much. If we do another 5 or so, I think we'll finish them."
INDC: How many insurgents do you think are operating in Fallujah?
Mohammed: "A little more than 500. Maybe more than that."
"Actually I need to go, because I don't want to stay a long time."
INDC: Ok. One last, quick question: what do you think of Americans, and has that opinion changed over time?
Mohammed: "I think we need the Americans. If they go out right now it's gonna be a disaster. And believe me, even if they get out of Fallujah, Washington itself will be a target."
***
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January 14, 2007
The Jacksonian Tradition:
An Interview with Lance Corporal Nathan (Chad) Yeager
Posted by Bill
Exchanging pictures with an Iraqi cop.
A preface: A few weeks before coming over here, I met a pleasant Icelandic woman in a bar. A friend introduced us and told her that I was headed to Iraq, which precipitated her espousal of some interesting political and cultural opinions. Perhaps the most baffling was her repetitive insistence on the morally equivalent, "but what is a terrorist, really?", after I'd employed the term to describe some, but not all, insurgents in Iraq. Even after I explained - three times - that a person who intentionally kills children to sow fear and make a political point animates the term, she had to agree to disagree, and move on to her next silly argument.
It was one of my favorites: "Members of the military are dumb or disadvantaged folks who have been duped or forced into going to Iraq."
I mentioned patriotism, family tradition and the Jacksonian tradition, written about rather eloquently by Walter Russell Meade:
To understand how Crabgrass Jacksonianism is shaping and will continue to shape American foreign policy, we must begin with another unfashionable concept: Honor. Although few Americans today use this anachronistic word, honor remains a core value for tens of millions of middle-class Americans, women as well as men. The unacknowledged code of honor that shapes so much of American behavior and aspiration today is a recognizable descendant of the frontier codes of honor of early Jacksonian America.
The first principle of this code is self-reliance. Real Americans, many Americans feel, are people who make their own way in the world.
...
The second principle of the code is equality. Among those members of the folk community who do pull their weight, there is an absolute equality of dignity and right.
...
The third principle is individualism. The Jacksonian does not just have the right to self-fulfillment -- he or she has a duty to seek it.
...
The fourth pillar in the Jacksonian honor code ... let us call it financial esprit. While the Jacksonian believes in hard work, he or she also believes that credit is a right and that money, especially borrowed money, is less a sacred trust than a means for self-discovery and expression.
..
Finally, courage is the crowning and indispensable part of the code. Jacksonians must be ready to defend their honor in great things and small. Americans ought to stick up for what they believe.
I was surprised when she recognized the term, and even more surprised when she still wouldn't accept my argument.
"They are just poor and uneducated," she said.
I took another stab: citing my high school friend Dan Eggers, my grandfather, various people I know or have read about, none of whom were poor, dumb or otherwise disadvantaged. Exceptions to the rule, according to her. Soon thereafter, our conversation came to a polite end.
Which brings me to this interview: I wish I had the chance to feature extended quotations from many more of the soldiers and Marines that I've met in Iraq, but that being impossible, Lance Corporal Yeager of the Marine Police Transition team will do. A 23 year-old Alabaman possessing an air of confidence and a slow, thick southern drawl, I certainly can't claim that everyone over here nor even the Marines are exactly like Yeager - but a relevant number share his idealism, sense of duty and patriotism.
If my Icelandic acquaintance were to travel to Iraq, she might think, "My, there sure are a lot of 'exceptions to the rule' out here."
The interview:
Read More »
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Why the Marine Corps:
(Originally) I took a different route, started a business, a body shop. But I always knew I wanted to be like my father; he was Staff Sergeant in the Army. Well, I guess about a year and a half into me owning my shop, my father got deployed over here to Mosul, and I was sittin' down one night and thinking, I got a great family, a father that's unbelievable, and what's it gonna take for me to be half the man he is? And I knew it would take the hardest branch out there, and so that's why I joined the Marine Corps.
I remember being 4 years-old coming home from drill, seeing my dad in his cammies and thinking, "Oh, my dad is a hero." I don't know, I've been raised up in the military. Never in my wildest dreams did I think I'd join the Marine Corps. I always wanted to be a pilot, so I had Air Force on my mind and this and that (Note: Yeager is very close to obtaining his civilian pilot's license).
But I don't know, the Marine Corps is fun, it's a lot of fun. You get really close to these guys, especially being out here with a small team. I love operating with a small team because you bond together like brothers, pick on each other and goof off. But when it comes down to the line, you'd fight to the death for 'em. And I'd hate to see anything happen to any of these guys.
Motivation for volunteering for Iraq:
One of my good friends who I'd gone to high school with, he joined the Marines right out of high school, and he got married to another one of my good friends, we all went to high school together. And they moved to Washington state.
But anyway, he came over here - he was in Ramadi - and I think he was two weeks 'till he came home. And they got ambushed one night, and they couldn't get anyone on the radio, so he stepped out of the humvee. He was the vehicle commander.
Right when he stepped out, the guy on the roof hit another IED and it killed him. The sad thing was, he was supposed to be home in two weeks and his little girl was supposed to be born in three. And, I don't know, it really bothered me. I had to bury him, and right after I buried him my unit asked me if I wanted to volunteer, and I was like "Hell yeah."
Iraq, "field Marines" and hurricane Katrina:
I love being out here. I'm more of a field Marine than I am a garrison Marine - it doesn't bother me to go without a shower for a month at a time. I volunteer for everything that comes up. I was in the hurricane relief for Katrina. That was a ... it made me grow up a lot out there.
It was really different seeing your own kind dead, your own people. We were going into houses and doing body counts, and you'd find a whole family in there. You know, kids ranging from two years old, all the way up to 15 years old, with their parents up in the attic and stuff. It was a ... it was terrible.
Katrina was hard. There was a lot of negative stuff there. I guess the people didn't think we came in soon enough. I was there the day after, but ... I don't know, we didn't know where we needed to be, what we needed to do. We didn't have the food sources there, but right when we got there we started doing everything we could. We started going from house to house, because our trucks were the only trucks that could get through. All the other fire trucks couldn't get through.
So we'd take our corpsman out, go house to house and check on people, take 'em out supplies. It was tough. It was really tough.
Being shot at:
I was up on the satellite phone, talking to my mother; hadn't talked to her for awhile, so calling to check in. And I'd been up there for awhile, about 15-20 minutes, and I'd just happened to stand up for 3 minutes, and tracers started flying.
Me, I didn't realize they had tracers, they were just like ours, and I just hit the ground, didn't cut off the phone, my mother was listening the whole time.
So I low crawled over on the other side of the roof because SGT [redacted for security] was over here ... and I couldn't find him. That's when a kind of panic attack set in: "Where's he at, has he crawled somewhere?" I thought I'd lost a Marine.
I scanned the whole top of the roof ... came back down here to grab my gear and everything, try to get a head count, and found out that the sergeant had come down. By the time I'd gotten here and staged my weapon the fire had stopped. It was a pretty wild night.
It's different. You think getting shot at, you think you'd hear the whistle of the bullet. (But) they start crackin' when they get close to your head, they start crackin'. It ... opened up my eyes.
More on being in Iraq:
I don't know, I enjoy being over here. I volunteered to be over here. I'd hate ... ... I see these little kids walking the streets while I'm out on patrols and stuff, I throw 'em candy and everything ... I could not imagine kids having to grow up like this. And that's why I try so hard over here to give it 110%, so maybe 10 years or 20 years down the road, I won't have to be back over here doing the same thing. Because I know I wouldn't want my son growing up like this.
Snipers and IEDs:
The only thing you can do is keep your weapon loaded and have all your gear on. If you're gonna die you're gonna die, it's just when and where. I could be rolling out there on a humvee, get shot at, and tuck and roll. But that's not the way we do.
We stop, we put ourselves in danger, we get out of the humvee, we've got all our gear on, and we engage. The Marine Corps has trained us and trained us and trained us to be like that.
Shooting back:
I saw muzzle flash coming out of that building. That's when I came over the radio and said, "I have muzzle flash, I got PID (positive ID), what do you want me to do?"
That's when we all came back up and saw muzzle flash again, and I probably threw about 150 rounds down (Yeager had a SAW). We don't know if we got them, but ever since that night? We haven't been hit again by small arms fire.
A different sort of war:
This war is ... you can't be hard all the time. You have to be understanding and, I don't know, cordial. And it's a different kind of professionalism.
The mission:
We're on the baby steps right now. We've finally got 'em to where they're halfway doing their job, going out there and doing their job, but if we pull out right now, they're still halfway depending on us. If we pull out right now, let's just say things will go straight back to where they were. There's been a lot of progress here. Take the SMG (Special Missions Group - very roughly, an Iraqi SWAT team): the first night they went out, they got butterflies and chickened out. One of them said, "We don't want to go out and do this, we just want to sit back and do QRF (Quick Reaction Force)."
And I said, "Why do you want to sit back and be QRF, what's that going to help? That's not going to help a thing. It's gonna take y'all to balls up, get some fight in you. Because yeah, some of y'all are gonna die. But your kids are gonna grow up to do the same thing you're doing, 20 years from now. You've gotta step up and be the leader."
And now, every night we've gone out, we've wrapped somebody up and got intel from them. We've made a lot of progress.
We've made a lot of progress.
***
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January 12, 2007
Where in the ... (Personal Anecdotes and Impressions: PTT Embed)
Posted by Bill
I've returned from downtown to Camp Fallujah, where I'll take a couple of days off from gathering material to transcribe interviews and write about the Police Transition Team's vital mission. My time with the team presented a fantastic opportunity to assess the state of Fallujah from inside the city, meet local Iraqis fighting the insurgency and see how Marines work and relax. Perhaps the hardest part of an embed here is deciding which stories to cover, as there are literally thousands of them.
While I try to synthesize a wealth of information into an accurate, contextual narrative, here are some anecdotes, random facts, amusing stories and personal reflections on the experience:
Read More »
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Morale Boosters: Morale among the Marines of the PTT is probably as good as it can be, given the difficulty and danger of their mission. The officers and senior non-coms bear much of the stress of working with the IP's and administering the outpost, while younger Marines responsible for security fight boredom and tension with work (convoys, patrols, administration, cleaning), internet, TV, care packages and dumb challenges, the latter a young male tradition that transcends time and place. Between the furor of battles, I'm fairly certain that young Roman Legionnaires challenged each other to Marshmallow Fluff eating contests (or their equivalent) in the snowy forests of Germania.
These good-natured young men reminded me of my friends in high school and college, with the wrinkle that we weren't being shot at or targeted by IED's. It's familiar yet surreal.
***
Angel of Death: I met an outgoing, enthusiastic kid from an Army PTT named Tim Israel. He told me that Iraqis have an excited reaction upon hearing his last name, as it sounds like either "Prophet" or "Angel of Death." When asked which, he jokes with the IP's (Iraqi Policemen) that it depends on whether they piss him off or not.
***
Laugh at the skittish blogger #1:
Mortars make a loud noise but are typically inaccurate, indirect threats. Insurgents rarely stay in a stationary position to fire more than one or two of them, lest American, IP or IA forces nail down their location and rain the wrath of God (or Boeing) upon their heads. That said, 120 mm mortars have a 70 meter "kill zone," and a close or direct hit from 60 - 120mm pieces can be pretty bad news for a given target.
Insurgents fired five mortars at the police station on Wednesday in an attempt to "dial in" the location. Though I've learned to ignore them when they land at a distance, a sufficiently large and close one authored a ringing crack and boom, and I instinctively skipped to put both the fellow with whom I was conversing and a sturdy pillar between the direction of the explosion and my precious behind. I didn't move fast enough, as he smiled kindly and said:
"You haven't been here too long, have you? I'm used to them. Maybe that's bad, but if they're gonna get you, they're gonna get you."
I don't know what that guy was talking about: I was just stretching my legs, man.
***
Blending in: My newly-bearded attempts to blend in with the locals paid off way better than expected: all throughout the visit, Iraqis would approach me and start speaking in Arabic, asking who I was or assuming that I was an interpretor. Communication did ensue, as many with a limited grasp of English have now learned to understand "I don't know what the **** you are saying, I'm American."
I was pretty jazzed about the successful conformity, until Marine Captain Tad Scott told me that the insurgents would probably shoot me first because I looked like a "Company man" (a CIA agent).
Nice sense of humor on those Marines. Does anyone have a razor?
***
Skittish Blogger #2: Yesterday, insurgents mortared police headquarters thrice, as well as mounted a coordinated (attempted) IED and small arms attack on another police station and some Iraqi Army posts in the city. So it was with trepidation that I very briefly walked outside without my armor to obtain the contact info of a visiting civil affairs officer in the compound.
As I walked back and neared the door to the station, I heard a "wa-WHOOMP!" right in front of me, jumped about two feet up and to the left and swore; for a split second, I assumed the worst. The sheepish laughter of a Marine and a Navy Corpsman drifted down from the roof to let me know I was alive, along with the sight of the pile of wood and cardboard they'd just dropped on the ground a few feet in front of me. They said it was unfortunate timing, and I believe them. I think.
Accidental and funny, but someone came a camel's hair away from owing me a new set of underpants.
And my underpants are expensive.
***
Handy Arabic Phrasebook:
Salaam: Hello, what's up?, literally "peace." i.e. " Salaam, nice Iraqi policeman."
Hamdillah: Thankfully, thank heavens. "It was only cardboard boxes and wood, hamdillah."
Zien: Good. "This local Fallujan food is zien, but I hope it doesn't give me the Iraqi trots."
Muzien: Not good, bad. (Running to the bathroom): "Muzien! Muzien! "
Lak-da-DAK-da-rasi, Anamoujihoodi: "Please don't cut my head off, I'm not Jewish."
That last one might seem like a handy thing to know in certain situations, but it's really useless; the radical insurgents here will cut your head off if you are man or woman, American or Iraqi, Christian, Jew or fellow Muslim. They're equal-opportunity killers.
***
Game Time:
Note:the image above does not depict the specific events described below.
Following the mortars and the attack on the other police station, I was standing on the second floor landing when loud gunfire erupted: BOOM! BOOM! BOOM! BOOM! BOOM! Heavier and infinitely closer than the familiar crackle of a distant AK-47, it sounded like it was coming from inside the courtyard on the first floor. "Holy *@&$, the insurgents are attacking the station and are inside the compound!" was the general thought.
The laconic professionalism of the Marines disintegrated into action.
"General Quarters!"
The men around me did furious wind sprints to their weapons and armor, then moved to established defensive positions. It was a brief, impressive flurry of adrenaline and coordinated activity, soundtracked by a few more bursts of fire from just outside. But as it turns out, the rounds were coming from newer Iraqi Police (IP) recruits who'd decided to celebrate the arrival of the bodies of insurgents killed in the day's attack. They were firing their PKC's (a Russian light machine gun vaguely analogous to an American SAW) up in the air right outside the station.
The IP leadership offered an apology in the face of a steely admonition not to "do that around Marines."
I'll tell you one thing: I feel pity for anyone who tries to attack that station.
***
Persistent reminders that this isn't a game:
Another group of Marines from Weapons Company 1st BN/24th Mar probably have the toughest job in Fallujah: they patrol its mean streets and look for trouble. Several of their number have been wounded or killed, and a Marine was shot in the neck just outside police headquarters last week while conducting a mounted security patrol. He was paralyzed, but the doctors think that he'll regain use of his body after the swelling in his neck subsides.
And just because mortars are generally well-tolerated, almost ignored, doesn't mean they aren't lethal: the rounds fired off in the aforementioned attacks struck wide around the target, wounding a 12 year-old boy and killing a local welder who several Americans described as "a good guy." The boy was treated by Corpsman Doc J, who had him smiling, eating a muffin and drinking juice just minutes after the attack, despite shrapnel stealing a tangelo-sized chunk from his knee. Tough little fella.
The wounded Iraqi Police who are incessantly drug in here and saved also telegraph the danger that lives in Fallujah. Over the weekend, several policemen were driving just outside the gate when rounds struck the hood of their vehicle. They dismounted to shoot at insurgents firing from a building and one patrolman was shot through the upper chest. He dropped to the ground, stood back up and continued to engage the enemy. Soon thereafter, his buddies threw him in the truck and drove him back to the station, where Corpsmen Doc J and Doc Watson treated him. The man had trouble breathing and the bullet had probably nicked his lung, but the docs were confident he would survive.
Days later, looking at the twisted remains of dead insurgents lent stark perspective: this is what death looks like, this is how and where the fiery struggle ends. All that these people were - very much like the animated Iraqis milling about them - is gone, and only a broken husk remains. I forced myself to look at them, and despite my respect for life and the tangible gravity of the reminder about war's stakes, as well as the gruesome nature of their poses and injuries, I remained oddly unmoved. Clinical. I'm not sure what to think about that, except an apathetic "fuck 'em, they're terrorists."
Once you've heard the first-hand stories and seen what terrorist insurgents are doing to both Americans and the people in this city, you might feel that way too. I don't know.
***
And finally, Bill's new first rule of interpersonal relationships: always make friends with the 6'4" hooded man with the large machine gun.
Cobra Commander up there is an Iraqi Policeman. During the police recruiting drive, one of the Marines kept yelling at him, "Hey John Rambo! It's John Rambo!"
The Iraqi smiled and said with a thumbs up, "Bruce Lee! Bruce Lee!" Good times.
I have several pieces in the works, including a review of the PTT's overall mission, a blow-by-blow account of Wednesday's recruiting drive, and a look inside the Iraqi Police Special Missions Group, a hand-picked force of IP's who are just beginning offensive operations in Fallujah. Stay tuned.
***
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