INDC Journal
January 30, 2007
Ghost Soldiers Follow-Up: Backstory and Hopeful Signs of Accountability in Iraq

Posted by Bill

I'd learned about how ghost soldiers were bleeding manpower and pay from the Iraqi Army on the 17th of January, when an outgoing Military Transition Team (MiTT) member angrily complained about security operations compromised by thin Iraqi Army units that were purposefully undermanned to skim payroll. Within 24 hours, his gripe had been verified to me by several American and Iraqi sources, and it quickly became apparent that logistical and manpower difficulties partly stemming from corruption were a major impediment to the success of Iraqi Army units operating in Fallujah.

I was awakened late at night on the 18th by a marine corporal who informed me that Brigade MiTT Commander Lt. COL Clayton Fisher requested my presence as soon as possible. I walked over to Fisher's office and found the MiTT leadership in a state of slightly tense animation; the Lt. COL asked me to use my web research skills to find an article about Iraqi Army Second Brigade Commander General Khalid Juad Khadim that was apparently causing quite an uproar among the Iraqi soldiers, the Arab media and the general himself. Searching on the name of the former MiTT commander quoted in the piece, it wasn't long until I'd found Ned Parker's Times of London article exposing endemic corruption in the Iraqi Ministry of Defense and the Iraqi Army.

Having learned of the extent of this corruption in the days prior, I could see that the article was accurate except for one significant piece of information: the Iraqi general specifically accused of stealing payroll in Fallujah was not "ousted," as the article claimed, but was in fact still in command and sitting in an office 30 yards from me as I read the premature report of his professional demise. And boy, was he ticked off.

In between initially futile diplomatic missions to the general's office by the MiTT leadership, the marines staged their weapons in "Condition One" (loaded and ready) and moved me from my solo bunk to share a room with a marine; the coincidence that a journalist was embedded with the Iraqi Brigade on the same day that the Times story broke was not lost on the Americans nor the Iraqi Army officers, and the marines were prudently cautious about the potential for flaring tempers. In addition, the direct quotes in the Times article from former MiTT commander Lt. COL Teeples caused a rift of suspicion and distrust between the Khalid's staff and the current MiTT members. In my case, aside from receiving a few poisonous looks from members of Khalid's security detail, nothing came of the ill will.

Eventually the general calmed down enough to speak to the MiTT leadership, several senior officers and State Department officials. He denied all charges and demanded to file a complaint with the Marines and the US government, apparently misunderstanding the relationship between a free press and governmental entities in Western society. He vowed to fight the charges and went ahead with a planned trip to Habbaniyah the next morning. Over the next 24 hours he refused two of my interview requests, a group of men in civilian vehicles robbed his house of all valuables and the general lit a pyre of documents behind his office late at night. He then left for Baghdad early Monday morning, continuing to assert via telephone his intent to fight the charges and open the books to investigators.

On Tuesday, Iraqi First Division Maj. General Tariq Abdul Wahab Jasim announced that Khalid had been relieved.

And just this morning, I learned of the official appointment of his successor, a General Ali, who one marine describes thusly:

"He's got a great attitude and is a true leader. He's been shaking things up around here, chewing Iraqi butt like it's cool, getting the Jundi to PT and making the brigade staff ... work."

So what happened to the Iraqi Army in Fallujah?

To some extent, General Khalid was scapegoated. While he was certainly guilty of corruption given his position's authority over the Brigade payroll, he's far from the only one; skimming is so common in the Iraqi Army and Ministry of Defense, I'd bet that you'd be hard pressed to find a senior officer without a hand in the pot. But that said, the Times article called out Khalid by name. From there, the Arab media picked up the story and ran with it, which caused quite a stir among the general's staff as well as other Iraqi Army, marine and American civilian officials. I added a very minor contribution, and within several days, the general had been relieved and replaced.

Thus begin stirrings of accountability in the Arab world.

It would be naive to think that such an event will stop corruption in the Iraqi bureacracy, but it may help curtail it; General Khalid's demise could serve as a cautionary tale to his successor and other general officers and bureacrats up the line. Instead of misreporting and skimming 50% of the pay intended for the Jundi, they might skim 20%. Instead of selling half of the fuel budgeted for operations, they may cut back to a third. And so it goes. The more the media can specifically expose individuals who prioritize criminal activity and personal gain over the establishment of Iraq's security, the better chance Iraq has to build a working government, defeat the insurgency and find stability. And it's important to note that while the initial article appeared in a Western news outlet, it was the Arab media's repetition of the story that really generated heat among the IA officers.

Regionally, this is a pretty new paradigm: the exposure of and quick accountability for General Khalid's corruption were among the more encouraging things I saw during my time in Iraq.

***


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Posted by Bill at 08:46 AM | Comments (7) | TrackBack (1)
January 27, 2007
Radio Appearance

Posted by Bill

I'll be talking about Iraq on the Northern Alliance Radio network today at 3PM Eastern, assuming other guest Mitt Romney doesn't bump me with his erratic schedule.

You can listen online here or here, or at 1280 AM in the Twin Cities.

UPDATE: Apologies for any incoherence: jet lag.

***


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Posted by Bill at 12:13 PM | Comments (1) | TrackBack (2)
January 26, 2007
Random Pictures, Two

Posted by Bill

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Loud, Bumpy, Fun: the view from the belly of a C-130.

More past the jump:

Read More »


Posted by Bill at 03:29 AM | Comments (5) | TrackBack (11)
January 24, 2007
Where in the ...

Posted by Bill

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My month-long leave has flown by and I'm in transit back to the states. Intermittent and slow internet access and a hectic schedule of interviews and missions only enabled me to publish a fraction of the stories I've gathered, however.

The following pieces are in the works:

*** An assessment of the Police Transition Team mission in Fallujah.

*** An accounting of a nighttime raid with an Iraqi Army unit and their Marine advisors.

*** An assessment of the Military Transition Team mission in Fallujah.

*** An interview with a Military Transition Team commanding officer.

*** An interview with the Jundi (Iraqi Army soldiers)

*** An interview with a civil affairs non-commissioned officer and a review of the CAG mission in Fallujah.

*** An interview-based piece on the role of Islam in the insurgency and global jihad.

*** A look at the Iraqi Army training facility at Habbaniyah.

*** A piece on the Marines, how they work and play.

*** Thoughts on the media's coverage of the war and citizen journalism.

*** Personal anecdotes and impressions.

*** At least 2-3 more random pictorials, possibly more.

*** And a final assessment of the current and future state of Fallujah and the war in Iraq as a whole.

I'm sure that other random posts will come up as well, as I've gathered a ton of information, but those are my prioritized topics. I've also got video in need of an editor.

This trip has briefly exposed me to personal extremes of stress, humor, camaraderie, nobility, savagery, hope, despair, fear and excitement, either as an observer or participant. I've arrived at a better understanding of the chaos that stalks civilization and met a lot of inspiring folks who make me want to be a better human being. I wouldn't trade the experience for anything in the world.

For the moment, a down-comfortered hotel bed and full-night's sleep await. Please stay tuned for new material, and thank you sincerely for the support.

UPDATE:

kuwhotel.jpg
Look Ma, No Snipers: AM view of Kuwait City.


***

***


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Posted by Bill at 02:16 PM | Comments (7) | TrackBack (3)
January 22, 2007
"Recruiting Day" (Pictorial Supplement)

Posted by Bill

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Police recruits line up (faces blurred for their protection, as terrorists target them and their families).

***

My third Examiner piece is up, an accounting of the recent recruiting drive for the Iraqi Police in Fallujah.

Not my preferred title on the article, by the way. I'm not sure that death and destruction, while present, are the lede.

More blog posts on the PiTT mission to follow.

Read the piece, then check out these pictures accompanying the story:

Read More »


Posted by Bill at 02:50 PM | Comments (9) | TrackBack (10)
"Ghost Soldiers" Compromise Operations, Endanger Iraqis and Americans

(UPDATE: Khalid "Relieved")

Posted by Bill

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Members of General Khalid Juad Khadim's staff light a pyre in the late evening hours.

Something quite strange even for Fallujah happened here Saturday when the occupants of three civilian vehicles stopped at the home of Iraqi General Khalid Juad Khadim, then marched into the residence and stole weapons, money and gold. What made the theft especially odd is the fact Khalid's personal security detail of 15 armed soldiers stood by and watched, doing nothing.

The identity of the burglars is as yet a mystery, but the raid may have been linked to controversy swirling around Khalid after a British newspaper claimed he is the corrupt beneficiary of large-scale thefts of supplies intended for the Iraqi Army, including fuel and weapons, as well as the pay intended for "ghost soldiers," imaginary Iraqi soldiers listed on a military unit's roster.

The Times of London article claimed corruption throughout the Iraqi Army chain of command and accused Khalid, who was also described as having been "ousted" of having "suspected ties to Shia militias." The latter allegation has circulated before the Times article appeared and was voiced to this writer by an Iraqi civilian and a Marine officer with no prompting other than mentioning the general's name. Other marines caution that such allegations are common yet difficult to verify, often based on thin speculation.

Contrary to the Times account, Khalid was not removed and is still in command of the Iraqi Army's Second Brigade, currently stationed in the Iraqi Training Camp adjacent to Camp Fallujah. Khalid has vigorously denied the allegations, but American military officials contend that overall theft of supplies and ghost soldiers in the Iraqi Army are both real and in part responsible for the deaths of American and Iraqi soldiers.

Many American personnel, including former Military Transition Team (MiTT) members advising the Iraqi Army in Fallujah, vehemently complained about fuel, supplies, weapons and pay stolen by higher echelons of the Iraqi Second Brigade of the First Iraqi Army (IA) Division, as well as IA officials up the chain of command. Current members of the MiTT, however, declined to comment.

A former MiTTer described how "ghost soldiers" result in both American and Iraqi deaths by compromising security operations in Fallujah.

"Let's say there are 500 soldiers reported on staff; there will really be only 300, but someone up the line will report 500 and pocket the extra pay," said the former MiTT member who insisted on anonymity. Having fewer actual soldiers available for patrols and other missions exposes both Iraqi and U.S. soldiers to more lethal attacks by insurgents, he said. The reduced manpower allows insurgents "freedom of movement" to both stage attacks and plant Improvised Explosive Devices, the number one killer of U.S. and Iraqi soldiers and police.

"There's always some level of corruption going on, and that's one thing, but when it's getting people killed, it's unacceptable," he angrily explained.

Another Coalition officer not attached to a MiTT cited what he termed reliable intelligence on another Iraqi general at the Division level whose base pay is vastly exceeded by the $30,000 per month he makes from the corruption. The officer noted, however, that officials must sometimes recognize "the lesser of two evils" as the general in question is "effective and gets the job done."

But it's hard to see how effective a senior officer would have to be to justify such a level of embezzlement. Perhaps half of the Iraqi Army in Fallujah, primarily the "Jundi" soldiers at the bottom of the pay scale, haven't been paid in months. As a result, 160 soldiers in the Iraqi Third Battalion recently walked off the job because of missed salaries. The supposed number of soldiers in the battalion was about 700, yet the loss of 160 reduced the unit's real strength by half. Fuel and equipment shortages greatly influenced by corruption also hamper operations.

Asked who is responsible for stopping such corruption, U.S. officials here point to the Iraqi Ministry of Defense. Because U.S. control of the Iraqi government bureaucracy has been phased out to let locals take the lead, American military personnel working with the Iraqi military have little ability to resolve such pay issues.

Realistic American officials expect and tolerate some degree of corruption in the young bureaucracy, but the Iraqi Army embezzlement is so widespread that at least one active duty Marine officer, Lt. Col. James Teeples, went on the record in the Times' article. Before Jan. 8, Teeples commanded the Marine MiTT advising the Iraqi Army in Fallujah.

"I know there are problems with other division commanders and I know there are problems with folks up at the Ministry of Defense," Teeples told the Times. "So it's not simply just this one brigade commander. If it were an isolated instance like that, they [the army] would probably be doing much better in Iraq than they currently are."

The comments voiced immediately after his departure have spun the relationship between current MiTT team members and the Iraqi Army staff into chaos.

General Khalid refused an interview request and declined to provide a written statement. U.S. MiTT team members who requested anonymity said Khalid denies the charges and plans to file a formal complaint through the U.S. military and State Department.

Khalid and members of his staff lit an unusual pyre in a metal garbage can behind his quarters late Saturday; many assumed that he was burning documents. In a later twist, the general left Fallujah for Baghdad with a well-armed security detail early Sunday morning.

Despite the publicity and the general's stated intent to challenge the accusations, no officials from the Iraqi Army or Ministry of Defense have yet traveled to Fallujah to investigate the claims.

UPDATE: Iraqi First Division Maj. General Tariq Abdul Wahab Jasim today stated that he has "relieved" Khalid.

UPDATE: "Base pay" salary figure of Iraqi Army general officer redacted to ascertain accuracy.


***

***


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Posted by Bill at 12:03 AM | Comments (11) | TrackBack (10)
January 21, 2007
Bill Roggio is Back in Iraq

Posted by Bill

... and blogging from Habbaniyah.

I was there yesterday, but missed him. Check it out:

Habbaniyah and the 3/3-1 Snake Eaters

and

Patrolling with the Snake Eaters

Great stuff.

Posted by Bill at 08:46 AM | Comments (2) | TrackBack (1)
January 19, 2007
Where in the ...

Posted by Bill

Still in Fallujah, very busy. The publication of the third Examiner piece was delayed, but should run this weekend. A fourth documenting my tag-along on a nighttime raid by the Iraqi Army is on deck.

In the meantime, anti-war, pro-war, confused as Hell, please do me a favor and read this posting in full, at least to understand what animates the idealists willing to sacrifice their lives. It's sure given me a second wind to tell their side of the story.

What a heartbreaking loss. "Immortal words" indeed.

Posted by Bill at 12:10 PM | Comments (2) | TrackBack (9)
January 17, 2007
HA & MM in Iraq

Posted by Bill

Bryan Preston reports. One tiny fragment:

Calling Iraq a "civil war" misunderstands the nature of Iraq and the term "civil war." Most of Iraq's warring parties don't have any chance at taking over the entire country and don't seem interested in doing so. Most of them are reacting to the vaccuum of power since the iron grip of Saddam slipped off the country. Most of them are reacting to threats they perceive are either coming from the presence of foreign troops, or from the presence of Wahhabi-influence terrorists (al Qaeda) or from fellow Iraqis who belong to the other major sect of Islam, or from Iran. Most militia fighters would probably lay down their weapons if the overall environment improved, and by that I mean improvements in the basics: the economy and education as well as the security environment.
I have minor disagreements with maybe 2 percent of his long, comprehensive piece, but overall, it's simply brilliant.

And Malkin shares her first impressions here.

Here, a task force of brainy commanders, brawny patrol officers, courageous Arab-American interpreters, wizened trainers and intel gatherers, baby-faced convoy drivers, and grim-humored gunners attempts to put President Bush's "winning hearts and minds" idealism into daily practice.

Yes.

Posted by Bill at 05:16 AM | Comments (3) | TrackBack (3)
Where in the ... (Change of Plans)

Posted by Bill

Again emulating Bill Roggio, I'm dropping plans to go to Ramadi in favor of staying here in Fallujah.

With travel buffers, my schedule probably can't accommodate more than one embed in a Ramadi Military Transition Team (MTT) before the leave of absence from my day job is up, whereas if I stay here, I can accomplish a MTT, a civil affairs embed and probably a visit to Habbaniya. I also don't think I have the full story on Fallujah, not having interacted with the Iraqi Army, nor seen civil affairs or reconstruction efforts.

I've come to the conclusion that to have an idea of what's going on in either city, you need to spend at least two to three solid weeks, ideally four, in each. Compounding the complexity is that the two cities and regions surrounding them are vastly different. All this makes the concept of authoritatively writing about either from Baghdad or DC, as some are inclined to do, all the more unrealistic. It's perhaps possible with a wealth of contacts, but access to first-hand local perspectives is pretty helpful.

Today I'm headed back into the city to embed with the Iraqi Army and their Marine MTT, so posts may be spare. I'm still working on my overall review of the PTT mission, but transcriptions are taking a while. A piece for the Examiner covering last Wednesday's recruiting drive should run this Wednesday, so look out for it if I don't have the ability to link.

In the meantime, enjoy some pics.

***


Please support citizen journalism, as you are willing and able.


If you'd prefer to donate via check, please e-mail me and I'll provide you mailing instructions. Thank you for your support.

Posted by Bill at 01:50 AM | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)
Random Pictures, One

Posted by Bill

01pvt.jpg
Army PFC Ian Reeser of the Ferris and Ammeriyah Police Transition Team sits with a "leetle friend."

Many more after the jump:

Read More »


Posted by Bill at 01:45 AM | Comments (11) | TrackBack (7)
January 15, 2007
"Because the language they use is killing."

An Interview with a Fallujan Police Officer

Posted by Bill

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The difficulty of obtaining this interview underscores the political and cultural complexities of the American effort in Fallujah. In order to get a few minutes of alone candor with an Iraqi patrolman, the Marines had to coordinate a task that excused his visit to the American wing of the station. Some Iraqi policeman - typically the ones who are in positions to work most closely with the Marines and civilian advisors - like the Americans, some tolerate the Americans, some dislike the Americans, and it's widely believed that a few actually (at least passively) work with insurgents. Paradoxically in most cases, the majority want Americans to leave, but not yet.

Two reasons: American firepower in and around Fallujah keeps the lid on chaos that waits to engulf the city, and the young Fallujan government still views itself as dependent on the Marines for everything from fuel to equipment to administrative savvy. One of the most frustrating tasks for the Police Transition Team is to wean locals off of this culture of dependency, a process reliant on them learning to work with and trust their central government, as well as do for themselves.

But Fallujans are remarkably insular; their local culture is famously mistrustful. A visitor from Ramadi or Baghdad is considered a foreigner. A Marine intelligence officer remarked to me that the first things Fallujans rebuilt after Operation al-Fajr were the gated walls surrounding their own houses. Another revealing anecdote was supplied by a Marine who cited a Western travel guide to Iraq circa the 1940's: it advised tourists in the region to steer clear of Fallujah, condemning the city as a notorious den of xenophobic smugglers.

Add decades of war and fealty to a Stalinist yet locally benevolent government to the mix, and you've got a difficult cultural stew of suspicion and missing initiative. Fallujans are proud and many are brave, but a number lack much will beyond the desire to personally prosper or just survive.

Broaching American politics for a moment: a simplistic left-wing interpretation might conclude that Americans are despised occupiers who need to leave Fallujans in peace, while a simplistic right-wing or populist interpretation relies on applying something like the golden rule to a multi-layered political situation: the idea that if Americans are there to help, Fallujans should simply go along and be grateful. The reality of the situation - and any successful expression of both Fallujan and American interest - is so much more complex than either of these views.

"Mohammed" is a young Iraqi with bright eyes and gentle demeanor. He immediately asked me for things: food, a soda and, at the conclusion of the interview, some shampoo. I was surprised by three aspects of his answers to my questions: his seeming openness, his intelligence sans education, and his political opinions about the nature of the insurgency. I can't read minds, but his presentation seemed sincere. I also felt great sympathy for the man. It certainly wasn't empathy, as I can barely fathom what it must be like to live his life.

Read More »


Posted by Bill at 06:47 PM | Comments (3182) | TrackBack (17)
January 14, 2007
The Jacksonian Tradition:

An Interview with Lance Corporal Nathan (Chad) Yeager

Posted by Bill

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Exchanging pictures with an Iraqi cop.

A preface: A few weeks before coming over here, I met a pleasant Icelandic woman in a bar. A friend introduced us and told her that I was headed to Iraq, which precipitated her espousal of some interesting political and cultural opinions. Perhaps the most baffling was her repetitive insistence on the morally equivalent, "but what is a terrorist, really?", after I'd employed the term to describe some, but not all, insurgents in Iraq. Even after I explained - three times - that a person who intentionally kills children to sow fear and make a political point animates the term, she had to agree to disagree, and move on to her next silly argument.

It was one of my favorites: "Members of the military are dumb or disadvantaged folks who have been duped or forced into going to Iraq."

I mentioned patriotism, family tradition and the Jacksonian tradition, written about rather eloquently by Walter Russell Meade:

To understand how Crabgrass Jacksonianism is shaping and will continue to shape American foreign policy, we must begin with another unfashionable concept: Honor. Although few Americans today use this anachronistic word, honor remains a core value for tens of millions of middle-class Americans, women as well as men. The unacknowledged code of honor that shapes so much of American behavior and aspiration today is a recognizable descendant of the frontier codes of honor of early Jacksonian America.

The first principle of this code is self-reliance. Real Americans, many Americans feel, are people who make their own way in the world.
...
The second principle of the code is equality. Among those members of the folk community who do pull their weight, there is an absolute equality of dignity and right.
...
The third principle is individualism. The Jacksonian does not just have the right to self-fulfillment -- he or she has a duty to seek it.
...
The fourth pillar in the Jacksonian honor code ... let us call it financial esprit. While the Jacksonian believes in hard work, he or she also believes that credit is a right and that money, especially borrowed money, is less a sacred trust than a means for self-discovery and expression.
..
Finally, courage is the crowning and indispensable part of the code. Jacksonians must be ready to defend their honor in great things and small. Americans ought to stick up for what they believe.

I was surprised when she recognized the term, and even more surprised when she still wouldn't accept my argument.

"They are just poor and uneducated," she said.

I took another stab: citing my high school friend Dan Eggers, my grandfather, various people I know or have read about, none of whom were poor, dumb or otherwise disadvantaged. Exceptions to the rule, according to her. Soon thereafter, our conversation came to a polite end.

Which brings me to this interview: I wish I had the chance to feature extended quotations from many more of the soldiers and Marines that I've met in Iraq, but that being impossible, Lance Corporal Yeager of the Marine Police Transition team will do. A 23 year-old Alabaman possessing an air of confidence and a slow, thick southern drawl, I certainly can't claim that everyone over here nor even the Marines are exactly like Yeager - but a relevant number share his idealism, sense of duty and patriotism.

If my Icelandic acquaintance were to travel to Iraq, she might think, "My, there sure are a lot of 'exceptions to the rule' out here."

The interview:

Read More »


Posted by Bill at 06:49 AM | Comments (26) | TrackBack (5)
January 12, 2007
Where in the ... (Personal Anecdotes and Impressions: PTT Embed)

Posted by Bill

I've returned from downtown to Camp Fallujah, where I'll take a couple of days off from gathering material to transcribe interviews and write about the Police Transition Team's vital mission. My time with the team presented a fantastic opportunity to assess the state of Fallujah from inside the city, meet local Iraqis fighting the insurgency and see how Marines work and relax. Perhaps the hardest part of an embed here is deciding which stories to cover, as there are literally thousands of them.

While I try to synthesize a wealth of information into an accurate, contextual narrative, here are some anecdotes, random facts, amusing stories and personal reflections on the experience:

Read More »


Posted by Bill at 11:05 AM | Comments (30) | TrackBack (11)
January 11, 2007
Iraq Redux

Posted by Bill

I endorse this sentiment:

Without hesitation, I can say that this fight is the most intricate and complicated mission our military has ever faced. Our troops are daily engaging in missions that their military training never prepared them for, but they are performing those missions with amazing thought and skill. When you add in the external forces at play, whether they're stateside politics or the mix of enemies on Iraq's doorsteps and operating on its streets, the mission in Iraq becomes a Gordian knot of military, political and humanitarian issues that overlap to the point that failure in any one will precipitate failure in all of them. So far, we're failing in several but not to the point that the situation can't be rescued. The failures are, in my opinion, almost entirely products of Washington politics and decision-making. Washington has yet to make the war in Iraq a truly national effort, and has not yet brought to bear the full range of American resources it will take to give us a chance of success here.

Very well put, though I would stress the mild caveat that aspects of some failures might be (but are not necessarily) beyond our control, at least within the time frame demanded by the American public. RTWT.

Malkin has also started blogging from Baghdad.

Posted by Bill at 12:11 AM | Comments (3) | TrackBack (3)
January 10, 2007
"I'm not afraid, I've lost everything in Iraq:"

An Interview with a Fallujan Civil Servant (& Former Insurgent)

Posted by Bill

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Note: Please consider this interview a companion piece to my second dispatch for the Examiner. Taken together, they provide a good primer on the challenges facing the establishment of stability in Fallujah.

What makes the insurgency tick? How are they funded? Why is the civil administrative infrastructure in the city so broken? And how can the insurgency be ultimately quelled? These questions are frustratingly complex, but some of them - from a local Fallujan perspective, at least - are answered in this interview. And as interviews go, I think this one is important.

For security purposes, I can't tell you who this man is or exactly what he does, except that he's a local Fallujan in a position to both know about the political situation in his city and to do something about it, if he follows through with requisite initiative. Remarkable about this interview with "Yusef" was the brevity and straight-forwardness of his answers, as it's been my experience that many Iraqis tend to tell long, winding stories as a preface to their point. We talked about the roots of the insurgency, the power vacuum in Fallujah and who and what fills it, his opinion of Americans and the various roles of the Coalition, local tribes, Iraqi Army and Fallujans themselves in establishing order and stopping a radical insurgency.

I'll stress once again that this information is an incomplete and strictly local read on the challenges facing the city; forthcoming American perspectives will add layers of complexity and insight to the situation. That said, it's a pretty good introduction to the fight in Fallujah:

Read More »


Posted by Bill at 04:09 AM | Comments (19) | TrackBack (5)
January 09, 2007
Where in the ...

Posted by Bill

jundi.jpg

"Jundi" ("soldier" in Arabic) is an Iraqi dog adopted by the Marines here at Fallujah Police Headquarters.

They seem to trust him, but I harbor suspicions about the dog's loyalties to local insurgent groups. That mutt has jihad written all over him.

I've extended my stay with the Marine Police Transition Team (PiTT) advising the Fallujan Police in order to cover tomorrow's recruitment drive, a potentially important milestone in their mission.

A forthcoming Examiner piece will broach analysis of the challenges and complexities of the political situation in Fallujah, and will be accompanied by an illuminating blog interview with a local Iraqi civil servant.

Stay tuned.

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Marines from the PiTT, Weapons Company 1st BN/24th Mar and an IPLO assess security, downtown Fallujah.

Posted by Bill at 05:58 AM | Comments (10) | TrackBack (2)
January 06, 2007
On Patrol with Team Gator

Posted by Bill

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Larger size

Last Wednesday I rode along on a mounted patrol with members of Bravo Company, Second Assault Amphibious Battalion, aka "Team Gator." As my recent predecessor Bill Roggio described their mission:

The traditional mission of an Assault Amphibious Battalion is to land Marines on the beach, using their huge Amphibious Assault Vehicles (or AAVs), which hold up to 20 Marines and a crew of three.

Here in Iraq, the mission has changed. The Gators have been assigned to patrol Route Mobile, 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. Route Mobile, which, along with Route Michigan, are the two largest roads running east-west through Anbar province.

Route Mobile is an essential supply line for the Iraqi Army, US Military and al-Anbar as a whole, as well as a main conduit for civilians and insurgents traveling between Syria, Ramadi, Fallujah and Baghdad, among other stops. It's undoubtedly also one of the most explosive stretches of highway on the planet.

Read More »


Posted by Bill at 07:10 AM | Comments (30) | TrackBack (8)
January 04, 2007
First Examiner Piece/Hangin' with the IPLOS

Posted by Bill

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IPLOS are "International Police Liaison Officers," civilian police officers hired by the State Department to help the military Police Transition Teams get their Iraqi stations on the right track. To the left is Jody Martinez of Leadville, CO, with Tom Gorman, of Stark, FL. The cigars are Dominican. Much more on them and their role with the Fallujah PD later.

For now, check out my first piece for the Washington Examiner, profiling two Navy Corpsmen doing an incredible job.

Power and internet are intermittent, so I'll get the promised pictorials uploaded when possible.

Posted by Bill at 05:52 PM | Comments (10) | TrackBack (3)
Daybreak in the City of Mosques

Posted by Bill

fallujahsunrise.jpg

I just finished my first piece for the Examiner and will link it as soon as it's published. Also on deck is the promised post on my patrol with the Gators and more, much more.

Read More »


Posted by Bill at 12:51 AM | Comments (6) | TrackBack (1)
January 02, 2007
Where in the ...

Posted by Bill

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I just got back from a first mounted patrol/IED hunt in and around Fallujah. It was interesting, long and uneventful in the violent sense, though another patrol was hit by two IED's as we headed back to base. No serious injuries, some rattled nerves and superficial damage to Humvees, thankfully.

But don't let my leading drama monopolize you: it's almost odd how "normal" operations seem here, with folks just doing their jobs, calmly and professionally. The food is good and morale seems high. The number one answer to "How do you like being a Marine?" is "I love it, sir." (Non-random sample size of 4 respondents, the results of this poll should not be considered scientific)

I'll have a pictorial post documenting my day with "the Gators," the Marines of Bravo Company, 2nd Assault Amphibious Battalion, up soon, but a few quick impressions: these Marines are professional, they work really, really hard, and most of them are unusually good-natured and funny; at least half the positive experience of today was listening to them bust each other's balls. Great guys.

I'm pressed for time with the embed schedule, as first thing tomorrow morning I head out for a 3-5 day stint with a Police Transition Team advising the local Fallujah police. I'm coasting in Bill Roggio's wake for my first two embed slots, and hope to augment his superb analysis with some human interest angles and pictorials. Therefore, it may be at least a day or two before any substantive posts.

sunsetfallujah.jpg




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UPDATE: Quote modified for accuracy.

Posted by Bill at 02:03 PM | Comments (13) | TrackBack (3)
"[T]hey want to destroy us:" An Interview with Quais Abdul Raazzaq

Part Two

Posted by Bill

This is the second installment of my interview with Quais Abdul Raazzaq, a 41 year-old Sunni Iraqi journalist. In the previous post we discussed Iraq's deterioration since 2003, the nature of Saddam's rule, political cronyism in the ministries and the shortcomings of the occupation, as well as briefly touching on Raazzaq's assertion that divisions between Shia and Sunni are exaggerated in the public perception of the conflict. In this post I press him on this claim, for if Iraqi Shia and Sunni get along, what has caused 2006's surge of violence along sectarian lines?

His responses started out oblique and gradually became more pointed as he prompted me to fill in some blanks. And his opinion, to the extent it's correct, has difficult implications for Iraq's establishment of a representative central government and American interest in the region.

INDC: What do you think the solution to these problems are now, working within the current framework of the government and the democratic process?

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Posted by Bill at 01:02 AM | Comments (7) | TrackBack (0)
January 01, 2007
Where in the ...

Posted by Bill

Headed to a helicopter bound for Anbar, so I'll have the follow-up interview post up within a day or so.

In the meantime, if anyone has any coverage suggestions or burning questions regarding the Iraqi police in Fallujah and their Police Transition Team advisors, feel free to e-mail or comment.

Posted by Bill at 12:30 PM | Comments (4) | TrackBack (0)
Chipping Away at the Sectarian Story: An Interview with Quais Abdul Raazzaq

Part One

Posted by Bill

The primary intent of my trip is to assess parts of the situation in Anbar, one of the two pivotal political and warfighting theatres of the conflict in Iraq. Of course the other theatre, subject to intense media attention, is Baghdad, the internationally recognized political center of gravity and violent microcosm of the country's larger ethnic divisions. Don't mistake outsized media focus for narrative clarity, however: trying to decipher just what's going on in Baghdad - much less the entirety of Iraq - is a bewilderingly complex task, as ably communicated by Christopher Hitchens in Slate:

Up and down the switchback one goes. At a party in the Green Zone featuring various politicians and intellectuals, I was told of the heartening success of the negotiations on oil revenues, with all parties agreeing in principle to share this national resource among the regions and provinces. On more or less the same day, a move in parliament to create a cross-party bloc of national unity was undone by Shiite hard-liners. In the morning, I was shown a proposal for the opening of an American University of Sulaymaniyah, offering degree courses in a wide range of subjects to students regardless of ethnic or religious origin. By the evening, I was being told of an exodus of qualified Iraqis to Jordan that now almost exceeds the number of educated people fleeing the country under Saddam Hussein.
...
It isn't so much a matter of deciding who or what to believe, because both may be simultaneously correct.

I suggest reading the whole thing, which I offer as a companion to my disclaimer: it's absurd to think that two days and several conversations in Baghdad grant special expertise on such a complex topic. That said, several aspects of Iraq's difficulties are coming into consistent focus.

Yesterday I met with an Iraqi journalist with the intent of acquiring his help in scouring the Green Zone for a cross-section of Iraqi opinion on the execution of Saddam Hussein. Instead we wound up talking for a few hours about Iraq's past, present and future, the roots of the conflict between Shia and Sunni, American motives and shortcomings, and his prescriptions for a better Iraq. The conversation - already difficult through the barrier of my non-existent Arabic and his serviceable if halting English - was at times frustratingly contradictory and surprising; but perhaps the biggest surprise of all was how many of the conventional narratives suspected by amateur analysts in America wound up validated by this man's first-hand opinion.

Quais Abdul Raazzaq is a 41 year-old correspondent for Reporters without Borders (among other outlets) who is well known to Western reporters in Baghdad, one of whom described him as a frank, honest man. All called him likable. I suspect that this status among foreign correspondents lends him significant influence to build the media's narrative about Iraq, as both an information source and a reporter in his own right. He is a Sunni, though he bristles at the popular characterization of this fact, which rigidly demarcates him from his Iraqi "Shia brothers" in the public's perception of a bloody sectarian conflict. Prior to the war, Raazzaq was a cameraman for Iraq Satellite TV, an arm of the government's information ministry, but he stresses that he was "not a member of the Baath."

And while he has significant criticisms of Saddam Hussein's regime, if forced to simply categorize his perspective, I'd label him an educated Sunni who believes Iraq was better off under the former dictator, and one who greatly fears the Iranian and Shiite militia influence in Iraq's politics and current violence. Despite the domestic horrors and wars of aggression stemming from Hussein's rule, Raazzaq's wistful reminiscence for a pre-war Iraq is not exactly irrational, given his frame of reference.

Please note: when Raazzaq refers to "parties" or "members" in the interview, he is often (but not always) referencing Iranian-backed Shiite militant influences in the current Iraqi government.

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Posted by Bill at 12:30 AM | Comments (9) | TrackBack (4)
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