January 30, 2007
Ghost Soldiers Follow-Up: Backstory and Hopeful Signs of Accountability in Iraq
Posted by Bill
I'd learned about how ghost soldiers were bleeding manpower and pay from the Iraqi Army on the 17th of January, when an outgoing Military Transition Team (MiTT) member angrily complained about security operations compromised by thin Iraqi Army units that were purposefully undermanned to skim payroll. Within 24 hours, his gripe had been verified to me by several American and Iraqi sources, and it quickly became apparent that logistical and manpower difficulties partly stemming from corruption were a major impediment to the success of Iraqi Army units operating in Fallujah.
I was awakened late at night on the 18th by a marine corporal who informed me that Brigade MiTT Commander Lt. COL Clayton Fisher requested my presence as soon as possible. I walked over to Fisher's office and found the MiTT leadership in a state of slightly tense animation; the Lt. COL asked me to use my web research skills to find an article about Iraqi Army Second Brigade Commander General Khalid Juad Khadim that was apparently causing quite an uproar among the Iraqi soldiers, the Arab media and the general himself. Searching on the name of the former MiTT commander quoted in the piece, it wasn't long until I'd found Ned Parker's Times of London article exposing endemic corruption in the Iraqi Ministry of Defense and the Iraqi Army.
Having learned of the extent of this corruption in the days prior, I could see that the article was accurate except for one significant piece of information: the Iraqi general specifically accused of stealing payroll in Fallujah was not "ousted," as the article claimed, but was in fact still in command and sitting in an office 30 yards from me as I read the premature report of his professional demise. And boy, was he ticked off.
In between initially futile diplomatic missions to the general's office by the MiTT leadership, the marines staged their weapons in "Condition One" (loaded and ready) and moved me from my solo bunk to share a room with a marine; the coincidence that a journalist was embedded with the Iraqi Brigade on the same day that the Times story broke was not lost on the Americans nor the Iraqi Army officers, and the marines were prudently cautious about the potential for flaring tempers. In addition, the direct quotes in the Times article from former MiTT commander Lt. COL Teeples caused a rift of suspicion and distrust between the Khalid's staff and the current MiTT members. In my case, aside from receiving a few poisonous looks from members of Khalid's security detail, nothing came of the ill will.
Eventually the general calmed down enough to speak to the MiTT leadership, several senior officers and State Department officials. He denied all charges and demanded to file a complaint with the Marines and the US government, apparently misunderstanding the relationship between a free press and governmental entities in Western society. He vowed to fight the charges and went ahead with a planned trip to Habbaniyah the next morning. Over the next 24 hours he refused two of my interview requests, a group of men in civilian vehicles robbed his house of all valuables and the general lit a pyre of documents behind his office late at night. He then left for Baghdad early Monday morning, continuing to assert via telephone his intent to fight the charges and open the books to investigators.
On Tuesday, Iraqi First Division Maj. General Tariq Abdul Wahab Jasim announced that Khalid had been relieved.
And just this morning, I learned of the official appointment of his successor, a General Ali, who one marine describes thusly:
"He's got a great attitude and is a true leader. He's been shaking things up around here, chewing Iraqi butt like it's cool, getting the Jundi to PT and making the brigade staff ... work."
So what happened to the Iraqi Army in Fallujah?
To some extent, General Khalid was scapegoated. While he was certainly guilty of corruption given his position's authority over the Brigade payroll, he's far from the only one; skimming is so common in the Iraqi Army and Ministry of Defense, I'd bet that you'd be hard pressed to find a senior officer without a hand in the pot. But that said, the Times article called out Khalid by name. From there, the Arab media picked up the story and ran with it, which caused quite a stir among the general's staff as well as other Iraqi Army, marine and American civilian officials. I added a very minor contribution, and within several days, the general had been relieved and replaced.
Thus begin stirrings of accountability in the Arab world.
It would be naive to think that such an event will stop corruption in the Iraqi bureacracy, but it may help curtail it; General Khalid's demise could serve as a cautionary tale to his successor and other general officers and bureacrats up the line. Instead of misreporting and skimming 50% of the pay intended for the Jundi, they might skim 20%. Instead of selling half of the fuel budgeted for operations, they may cut back to a third. And so it goes. The more the media can specifically expose individuals who prioritize criminal activity and personal gain over the establishment of Iraq's security, the better chance Iraq has to build a working government, defeat the insurgency and find stability. And it's important to note that while the initial article appeared in a Western news outlet, it was the Arab media's repetition of the story that really generated heat among the IA officers.
Regionally, this is a pretty new paradigm: the exposure of and quick accountability for General Khalid's corruption were among the more encouraging things I saw during my time in Iraq.
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January 27, 2007
Radio Appearance
Posted by Bill
I'll be talking about Iraq on the Northern Alliance Radio network today at 3PM Eastern, assuming other guest Mitt Romney doesn't bump me with his erratic schedule.
You can listen online here or here, or at 1280 AM in the Twin Cities.
UPDATE: Apologies for any incoherence: jet lag.
***
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January 26, 2007
Random Pictures, Two
Posted by Bill
Loud, Bumpy, Fun: the view from the belly of a C-130.
More past the jump:
Read More »
View Larger Image
A mural depicting the massacre at Halabja in Kuwait's "Not to Forget" museum.
Everybody on the Horn: Fallujah Police Transition Team (PiTT) Marines key mics after a mortar attack begins.
Investigate: Corporal Jon Malone checks out a nook of the old Iraqi Police station. I wish I had video, as our terp gave us a guided tour of the scene of the al Qaeda massacre of Iraqi cops while haunting calls to prayer emanated from surrounding Mosques at dusk.
Beats: a Marine checks an Iraqi Police hopeful's resting heart rate before a PT test.
Stone Cold: Navy Corpsman Doc Watson stares down a glob of peanut butter during one of the Marines' downtime eating contests.
In addition to being respected for his medical skill, Doc Watson is feted by the PiTT marines for having done "high speed shit:" he's one of only four Navy corpsmen to ever complete Marine Scout Sniper school, serving on a sniper team in the mountains of Afghanistan after 9.11. He won the eating contest, btw.
IED Effect 3: The charred inside of an Iraqi Police patrol truck. Insurgents have taken to adding fuel accelerant to the bombs in the past year or so.
Powder SLAP: Lance Corporal Aimar Campbell metes out Doc J's punishment for losing an eating contest: a slap with a palm-full of footpowder. Lance Corporal Yeager observes.
Lineup: Iraqi Army recruits form up during basic training at Habbaniyah.
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Ready for PID: waiting for "positive identification" in the turret of a humvee.
You the Man Now, Dogg: SSGT Thomas "Smitty" Smith of Military Transition Team 6 teaches an Iraqi janitor how to shake hands, OG style.
The Iraqi maintenance guys would show up daily to chat and ask for food, soda and "freaky freaky," Iraqi-English slang for skin mags like Maxim.
Smitty gave them a soda, a fitness magazine and some granola bars that day, in addition to the lesson.
Chill: MiTT Marines Lance Corporal Jason Navarro and Corporal Carlos Castillo relax while waiting to convoy.
Fricke Suits Up: Lance Corporal Daniel Fricke is a quirky dude and respected turret gunner. I overheard two other MiTT Marines mentioning that they like having him up there because "Fricke is good to go on the .50."
No Flash Allowed: Jundi (IA soldiers) guard a doorway during a midnight raid and search of a Fallujan residence housing suspected insurgents.
It's a Great Day to Convoy: MSGT James Johnson strikes a pose.
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Bridge Over the River Sty: A quickly engineered footpath keeps most of the mud off of a marine's shoes at Forward Operating Base Castle in the NE part of the city proper.
Way Out: a doorway at FOB Castle.
Marked: it's hard to escape Iraq without acquiring one or more nicknames. The Marines and IPLOs at the PiTT branded me when I left my gear sitting around. A second nickname: "Scoop."
Fricke looks on as Lance Corporal Tyler Mortimer strums a guitar.
***
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January 24, 2007
Where in the ...
Posted by Bill
My month-long leave has flown by and I'm in transit back to the states. Intermittent and slow internet access and a hectic schedule of interviews and missions only enabled me to publish a fraction of the stories I've gathered, however.
The following pieces are in the works:
*** An assessment of the Police Transition Team mission in Fallujah.
*** An accounting of a nighttime raid with an Iraqi Army unit and their Marine advisors.
*** An assessment of the Military Transition Team mission in Fallujah.
*** An interview with a Military Transition Team commanding officer.
*** An interview with the Jundi (Iraqi Army soldiers)
*** An interview with a civil affairs non-commissioned officer and a review of the CAG mission in Fallujah.
*** An interview-based piece on the role of Islam in the insurgency and global jihad.
*** A look at the Iraqi Army training facility at Habbaniyah.
*** A piece on the Marines, how they work and play.
*** Thoughts on the media's coverage of the war and citizen journalism.
*** Personal anecdotes and impressions.
*** At least 2-3 more random pictorials, possibly more.
*** And a final assessment of the current and future state of Fallujah and the war in Iraq as a whole.
I'm sure that other random posts will come up as well, as I've gathered a ton of information, but those are my prioritized topics. I've also got video in need of an editor.
This trip has briefly exposed me to personal extremes of stress, humor, camaraderie, nobility, savagery, hope, despair, fear and excitement, either as an observer or participant. I've arrived at a better understanding of the chaos that stalks civilization and met a lot of inspiring folks who make me want to be a better human being. I wouldn't trade the experience for anything in the world.
For the moment, a down-comfortered hotel bed and full-night's sleep await. Please stay tuned for new material, and thank you sincerely for the support.
UPDATE:
Look Ma, No Snipers: AM view of Kuwait City.
***
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January 22, 2007
"Recruiting Day" (Pictorial Supplement)
Posted by Bill
Police recruits line up (faces blurred for their protection, as terrorists target them and their families).
***
My third Examiner piece is up, an accounting of the recent recruiting drive for the Iraqi Police in Fallujah.
Not my preferred title on the article, by the way. I'm not sure that death and destruction, while present, are the lede.
More blog posts on the PiTT mission to follow.
Read the piece, then check out these pictures accompanying the story:
Read More »
Major Brian Lippo, the Marine Fallujah Police Transition Team (PiTT) commander. An energetic realist and occasional cynic, Lippo was happy with the day's result.
Falluja Marine PiTT executive officer Captain Tad Scott. "You as worried as I am, Bill?" My answer is unprintable.
Corporal Jonathan Malone conducts a briefing. Malone was responsible for organizing all aspects of the recruiting drive, from security to logistics.
Marine and Army PiTT members move out in formation.
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Members of the Army PiTT test a recruit's basic physical fitness with 4 laps.
Applicants were also tested with 20 push-ups. Fallujan push-ups, but close enough.
Iraqi police recruits are processed by the Marines.
Lance Corporal Avneesh Arora retinal scans an applicant.
A Marine scans for threats as mortars come in.
HN Jared "Doc J" Jurgensmier treats and comforts an Iraqi child injured in the mortar attack on the station.
Doc J had him smiling within an hour after the injury: a large chunk of his knee taken by shrapnel.
Lance Corporal Thomas Hauck, Lance Corporal Michael Rickard and Gunnery Sergeant Jason "Gunny" Lawson process and congratulate new Iraqi police recruits.
***
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"Ghost Soldiers" Compromise Operations, Endanger Iraqis and Americans
(UPDATE: Khalid "Relieved")
Posted by Bill
Members of General Khalid Juad Khadim's staff light a pyre in the late evening hours.
Something quite strange even for Fallujah happened here Saturday when the occupants of three civilian vehicles stopped at the home of Iraqi General Khalid Juad Khadim, then marched into the residence and stole weapons, money and gold. What made the theft especially odd is the fact Khalid's personal security detail of 15 armed soldiers stood by and watched, doing nothing.
The identity of the burglars is as yet a mystery, but the raid may have been linked to controversy swirling around Khalid after a British newspaper claimed he is the corrupt beneficiary of large-scale thefts of supplies intended for the Iraqi Army, including fuel and weapons, as well as the pay intended for "ghost soldiers," imaginary Iraqi soldiers listed on a military unit's roster.
The Times of London article claimed corruption throughout the Iraqi Army chain of command and accused Khalid, who was also described as having been "ousted" of having "suspected ties to Shia militias." The latter allegation has circulated before the Times article appeared and was voiced to this writer by an Iraqi civilian and a Marine officer with no prompting other than mentioning the general's name. Other marines caution that such allegations are common yet difficult to verify, often based on thin speculation.
Contrary to the Times account, Khalid was not removed and is still in command of the Iraqi Army's Second Brigade, currently stationed in the Iraqi Training Camp adjacent to Camp Fallujah. Khalid has vigorously denied the allegations, but American military officials contend that overall theft of supplies and ghost soldiers in the Iraqi Army are both real and in part responsible for the deaths of American and Iraqi soldiers.
Many American personnel, including former Military Transition Team (MiTT) members advising the Iraqi Army in Fallujah, vehemently complained about fuel, supplies, weapons and pay stolen by higher echelons of the Iraqi Second Brigade of the First Iraqi Army (IA) Division, as well as IA officials up the chain of command. Current members of the MiTT, however, declined to comment.
A former MiTTer described how "ghost soldiers" result in both American and Iraqi deaths by compromising security operations in Fallujah.
"Let's say there are 500 soldiers reported on staff; there will really be only 300, but someone up the line will report 500 and pocket the extra pay," said the former MiTT member who insisted on anonymity. Having fewer actual soldiers available for patrols and other missions exposes both Iraqi and U.S. soldiers to more lethal attacks by insurgents, he said. The reduced manpower allows insurgents "freedom of movement" to both stage attacks and plant Improvised Explosive Devices, the number one killer of U.S. and Iraqi soldiers and police.
"There's always some level of corruption going on, and that's one thing, but when it's getting people killed, it's unacceptable," he angrily explained.
Another Coalition officer not attached to a MiTT cited what he termed reliable intelligence on another Iraqi general at the Division level whose base pay is vastly exceeded by the $30,000 per month he makes from the corruption. The officer noted, however, that officials must sometimes recognize "the lesser of two evils" as the general in question is "effective and gets the job done."
But it's hard to see how effective a senior officer would have to be to justify such a level of embezzlement. Perhaps half of the Iraqi Army in Fallujah, primarily the "Jundi" soldiers at the bottom of the pay scale, haven't been paid in months. As a result, 160 soldiers in the Iraqi Third Battalion recently walked off the job because of missed salaries. The supposed number of soldiers in the battalion was about 700, yet the loss of 160 reduced the unit's real strength by half. Fuel and equipment shortages greatly influenced by corruption also hamper operations.
Asked who is responsible for stopping such corruption, U.S. officials here point to the Iraqi Ministry of Defense. Because U.S. control of the Iraqi government bureaucracy has been phased out to let locals take the lead, American military personnel working with the Iraqi military have little ability to resolve such pay issues.
Realistic American officials expect and tolerate some degree of corruption in the young bureaucracy, but the Iraqi Army embezzlement is so widespread that at least one active duty Marine officer, Lt. Col. James Teeples, went on the record in the Times' article. Before Jan. 8, Teeples commanded the Marine MiTT advising the Iraqi Army in Fallujah.
"I know there are problems with other division commanders and I know there are problems with folks up at the Ministry of Defense," Teeples told the Times. "So it's not simply just this one brigade commander. If it were an isolated instance like that, they [the army] would probably be doing much better in Iraq than they currently are."
The comments voiced immediately after his departure have spun the relationship between current MiTT team members and the Iraqi Army staff into chaos.
General Khalid refused an interview request and declined to provide a written statement. U.S. MiTT team members who requested anonymity said Khalid denies the charges and plans to file a formal complaint through the U.S. military and State Department.
Khalid and members of his staff lit an unusual pyre in a metal garbage can behind his quarters late Saturday; many assumed that he was burning documents. In a later twist, the general left Fallujah for Baghdad with a well-armed security detail early Sunday morning.
Despite the publicity and the general's stated intent to challenge the accusations, no officials from the Iraqi Army or Ministry of Defense have yet traveled to Fallujah to investigate the claims.
UPDATE: Iraqi First Division Maj. General Tariq Abdul Wahab Jasim today stated that he has "relieved" Khalid.
UPDATE: "Base pay" salary figure of Iraqi Army general officer redacted to ascertain accuracy.
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January 21, 2007
Bill Roggio is Back in Iraq
Posted by Bill
... and blogging from Habbaniyah.
I was there yesterday, but missed him. Check it out:
Habbaniyah and the 3/3-1 Snake Eaters
and
Patrolling with the Snake Eaters
Great stuff.
January 19, 2007
Where in the ...
Posted by Bill
Still in Fallujah, very busy. The publication of the third Examiner piece was delayed, but should run this weekend. A fourth documenting my tag-along on a nighttime raid by the Iraqi Army is on deck.
In the meantime, anti-war, pro-war, confused as Hell, please do me a favor and read this posting in full, at least to understand what animates the idealists willing to sacrifice their lives. It's sure given me a second wind to tell their side of the story.
What a heartbreaking loss. "Immortal words" indeed.
January 17, 2007
HA & MM in Iraq
Posted by Bill
Bryan Preston reports. One tiny fragment:
Calling Iraq a "civil war" misunderstands the nature of Iraq and the term "civil war." Most of Iraq's warring parties don't have any chance at taking over the entire country and don't seem interested in doing so. Most of them are reacting to the vaccuum of power since the iron grip of Saddam slipped off the country. Most of them are reacting to threats they perceive are either coming from the presence of foreign troops, or from the presence of Wahhabi-influence terrorists (al Qaeda) or from fellow Iraqis who belong to the other major sect of Islam, or from Iran. Most militia fighters would probably lay down their weapons if the overall environment improved, and by that I mean improvements in the basics: the economy and education as well as the security environment.
I have minor disagreements with maybe 2 percent of his long, comprehensive piece, but overall, it's simply brilliant.
And Malkin shares her first impressions here.
Here, a task force of brainy commanders, brawny patrol officers, courageous Arab-American interpreters, wizened trainers and intel gatherers, baby-faced convoy drivers, and grim-humored gunners attempts to put President Bush's "winning hearts and minds" idealism into daily practice.
Yes.
Where in the ... (Change of Plans)
Posted by Bill
Again emulating Bill Roggio, I'm dropping plans to go to Ramadi in favor of staying here in Fallujah.
With travel buffers, my schedule probably can't accommodate more than one embed in a Ramadi Military Transition Team (MTT) before the leave of absence from my day job is up, whereas if I stay here, I can accomplish a MTT, a civil affairs embed and probably a visit to Habbaniya. I also don't think I have the full story on Fallujah, not having interacted with the Iraqi Army, nor seen civil affairs or reconstruction efforts.
I've come to the conclusion that to have an idea of what's going on in either city, you need to spend at least two to three solid weeks, ideally four, in each. Compounding the complexity is that the two cities and regions surrounding them are vastly different. All this makes the concept of authoritatively writing about either from Baghdad or DC, as some are inclined to do, all the more unrealistic. It's perhaps possible with a wealth of contacts, but access to first-hand local perspectives is pretty helpful.
Today I'm headed back into the city to embed with the Iraqi Army and their Marine MTT, so posts may be spare. I'm still working on my overall review of the PTT mission, but transcriptions are taking a while. A piece for the Examiner covering last Wednesday's recruiting drive should run this Wednesday, so look out for it if I don't have the ability to link.
In the meantime, enjoy some pics.
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Random Pictures, One
Posted by Bill
Army PFC Ian Reeser of the Ferris and Ammeriyah Police Transition Team sits with a "leetle friend."
Many more after the jump:
Read More »
Walking the Persian Gulf, Kuwait.
Blinky and Inky, BFF: two Iraqi policemen break for a picture on recruiting day.
Anticipation.
Me, I'd rather be back in Kuwait.
IED Effect 1: an Iraqi patrol truck.
IED Effect 2:an Iraqi Policeman's ID, burned along with its owner in a fuel accelerant-laden IED attack.
Got everything you need? Fallujah Police Transition Team commander Major Brian Lippo (right): checks up on members of a Marine Military Transition Team and their Iraqi Army unit in the Fallujah Government Center.
Playing with Light #1: Marine Corporal Jonathan Malone.
Playing with Light #2: International Police Liaison Officer Tom Gorman.
Graffiti left by Iraqi Army units on the walls of the old police station.
Checking In: Lance Corporal Thomas Hauck keys his radio.
Keeping Warm: Marines from Weapons Company 1st BN/24th Mar gather around a fire at a security outpost, downtown Fallujah.
Scars: bullets and shrapnel mark the scene of the Fallujah "Valentine's Day Massacre," when al Qaeda in Iraq stormed the old station, killing 24 Iraqi policemen and one prisoner. Policemen were sleeping in this room when it was grenaded and sprayed with machine gun fire.
A sergeant from Weapons Company 1st BN/24th Mar discusses security with Major Lippo.
Profile: Marine Lance Corporal Michael Baker.
Moving Out: Army and Marine PTT members in patrol formation on recruiting day.
Lippo's Lucky Charms: on the left, a scapular and Mass card of St. Michael, the Patron Saint of Police Officers; the tokens kept Lippo's father safe in his 30+ years as a Philadelphia PD patrolman. On the right is a picture of Patrick J Brown, a firefighter killed on September 11th.
"Stay in School, Kids:" a turkish toilet in an Iraqi jail. I was assured that these were cleaner examples of the genre.
Scanning Rooftops: Marine Corporal Jonathan Malone looks out over downtown Fallujah.
On Guard: Iraqi Policemen man a security outpost at the police compound. IP's take regular casualties from snipers and small arms fire in and around these posts.
J's and a Dominican Cigar: Navy HN Jared "Doc J" Jurgensmier and "Jundi" bond on the roof.
Good to go.
Mine were Fake: this little deaf boy loves, loves, loves caddying around dad's weapon. And he had better trigger discipline than many of the Iraqi grown-ups around him.
Rock n' Roll: Lance Corporal Brian Desouza may be the only Marine in the Corps who smiles when he knows he's being photographed.
Buckle Up: A reminder to the IP's.
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January 15, 2007
"Because the language they use is killing."
An Interview with a Fallujan Police Officer
Posted by Bill
The difficulty of obtaining this interview underscores the political and cultural complexities of the American effort in Fallujah. In order to get a few minutes of alone candor with an Iraqi patrolman, the Marines had to coordinate a task that excused his visit to the American wing of the station. Some Iraqi policeman - typically the ones who are in positions to work most closely with the Marines and civilian advisors - like the Americans, some tolerate the Americans, some dislike the Americans, and it's widely believed that a few actually (at least passively) work with insurgents. Paradoxically in most cases, the majority want Americans to leave, but not yet.
Two reasons: American firepower in and around Fallujah keeps the lid on chaos that waits to engulf the city, and the young Fallujan government still views itself as dependent on the Marines for everything from fuel to equipment to administrative savvy. One of the most frustrating tasks for the Police Transition Team is to wean locals off of this culture of dependency, a process reliant on them learning to work with and trust their central government, as well as do for themselves.
But Fallujans are remarkably insular; their local culture is famously mistrustful. A visitor from Ramadi or Baghdad is considered a foreigner. A Marine intelligence officer remarked to me that the first things Fallujans rebuilt after Operation al-Fajr were the gated walls surrounding their own houses. Another revealing anecdote was supplied by a Marine who cited a Western travel guide to Iraq circa the 1940's: it advised tourists in the region to steer clear of Fallujah, condemning the city as a notorious den of xenophobic smugglers.
Add decades of war and fealty to a Stalinist yet locally benevolent government to the mix, and you've got a difficult cultural stew of suspicion and missing initiative. Fallujans are proud and many are brave, but a number lack much will beyond the desire to personally prosper or just survive.
Broaching American politics for a moment: a simplistic left-wing interpretation might conclude that Americans are despised occupiers who need to leave Fallujans in peace, while a simplistic right-wing or populist interpretation relies on applying something like the golden rule to a multi-layered political situation: the idea that if Americans are there to help, Fallujans should simply go along and be grateful. The reality of the situation - and any successful expression of both Fallujan and American interest - is so much more complex than either of these views.
"Mohammed" is a young Iraqi with bright eyes and gentle demeanor. He immediately asked me for things: food, a soda and, at the conclusion of the interview, some shampoo. I was surprised by three aspects of his answers to my questions: his seeming openness, his intelligence sans education, and his political opinions about the nature of the insurgency. I can't read minds, but his presentation seemed sincere. I also felt great sympathy for the man. It certainly wasn't empathy, as I can barely fathom what it must be like to live his life.
Read More »
INDC: Why did you decide to join the police?
Mohammed: "Just to survive, because you can't make money anywhere else."
INDC: Is the pay good for you?
Mohammed: "Yes. Even I got hit before, I got shot. And that's (also) why I really hate those guys (the insurgents) and I came back to the police force again."
INDC: Where were you shot?
Mohammed: "Nearby the (a specific location in Fallujah). Actually Americans died and I got hurt."
INDC: And where were you shot on your body?
Mohammed: "In my hand and (motions to his side). It was a PKC ... and it was a Syrian guy who shot us."
INDC: How long did it take to recover?
Mohammed: "Two months. And I wished I were dead because it was so painful." (He smiled)
INDC: You mentioned that you hate the insurgents, is that just more now because you've been shot or did you have a different opinion of them before?
Mohammed: "They hit me and they also killed some of my family. Actually they killed my uncle who used to be an Iraqi Army soldier, and they killed him and burned his face. And then they actually started threatening us as well."
INDC: They burned his face?
Mohammed: "Yes. It's a substance called "tizar," it's like, acid. They put it in his face."
INDC: He was alive when they did this?
Mohammed: "Yes, he was alive. They burned him and stabbed him so many times, and also they shot him with bullets. And we found a note on him saying, 'The police and the army and the Americans are all the same.'
INDC: So they killed him because he was in the Iraqi Army?
Mohammed: "Yes. But we didn't tell any of these guys (the Iraqi police) around here (at the time) because they hated the Army as well."
INDC: So why do police hate the army?
Mohammed: "I think because the army actually liberated Fallujah, they work well, and they liberated Fallujah. And some of (the police) actually like (or liked) the insurgents."
"And the other thing would be because they are different (sects of Islam). But after the operations we started doing together, now we became like one and the same, we became like brothers."
INDC: The Iraqi police and the Iraqi Army?
Mohammed: "Yes. Now we became like brothers."
INDC: So how does the police work with the Iraqi Army when some of the police hate the IA's?
Mohammed: "Some bad guys used to be part of the police, but now they quit and ran to Syria. And actually in the JCC (American control room) they know (who) most of them (are)."
The rift between the IP's and IA's that Mohammed describes is accurate, as is the recent, though potentially transitory accord. After a recent set of operations where the Marines encouraged the police and army to work together, the Americans were surprised to find Shia IA's and Sunni IP's joking around with each other and hugging after a successful raid. As Gunnery Sergeant Jason Lawson put it, they were showing off captured insurgents "like kids comparing Halloween candy." Whether this amity will last is anyone's guess.
INDC: So who are the insurgents? Who are the people who are fighting stability? Are they locals?
Mohammed: "(Yes), almost all of them."
INDC: So why are local Fallujans fighting other Fallujans?
Mohammed: "Because the al Qaeda organization came to this city and controlled it so hard by killing. And some people here actually like killing and they liked Saddam Hussein as well, and I think the al Qaeda organization and Saddam Hussein are the same face."
INDC: What do you mean by "the same face," because Saddam was secular, he was not religious and al Qaeda is ...
Mohammed: "Because the language they use is killing. And the same people who used to be with Saddam, now they participate with the insurgency."
INDC: So their motivation for killing is what?
Mohammed: "Money and to be famous. And I think the first reason is to fight the American troops. They say, 'we can start from here and cross all the way to America to fight them.'"
INDC: What would happen if America left Iraq and Fallujah right now? What would happen?
Mohammed: "It's going to be a disaster."
INDC: How so?
Mohammed: "There will be revenge from everybody. And now they are trying to (form the) Islamic Emirate right here."
INDC: What do you think can be done to stop the insurgents?
Mohammed: "By fighting them back and killing them. Or reporting them to the troops."
INDC: But if the Iraqi police isn't doing patrolling, and the Iraqi Army isn't trusted, and the Americans won't be here forever, who is going to do the killing?
Mohammed: "What do you mean about 'no trust for the Iraqi Army?'"
INDC: Well, I've been told that the locals don't trust the IA's because they are from Baghdad and they are mostly Shia.
Mohammed: "No, no, no. Most people they actually hate the Mujahedeen. But they are scared, they're scared, they don't have power in their hands."
INDC: So how do they feel about the Iraqi Army?
Mohammed: "Most of the educated people actually like the Iraqi Army. But two displacements (two major evacuations and upheavals) have happened here in Fallujah, and if another one happens, everybody will die."
INDC: Tell me about the history of the Iraqi police, they've been sort of up and down, they've gone from zero to being massacred, to being reconstituted by the Americans ... where do you think they are now?
Mohammed: "I think only the Americans can (maintain order) with the Iraqi Army."
INDC: What about the police?
Mohammed: "I don't think they can, because they are easy targets. Most of the police get attacked at home and killed."
INDC: Right. Whereas the Iraqi Army and the Americans live in barracks and bases, and their families are elsewhere.
Mohammed: "Yes."
He then told me that a secret war is going on in Fallujah. That citizens, fed up with the insurgency, are tracking down insurgents and killing them. These vigilantes then blame the killing on other insurgent groups, to try and get the splintered mass of terrorists to start killing each other.
Mohammed: "Actually now the mujahadeen and the al Qaeda organizations are fighting each other. Hopefully that will ease things on the police and the Americans."
INDC: What about the tribes? Where are they in all of this?
Mohammed: "Only in Ramadi the tribes are fighting the insurgents. Here in Fallujah some actually support the insurgents because they are scared."
A day earlier, an American soldier told me that the tribes has just, within the past week, declared themselves neutral, intending to let the insurgents fight each other, the Iraqi Army, the police and the Americans. Previously they had been passively or actively working with insurgents or playing both sides of the fence.
INDC: What are your personal plans for the next few years? What do you see yourself doing?
Mohammed: "I think if the situation keeps going the same way, (with vigilantes) killing the insurgents the same way, it (the insurgency) will finish."
"Not to mention the operation that took place yesterday, by the Iraqi Army and the police (Special Missions Group). It actually shook (the insurgents) so much. If we do another 5 or so, I think we'll finish them."
INDC: How many insurgents do you think are operating in Fallujah?
Mohammed: "A little more than 500. Maybe more than that."
"Actually I need to go, because I don't want to stay a long time."
INDC: Ok. One last, quick question: what do you think of Americans, and has that opinion changed over time?
Mohammed: "I think we need the Americans. If they go out right now it's gonna be a disaster. And believe me, even if they get out of Fallujah, Washington itself will be a target."
***
***
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January 14, 2007
The Jacksonian Tradition:
An Interview with Lance Corporal Nathan (Chad) Yeager
Posted by Bill
Exchanging pictures with an Iraqi cop.
A preface: A few weeks before coming over here, I met a pleasant Icelandic woman in a bar. A friend introduced us and told her that I was headed to Iraq, which precipitated her espousal of some interesting political and cultural opinions. Perhaps the most baffling was her repetitive insistence on the morally equivalent, "but what is a terrorist, really?", after I'd employed the term to describe some, but not all, insurgents in Iraq. Even after I explained - three times - that a person who intentionally kills children to sow fear and make a political point animates the term, she had to agree to disagree, and move on to her next silly argument.
It was one of my favorites: "Members of the military are dumb or disadvantaged folks who have been duped or forced into going to Iraq."
I mentioned patriotism, family tradition and the Jacksonian tradition, written about rather eloquently by Walter Russell Meade:
To understand how Crabgrass Jacksonianism is shaping and will continue to shape American foreign policy, we must begin with another unfashionable concept: Honor. Although few Americans today use this anachronistic word, honor remains a core value for tens of millions of middle-class Americans, women as well as men. The unacknowledged code of honor that shapes so much of American behavior and aspiration today is a recognizable descendant of the frontier codes of honor of early Jacksonian America.
The first principle of this code is self-reliance. Real Americans, many Americans feel, are people who make their own way in the world.
...
The second principle of the code is equality. Among those members of the folk community who do pull their weight, there is an absolute equality of dignity and right.
...
The third principle is individualism. The Jacksonian does not just have the right to self-fulfillment -- he or she has a duty to seek it.
...
The fourth pillar in the Jacksonian honor code ... let us call it financial esprit. While the Jacksonian believes in hard work, he or she also believes that credit is a right and that money, especially borrowed money, is less a sacred trust than a means for self-discovery and expression.
..
Finally, courage is the crowning and indispensable part of the code. Jacksonians must be ready to defend their honor in great things and small. Americans ought to stick up for what they believe.
I was surprised when she recognized the term, and even more surprised when she still wouldn't accept my argument.
"They are just poor and uneducated," she said.
I took another stab: citing my high school friend Dan Eggers, my grandfather, various people I know or have read about, none of whom were poor, dumb or otherwise disadvantaged. Exceptions to the rule, according to her. Soon thereafter, our conversation came to a polite end.
Which brings me to this interview: I wish I had the chance to feature extended quotations from many more of the soldiers and Marines that I've met in Iraq, but that being impossible, Lance Corporal Yeager of the Marine Police Transition team will do. A 23 year-old Alabaman possessing an air of confidence and a slow, thick southern drawl, I certainly can't claim that everyone over here nor even the Marines are exactly like Yeager - but a relevant number share his idealism, sense of duty and patriotism.
If my Icelandic acquaintance were to travel to Iraq, she might think, "My, there sure are a lot of 'exceptions to the rule' out here."
The interview:
Read More »
***
Why the Marine Corps:
(Originally) I took a different route, started a business, a body shop. But I always knew I wanted to be like my father; he was Staff Sergeant in the Army. Well, I guess about a year and a half into me owning my shop, my father got deployed over here to Mosul, and I was sittin' down one night and thinking, I got a great family, a father that's unbelievable, and what's it gonna take for me to be half the man he is? And I knew it would take the hardest branch out there, and so that's why I joined the Marine Corps.
I remember being 4 years-old coming home from drill, seeing my dad in his cammies and thinking, "Oh, my dad is a hero." I don't know, I've been raised up in the military. Never in my wildest dreams did I think I'd join the Marine Corps. I always wanted to be a pilot, so I had Air Force on my mind and this and that (Note: Yeager is very close to obtaining his civilian pilot's license).
But I don't know, the Marine Corps is fun, it's a lot of fun. You get really close to these guys, especially being out here with a small team. I love operating with a small team because you bond together like brothers, pick on each other and goof off. But when it comes down to the line, you'd fight to the death for 'em. And I'd hate to see anything happen to any of these guys.
Motivation for volunteering for Iraq:
One of my good friends who I'd gone to high school with, he joined the Marines right out of high school, and he got married to another one of my good friends, we all went to high school together. And they moved to Washington state.
But anyway, he came over here - he was in Ramadi - and I think he was two weeks 'till he came home. And they got ambushed one night, and they couldn't get anyone on the radio, so he stepped out of the humvee. He was the vehicle commander.
Right when he stepped out, the guy on the roof hit another IED and it killed him. The sad thing was, he was supposed to be home in two weeks and his little girl was supposed to be born in three. And, I don't know, it really bothered me. I had to bury him, and right after I buried him my unit asked me if I wanted to volunteer, and I was like "Hell yeah."
Iraq, "field Marines" and hurricane Katrina:
I love being out here. I'm more of a field Marine than I am a garrison Marine - it doesn't bother me to go without a shower for a month at a time. I volunteer for everything that comes up. I was in the hurricane relief for Katrina. That was a ... it made me grow up a lot out there.
It was really different seeing your own kind dead, your own people. We were going into houses and doing body counts, and you'd find a whole family in there. You know, kids ranging from two years old, all the way up to 15 years old, with their parents up in the attic and stuff. It was a ... it was terrible.
Katrina was hard. There was a lot of negative stuff there. I guess the people didn't think we came in soon enough. I was there the day after, but ... I don't know, we didn't know where we needed to be, what we needed to do. We didn't have the food sources there, but right when we got there we started doing everything we could. We started going from house to house, because our trucks were the only trucks that could get through. All the other fire trucks couldn't get through.
So we'd take our corpsman out, go house to house and check on people, take 'em out supplies. It was tough. It was really tough.
Being shot at:
I was up on the satellite phone, talking to my mother; hadn't talked to her for a while, so calling to check in. And I'd been up there for a while, about 15-20 minutes, and I'd just happened to stand up for 3 minutes, and tracers started flying.
Me, I didn't realize they had tracers, they were just like ours, and I just hit the ground, didn't cut off the phone, my mother was listening the whole time.
So I low crawled over on the other side of the roof because SGT [redacted for security] was over here ... and I couldn't find him. That's when a kind of panic attack set in: "Where's he at, has he crawled somewhere?" I thought I'd lost a Marine.
I scanned the whole top of the roof ... came back down here to grab my gear and everything, try to get a head count, and found out that the sergeant had come down. By the time I'd gotten here and staged my weapon the fire had stopped. It was a pretty wild night.
It's different. You think getting shot at, you think you'd hear the whistle of the bullet. (But) they start crackin' when they get close to your head, they start crackin'. It ... opened up my eyes.
More on being in Iraq:
I don't know, I enjoy being over here. I volunteered to be over here. I'd hate ... ... I see these little kids walking the streets while I'm out on patrols and stuff, I throw 'em candy and everything ... I could not imagine kids having to grow up like this. And that's why I try so hard over here to give it 110%, so maybe 10 years or 20 years down the road, I won't have to be back over here doing the same thing. Because I know I wouldn't want my son growing up like this.
Snipers and IEDs:
The only thing you can do is keep your weapon loaded and have all your gear on. If you're gonna die you're gonna die, it's just when and where. I could be rolling out there on a humvee, get shot at, and tuck and roll. But that's not the way we do.
We stop, we put ourselves in danger, we get out of the humvee, we've got all our gear on, and we engage. The Marine Corps has trained us and trained us and trained us to be like that.
Shooting back:
I saw muzzle flash coming out of that building. That's when I came over the radio and said, "I have muzzle flash, I got PID (positive ID), what do you want me to do?"
That's when we all came back up and saw muzzle flash again, and I probably threw about 150 rounds down (Yeager had a SAW). We don't know if we got them, but ever since that night? We haven't been hit again by small arms fire.
A different sort of war:
This war is ... you can't be hard all the time. You have to be understanding and, I don't know, cordial. And it's a different kind of professionalism.
The mission:
We're on the baby steps right now. We've finally got 'em to where they're halfway doing their job, going out there and doing their job, but if we pull out right now, they're still halfway depending on us. If we pull out right now, let's just say things will go straight back to where they were. There's been a lot of progress here. Take the SMG (Special Missions Group - very roughly, an Iraqi SWAT team): the first night they went out, they got butterflies and chickened out. One of them said, "We don't want to go out and do this, we just want to sit back and do QRF (Quick Reaction Force)."
And I said, "Why do you want to sit back and be QRF, what's that going to help? That's not going to help a thing. It's gonna take y'all to balls up, get some fight in you. Because yeah, some of y'all are gonna die. But your kids are gonna grow up to do the same thing you're doing, 20 years from now. You've gotta step up and be the leader."
And now, every night we've gone out, we've wrapped somebody up and got intel from them. We've made a lot of progress.
We've made a lot of progress.
***
***
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January 12, 2007
Where in the ... (Personal Anecdotes and Impressions: PTT Embed)
Posted by Bill
I've returned from downtown to Camp Fallujah, where I'll take a couple of days off from gathering material to transcribe interviews and write about the Police Transition Team's vital mission. My time with the team presented a fantastic opportunity to assess the state of Fallujah from inside the city, meet local Iraqis fighting the insurgency and see how Marines work and relax. Perhaps the hardest part of an embed here is deciding which stories to cover, as there are literally thousands of them.
While I try to synthesize a wealth of information into an accurate, contextual narrative, here are some anecdotes, random facts, amusing stories and personal reflections on the experience:
Read More »
***
Morale Boosters: Morale among the Marines of the PTT is probably as good as it can be, given the difficulty and danger of their mission. The officers and senior non-coms bear much of the stress of working with the IP's and administering the outpost, while younger Marines responsible for security fight boredom and tension with work (convoys, patrols, administration, cleaning), internet, TV, care packages and dumb challenges, the latter a young male tradition that transcends time and place. Between the furor of battles, I'm fairly certain that young Roman Legionnaires challenged each other to Marshmallow Fluff eating contests (or their equivalent) in the snowy forests of Germania.
These good-natured young men reminded me of my friends in high school and college, with the wrinkle that we weren't being shot at or targeted by IED's. It's familiar yet surreal.
***
Angel of Death: I met an outgoing, enthusiastic kid from an Army PTT named Tim Israel. He told me that Iraqis have an excited reaction upon hearing his last name, as it sounds like either "Prophet" or "Angel of Death." When asked which, he jokes with the IP's (Iraqi Policemen) that it depends on whether they piss him off or not.
***
Laugh at the skittish blogger #1:
Mortars make a loud noise but are typically inaccurate, indirect threats. Insurgents rarely stay in a stationary position to fire more than one or two of them, lest American, IP or IA forces nail down their location and rain the wrath of God (or Boeing) upon their heads. That said, 120 mm mortars have a 70 meter "kill zone," and a close or direct hit from 60 - 120mm pieces can be pretty bad news for a given target.
Insurgents fired five mortars at the police station on Wednesday in an attempt to "dial in" the location. Though I've learned to ignore them when they land at a distance, a sufficiently large and close one authored a ringing crack and boom, and I instinctively skipped to put both the fellow with whom I was conversing and a sturdy pillar between the direction of the explosion and my precious behind. I didn't move fast enough, as he smiled kindly and said:
"You haven't been here too long, have you? I'm used to them. Maybe that's bad, but if they're gonna get you, they're gonna get you."
I don't know what that guy was talking about: I was just stretching my legs, man.
***
Blending in: My newly-bearded attempts to blend in with the locals paid off way better than expected: all throughout the visit, Iraqis would approach me and start speaking in Arabic, asking who I was or assuming that I was an interpretor. Communication did ensue, as many with a limited grasp of English have now learned to understand "I don't know what the **** you are saying, I'm American."
I was pretty jazzed about the successful conformity, until Marine Captain Tad Scott told me that the insurgents would probably shoot me first because I looked like a "Company man" (a CIA agent).
Nice sense of humor on those Marines. Does anyone have a razor?
***
Skittish Blogger #2: Yesterday, insurgents mortared police headquarters thrice, as well as mounted a coordinated (attempted) IED and small arms attack on another police station and some Iraqi Army posts in the city. So it was with trepidation that I very briefly walked outside without my armor to obtain the contact info of a visiting civil affairs officer in the compound.
As I walked back and neared the door to the station, I heard a "wa-WHOOMP!" right in front of me, jumped about two feet up and to the left and swore; for a split second, I assumed the worst. The sheepish laughter of a Marine and a Navy Corpsman drifted down from the roof to let me know I was alive, along with the sight of the pile of wood and cardboard they'd just dropped on the ground a few feet in front of me. They said it was unfortunate timing, and I believe them. I think.
Accidental and funny, but someone came a camel's hair away from owing me a new set of underpants.
***
Handy Arabic Phrasebook:
Salaam: Hello, what's up?, literally "peace." i.e. " Salaam, nice Iraqi policeman."
Hamdillah: Thankfully, thank heavens. "It was only cardboard boxes and wood, hamdillah."
Zien: Good. "This local Fallujan food is zien, but I hope it doesn't give me the Iraqi trots."
Muzien: Not good, bad. (Running to the bathroom): "Muzien! Muzien! "
Lak-da-DAK-da-rasi, Anamoujihoodi: "Please don't cut my head off, I'm not Jewish."
That last one might seem like a handy thing to know in certain situations, but it's really useless; the radical insurgents here will cut your head off if you are man or woman, American or Iraqi, Christian, Jew or fellow Muslim. They're equal-opportunity killers.
***
Game Time:
Note:the image above does not depict the specific events described below.
Following the mortars and the attack on the other police station, I was standing on the second floor landing when loud gunfire erupted: BOOM! BOOM! BOOM! BOOM! BOOM! Heavier and infinitely closer than the familiar crackle of a distant AK-47, it sounded like it was coming from inside the courtyard on the first floor. "Holy *@&$, the insurgents are attacking the station and are inside the compound!" was the general thought.
The laconic professionalism of the Marines disintegrated into action.
"General Quarters!"
The men around me did furious wind sprints to their weapons and armor, then moved to established defensive positions. It was a brief, impressive flurry of adrenaline and coordinated activity, soundtracked by a few more bursts of fire from just outside. But as it turns out, the rounds were coming from newer Iraqi Police (IP) recruits who'd decided to celebrate the arrival of the bodies of insurgents killed in the day's attack. They were firing their PKC's (a Russian light machine gun vaguely analogous to an American SAW) up in the air right outside the station.
The IP leadership offered an apology in the face of a steely admonition not to "do that around Marines."
I'll tell you one thing: I feel pity for anyone who tries to attack that station.
***
Persistent reminders that this isn't a game:
Another group of Marines from Weapons Company 1st BN/24th Mar probably have the toughest job in Fallujah: they patrol its mean streets and look for trouble. Several of their number have been wounded or killed, and a Marine was shot in the neck just outside police headquarters last week while conducting a mounted security patrol. He was paralyzed, but the doctors think that he'll regain use of his body after the swelling in his neck subsides.
And just because mortars are generally well-tolerated, almost ignored, doesn't mean they aren't lethal: the rounds fired off in the aforementioned attacks struck wide around the target, wounding a 12 year-old boy and killing a local welder who several Americans described as "a good guy." The boy was treated by Corpsman Doc J, who had him smiling, eating a muffin and drinking juice just minutes after the attack, despite shrapnel stealing a tangelo-sized chunk from his knee. Tough little fella.
The wounded Iraqi Police who are incessantly drug in here and saved also telegraph the danger that lives in Fallujah. Over the weekend, several policemen were driving just outside the gate when rounds struck the hood of their vehicle. They dismounted to shoot at insurgents firing from a building and one patrolman was shot through the upper chest. He dropped to the ground, stood back up and continued to engage the enemy. Soon thereafter, his buddies threw him in the truck and drove him back to the station, where Corpsmen Doc J and Doc Watson treated him. The man had trouble breathing and the bullet had probably nicked his lung, but the docs were confident he would survive.
Days later, looking at the twisted remains of dead insurgents lent stark perspective: this is what death looks like, this is how and where the fiery struggle ends. All that these people were - very much like the animated Iraqis milling about them - is gone, and only a broken husk remains. I forced myself to look at them, and despite my respect for life and the tangible gravity of the reminder about war's stakes, as well as the gruesome nature of their poses and injuries, I remained oddly unmoved. Clinical. I'm not sure what to think about that, except an apathetic "fuck 'em, they're terrorists."
Once you've heard the first-hand stories and seen what terrorist insurgents are doing to both Americans and the people in this city, you might feel that way too. I don't know.
***
And finally, Bill's new first rule of interpersonal relationships: always make friends with the 6'5" hooded man with the large machine gun.
Cobra Commander up there is an Iraqi Policeman. During the police recruiting drive, one of the Marines kept yelling at him, "Hey John Rambo! It's John Rambo!"
The Iraqi smiled and said with a thumbs up, "Bruce Lee! Bruce Lee!" Good times.
I have several pieces in the works, including a review of the PTT's overall mission, a blow-by-blow account of Wednesday's recruiting drive, and a look inside the Iraqi Police Special Missions Group, a hand-picked force of IP's who are just beginning offensive operations in Fallujah. Stay tuned.
***
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January 11, 2007
Iraq Redux
Posted by Bill
I endorse this sentiment:
Without hesitation, I can say that this fight is the most intricate and complicated mission our military has ever faced. Our troops are daily engaging in missions that their military training never prepared them for, but they are performing those missions with amazing thought and skill. When you add in the external forces at play, whether they're stateside politics or the mix of enemies on Iraq's doorsteps and operating on its streets, the mission in Iraq becomes a Gordian knot of military, political and humanitarian issues that overlap to the point that failure in any one will precipitate failure in all of them. So far, we're failing in several but not to the point that the situation can't be rescued. The failures are, in my opinion, almost entirely products of Washington politics and decision-making. Washington has yet to make the war in Iraq a truly national effort, and has not yet brought to bear the full range of American resources it will take to give us a chance of success here.
Very well put, though I would stress the mild caveat that aspects of some failures might be (but are not necessarily) beyond our control, at least within the time frame demanded by the American public. RTWT.
Malkin has also started blogging from Baghdad.
January 10, 2007
"I'm not afraid, I've lost everything in Iraq:"
An Interview with a Fallujan Civil Servant (& Former Insurgent)
Posted by Bill
Note: Please consider this interview a companion piece to my second dispatch for the Examiner. Taken together, they provide a good primer on the challenges facing the establishment of stability in Fallujah.
What makes the insurgency tick? How are they funded? Why is the civil administrative infrastructure in the city so broken? And how can the insurgency be ultimately quelled? These questions are frustratingly complex, but some of them - from a local Fallujan perspective, at least - are answered in this interview. And as interviews go, I think this one is important.
For security purposes, I can't tell you who this man is or exactly what he does, except that he's a local Fallujan in a position to both know about the political situation in his city and to do something about it, if he follows through with requisite initiative. Remarkable about this interview with "Yusef" was the brevity and straight-forwardness of his answers, as it's been my experience that many Iraqis tend to tell long, winding stories as a preface to their point. We talked about the roots of the insurgency, the power vacuum in Fallujah and who and what fills it, his opinion of Americans and the various roles of the Coalition, local tribes, Iraqi Army and Fallujans themselves in establishing order and stopping a radical insurgency.
I'll stress once again that this information is an incomplete and strictly local read on the challenges facing the city; forthcoming American perspectives will add layers of complexity and insight to the situation. That said, it's a pretty good introduction to the fight in Fallujah:
Read More »
INDC: Americans want Fallujah to succeed, to be a successful city, because it's in the American interest. What do you think needs to happen to make this possible?
Yusef: "The last few years when the fight started in Fallujah ... the insurgency, whatever you call them, the resistance against the American occupation in Iraq, it was here, everything started here. It was one of the first cities to fight against the Americans, and since that history it has had that name, that reputation that this city is the best, with the most heroes who fought the Americans. And even if you ask the insurgents which city they would prefer to be fighting from, Fallujah or Baghdad, they choose here. Now everybody knows Fallujah in Iraq, that it is the capital of the heroes who fought the Americans. If the insurgents can get back into the city again, it's going to be a bigger fight than the two battles that happened here earlier. The next battle is going to be tough, tougher than the day the Americans themselves entered Iraq, crossed the borders."
"Working honestly, the way we look at it, we are looking out for the city, and the country after. We are not working for the (Iraqi) government, nor for Americans. To achieve success is not for the government or the Americans, it is for the city itself. I will go to the tribes to ask them - and the answer is 'yes' - if you want the Americans to leave the city, if you want the Iraqi Army to leave the city, we need to work together. To work to protect Fallujah from any insurgents trying to get into the city again."
INDC: So aren't most of the tribes already on the side of law and order in al-Anbar and Fallujah particularly? It's been reported that the majority of Anbar tribes have declared war on the umbrella group of radicals in the province ...
Yusef: "That's true in al-Anbar yes, but here in Fallujah (the local tribes) are not here yet. In al-Anbar yes, I'm not sure of the number."
INDC: So the tribes in Fallujah are not on board yet.
Yusef: "[Soon] we will meet with the tribes. We will meet them and we will tell them the same thing I told you, 'you know what, if you want the Americans and the IA's to leave, the citizens of Fallujah are going to have to take over the city and protect it from insurgency activities.' If they say yes we're going to say we need to work together, you need to get your tribesmen to join the police [and local government]. And fight side by side with us."
INDC: Who is the insurgency? Who are the people who plant bombs every day and shoot at Americans, IA and police?
Yusef: "They have some ideology from some of the American prisons, the one in Bucca and south, in those two prisons there were extremist religious insurgents. The Americans took those people and put them in the prison too and they (the radicals) worked on the other prisoners, teaching them and feeding them that ideology of fighting and to think that everyone else is a sinner and that they should be killed."
Note: I spoke to a Marine Detention Facility Officer intimately familiar with the mentioned corrections facilities, and he verified this characterization; young Iraqis on the fence are often radicalized there, initially associating with fundamentalists as a survival mechanism.
INDC: So the majority of the insurgency here is religious radicals?
Yusef: "People in Iraq fighting, they are kids. They have no knowledge, they are ignorant from both sides, about their religion and education-wise. They (the radicals) buy them with money, so why not? Some guys who work with insurgents and start killing people, when they begin and kill one, they cannot leave."
INDC: What do you mean, they can't stop killing?
The interpreter explains: "It's like when you join a gang in the states. Once you do something, that's it, you cannot leave."
INDC: So the religious radicals are paying young people to join these gangs
Yusef: "From Fallujah to the city of Abu Ghraib, the radicals control everything. Gas stations, power, contracts and, believe it or not, contracts with the Americans themselves. The Americans give a contract to someone and the insurgents extort their share. This is how they finance their operations. An oil distribution facility in al-Anbar, believe it or not, half of its production goes to those radicals and to finance insurgency activities. A Fallujah judge doesn't dare to judge someone. He's too scared. He's been threatened and he has no power to protect himself."
INDC: So how did the insurgents take control of these contracts and the city functions?
Yusef: "They don't do the actual work. They come with money. They find the contractor. That contractor is an innocent person, he is not involved with anything and most all of them now, they are from Baghdad. Like there are some Fallujans, they do their contracts in Baghdad because it's too dangerous to be here, so most all contractors (coming to work in Fallujah) come from Baghdad. The contractor gets the contract, he shows up here in Fallujah to do the job. He starts planning, getting equipment. The insurgents find out about him, they show up, and they tell him, 'you know what, either we get a portion of that amount or you are not finishing it.'"
INDC: It's like the mafia in America.
Yusef: "Yes. So what choice does the contractor have? He's going to be killed anyway, so he's going to accept that deal. He's going to finish the contract, take half the money, and give the insurgent the other half."
INDC: So it all runs on violence and intimidation.
Yusef: "Exactly. Like for a construction worker to do a job here, if he walks in [and is associated with Americans, police or IA], he'll be killed when he leaves."
We then discussed my camera, and whether I was going to take his picture. All Iraqis in civil positions shun pictures and cover their faces in public, lest the revelation of their identity cause them and their families to be killed.
Yusef: "Go ahead and take my picture, I'm not afraid, I've lost everything in Iraq. (al Qaeda) killed my family, they killed my father in one spot, they killed my brother. They chopped my brother's head off. So there is no more to lose."
INDC: But don't you fear for your own life?
Yusef: "No. If you want picture of me go ahead, put it wherever you want."
(I declined)
INDC: If everything runs on violence and intimidation, and that's what people respect in Fallujah, what can we do, and what can the tribes do, practically, to take that power back?
Yusef: "If the tribes will work with us honestly, we can do something about it. But honestly, the tribes let us down."
INDC: How do they let you down?
Yusef: "They do work with the insurgents. When they sit with us, they tell us one version of the story, when they sit with the insurgents, there is another version of the same story."
INDC: So how do you gauge the chances of success of getting the tribes to stop being two-faced and start looking out for law and order in Fallujah?
Yusef: "The tribes will follow, they will be on the side of the powerful person, the powerful group. If we have that power, they're going to be on our side. Right now the insurgents are more powerful, so they are going to be on their side."
INDC: So how do you get that power?
Yusef: "More Iraqi Police. If [Fallujah] recruits more police, it is a good thing, that means we'll get that power, and at that point tribal leaders will be on our side."
INDC: What are your plans to make this happen?
Yusef: "It's going to depend on an upcoming meeting [with] tribal leaders. This is key, I believe, to use it to get into their mentality and convince them to be on our side. [They need to be told] about Marines leaving, Iraqi Army leaving, if the sons of Fallujah will provide security and work with the police."
"If their answer is yes, start sending tribe members to join the police service and the Iraqi Army in Fallujah. If you want the Marines and the (predominantly Shia) Iraqi Army to stay in the city, that's your choice, but you need to be responsible for it. Let's not waste our time standing here and talking. Either yes, the sons of Fallujah will take over, or if the answer is no, end this meeting."
INDC: What if they say 'no?'
Yusef: "[There will be] one option: [government forces] from Baghdad. And they're not [like local forces], it's really kind of [special forces] from Baghdad. But the local Sunni hate them (as they are predominantly Shia), and the members of that team will treat Fallujans terribly."
INDC: Why did you decide to [work to quell the insurgency]?
Yusef: "Because I found that this is going to be the best solution to serve my city and my country."
He then said that he'd like to tell me two things, but warned me that one may anger Americans, and he hoped they didn't get upset.
Yusef: "Through my [experience as an enemy], the way I look at Americans, I look at them and feel like they are occupiers, occupying my country when the invasion happened. But when other parties showed up - especially the radicals and the Iranian militias, both who are not Iraqis - now I prefer the Americans. I've met [various Americans working for Fallujah]. It is my feeling that [they are] working hard, and (before I knew) you (Americans) I had a different image. Now that I know the Americans, I have a different impression. Now I deal honestly with them and feel they are really working for the benefit of my side."
"I think the Americans are more for Iraq than the Iraqis themselves."
He then moved on to his second point.
Yusef: "I want to ask you for something: a one month vacation in the United States to get away from all of this. And if they give me refugee status, I'm marrying an American woman and not coming back."
He laughed.
***
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January 09, 2007
Where in the ...
Posted by Bill
"Jundi" ("soldier" in Arabic) is an Iraqi dog adopted by the Marines here at Fallujah Police Headquarters.
They seem to trust him, but I harbor suspicions about the dog's loyalties to local insurgent groups. That mutt has jihad written all over him.
I've extended my stay with the Marine Police Transition Team (PiTT) advising the Fallujan Police in order to cover tomorrow's recruitment drive, a potentially important milestone in their mission.
A forthcoming Examiner piece will broach analysis of the challenges and complexities of the political situation in Fallujah, and will be accompanied by an illuminating blog interview with a local Iraqi civil servant.
Stay tuned.
Marines from the PiTT, Weapons Company 1st BN/24th Mar and an IPLO assess security, downtown Fallujah.
January 06, 2007
On Patrol with Team Gator
Posted by Bill
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Last Wednesday I rode along on a mounted patrol with members of Bravo Company, Second Assault Amphibious Battalion, aka "Team Gator." As my recent predecessor Bill Roggio described their mission:
The traditional mission of an Assault Amphibious Battalion is to land Marines on the beach, using their huge Amphibious Assault Vehicles (or AAVs), which hold up to 20 Marines and a crew of three.
Here in Iraq, the mission has changed. The Gators have been assigned to patrol Route Mobile, 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. Route Mobile, which, along with Route Michigan, are the two largest roads running east-west through Anbar province.
Route Mobile is an essential supply line for the Iraqi Army, US Military and al-Anbar as a whole, as well as a main conduit for civilians and insurgents traveling between Syria, Ramadi, Fallujah and Baghdad, among other stops. It's undoubtedly also one of the most explosive stretches of highway on the planet.
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Bravo Company is commanded by Captain Eric "Disco" Dominijanni, 34, a charismatic officer originally from Queens, NY. I scratched my head when Dominijani greeted me as a "fellow paisan," until he explained his Chinese, black and Italian heritage. A talented chef who was offered his own show on the Food Network (turned down because of deployment to Iraq), he fed me with a gourmet stash of provolone, prosciutto and salami while conducting a briefing on the Gators' mission.
"Our job is to patrol up and down MSR Mobile, provide route security and convoy security. Basically anything that happens on Mobile is my responsibility," he explained. "We clear it of IED's and provide security for ourselves, anyone who is transiting: military convoys, contractors, IP's (Iraqi Police), the IA's (Iraqi Army), everyone who runs down mobile."
He outlined the nature of the threats to security: Improvised Explosive Devices (IED's) placed along the road, Vehicle-borne IEDs (VBIEDs) driven at their targets, small-arms fire (SAF), rocket-propelled grenades (RPG's) and snipers who sit along the highway in palm groves and buildings. Two Marines were killed and several injured in the month of December. Morale improved when they caught most of the insurgent sniper team responsible for the attacks.
I asked him who the enemy was:
"A lot of (those who plant IED's) are poor farmers who have no money. Some just drop them off on their way to work. A local insurgent leader or ringleader will say 'hey, here's $5 to drop an IED against the Americans," sometimes more if they video them dropping it. It's also almost like a rite to manhood out here. We're getting kids, like 18 and 19 years-old that are trying to look like men, get that symbol of manhood and establish themselves as local leaders in the community. And what's the best way to do that? It's to fight the infidels."
I suggested they join football teams instead.
"Well actually we're doing that, we're handing out soccer balls, and you can actually see the impact in some areas with the younger kids. All kids want candy, but when you see them and they are waving when you drive by, that's a key indicator - but only when no adults are nearby, because some of them will slap their hands down. Some areas are friendly and some are not; you'll feel it, like back in NY. When everyone scatters, something is about to go down."
After a full meal and briefing, I headed out to the vehicle to meet the section commander and his crew.
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Team Gator patrols in an Assault Amphibian Vehicle Personnel 7 (AAVP7A1), also known as an Amtrak Trak, Hog or Gator. The Iraqis call them "the Green Dragon." AAV's are big and boxy enough to wonder just how their 27 tons float, much less maneuver on water.
In the rear is a loading and unloading ramp for the 20 Marine infantry that the craft is designed to hold, but the crew typically mounts the vehicle by climbing up the sides.
My trak and the section of three vehicles as a whole were commanded by Staff Sergeant Niceforo "Joker" Mendoza, a laid-back Marine from Plano, Texas. Mendoza sits in the turret ...
... which swivels 360 degrees and houses the rig's main guns, a .50 caliber machine gun and a Mark 19 grenade launcher. His responsibility, in addition to commanding the vehicle and section, is to monitor the sides of the road for threats.
The driver, Corporal Randal "Wopper" Galan, sits on the left front of the vehicle.
In addition to operating the AAV, he's the vehicle's crew chief. During missions Galan monitors Mobile's three lanes.
"Between the two of us, not much gets by," says Mendoza.
Corporal Tommy Colvin is the third crewman, as well as the section's mechanic.
I sat behind the driver in the "troop commander's seat," traditionally the station that lets a Marine infantry commander gauge "just what his troops in the back are rolling into," explained Mendoza.
With the crews mounted and ready, the Gators rolled out of Camp Fallujah ...
... and on to the arid stretch of highway dubbed "MSR Mobile."
The highway's median is littered with smashed and broken guardrails. Earlier in the conflict, insurgents and their hires were placing IED's on the inside of the rails, making them impossible to spot without having parallel patrols cover each other from both sides of the road. Engineers took care of the problem by destroying the tempting hiding places.
Lowered into the hatch, the crew leaves snipers little-to-no target, though Mendoza jokes that he faces exposure in the turret because he's "so damn tall." 360 degrees of armored glass panes give crew members a view in front of and around the vehicle.
The search for threats is constant. Cars stopped by the side of the road are potential VBIED's. Mendoza watches their wheels for an outward turn signaling an attempted charge at the Traks. When a suicide bomber makes a run at one of his vehicles, the turret gunner on that Trak and/or another vehicle covering the Trak uses its guns to destroy the vehicle before it can close and detonate.
IED's can hide in or behind innumerable objects. While on patrol, we slowed for tires, rocks, more tires, more rocks, trash and ...
... holes made from previous IED explosions.
"One of the insurgents' favorite things to use is a hole from a previous blast. If it's in the concrete, Seabees or engineers will go out with Quikrete to seal up the hole ... so when we see a hole it makes us nervous. They'll also stuff it inside tires. Firestone must give them their tires over here, because there is rubber everywhere. We started burning dead animals because they started stuffing them with IEDS."
"Any time you can't see on the other side of something, you have to assume it's an IED. We approach slowly. If it really doesn't feel right, we stop, form the vehicles in a defensive perimeter."
Mendoza then looks through various optics to assess the threat. If one is found, an Explosive Ordinance Disposal team is called out to take care of it.
A couple of hours into the patrol, Mendoza ordered this vehicle stopped and searched along with its occupants.
"I saw two trucks and one white car. The area we were in has been prone to everything from kidnapping, to carjackings, to basic burglary. Part of our job out there is to keep the Iraqis safe as well as Coalition forces. It appeared that the occupants of the white car might have been trying to burglarize or carjack the two white trucks, and I might have pulled up to disrupt it. When we pulled up and I got closer, I saw there were four male occupants in the vehicle, which made it even more suspicious, so we just conducted what's called a "SNAP" vehicle check on them, where we block off the road and conduct a search. We pulled in tight, real tight, the way we did to combat any snipers or anybody who was watching us, to keep my guys who were on the deck (conducting the search) as safe as I could."
No weapons were found and the men were let go.
"Last month on the same road, I was actually down by the Abu Ghraib prison, and I was stopped by an Aegis convoy, which is a British civilian-run contractor. They'd just taken some small arms fire up near the Iraqi checkpoint, so we pushed up to see what was going on, we got there right after the engagement. I went to talk to the Iraqi soldiers to ... check the area out. While I was doing that, another bus had pulled up, stopped, talked to the Iraqi captain, who was able to turn around and tell me in English that some buses had gotten hijacked up the road. So we took off with the Iraqi Army captain, following his humvees to try and find these buses."
"As we got closer to the area, I saw the buses about two kilometers to the south down that road, and as I pulled up, there were five or six sedans that took off along with the buses. I was able to get the buses stopped so I could chase down some of the cars - not gonna happen in an Amtrak, they were too fast. So we went ahead and searched all the buses to make sure there were no hijackers in them. We got the buses cleared (with the Iraqi Army). (The bus drivers) were nervous about getting attacked again so we escorted them with a humvee gun truck all the way out of our area. "
"Had I not shown up, they would definitely have had some hostages, they would have robbed every single person on that bus clean. The people on that bus were from Baghdad, they were trying to make their way out of the country to Syria, so they pretty much had all of their possessions they could carry on them, including their money."
I asked him who the perpetrators were:
"The vehicles that we came on matched the vehicle descriptions of the ones that fired on the IA's (Iraqi Army), so there is no doubt they were part of an insurgent cell looking for means to get money to purchase weapons, either by straight burglary or by kidnapping individuals and holding them for ransom."
Blue sky, open hatch.
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Other than the SNAP, a brief stop for a maintenance issue and various IED checks, our patrol wound down in the early evening hours peacefully, the gators heading back towards base to meet their relief. Unfortunately a sister humvee patrol was hit by two IED's at the close of the shift, but the section escaped with rattled nerves, two concussions and superficial damage to their vehicles.
What struck me about the seven-hour patrol was how tough it was; not only from keyed up nerves that come along with looking for explosives, trying to draw small arms fire and worrying about snipers, but its discomfort (the seats are not La-Z-Boys and the trak is loud), length, tedium and temperature - the January evening in the Iraqi desert quickly became frigid. I can only imagine how uncomfortable these patrols are in the summer, especially when you consider that they lasted 12 hours on Mendoza's last deployment.
These guys work hard.
After queuing up with other vehicles for refueling ...
... the Hog was parked and the crew headed for Camp Fallujah's chow hall.
Unloading.
I then sat down with SSgt Mendoza and asked what defines a successful mission:
"Successful missions for me ... bottom line is bringing everyone back into the wire, alive, with all of their fingers and toes attached, and everything working the same way it was when we left. If I can do that, it's a successful mission for me. If I can find things, that's like bonus. And that's really what keeps us going. It's like the ultimate Easter Egg Hunt, except you're not getting candy or money out of it, it's just the satisfaction of a good day's work.
I have to go find these IED's, but I don't want to do it recklessly. Leading these guys out here looking for these IED's, and to make it successful, you really have to do two things - that's ... to trust your gut instinct and your brain, you really need to know what's going on out there. I can teach you 300 different ways to look for IED's out of textbooks, but if it doesn't feel right, then that's the best indicator of all."
I asked why he liked being a Marine:
"My favorite part about being a Marine is just being with my fellow Marines. Being with those young kids ... I call them kids, but they're men, but... they're (a little over) half my age so a lot of them were in grade school when I started out. Almost all of them were in high school when Septemer 11th happened. 90% of my Marines in my section watched the invasion of Iraq on TV, and I look back and think about Desert Storm, how I watched Desert Storm on TV - these kids are out here for a reason."
"They knew what they were getting into and I don't want to let them down."
"(I like) just being around them, being with them. Going out there every day with them. There have been a couple of times where they left the wire without me because of injury and it killed me, ate me up inside. I couldn't stand it. But both times I sat there right in that radio room, listening to that mission. I have a wife and two kids back home, that's back home. Out here I have nine young Marines who depend on me to not take them out there and get them killed."
I asked him how Fallujah is doing and how he regards the progress of his mission:
"I like to think I'm making a difference. We have to be doing something right, with how the IEDs are going down. Now, with the bad guys shooting at us? We almost invite them too, because it gives us a chance to do some killing ourselves."
"I keep hearing Fallujah is a safe haven, it's an oasis compared to what it was last year. It's such a huge change between last year and now, we must be doing something right. We're working on the security issue, but the Iraqis have to stand up and do that for themselves, as we're not gonna be here forever."
"But we'll stay as long as necessary to get the job done."
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January 04, 2007
First Examiner Piece/Hangin' with the IPLOS
Posted by Bill
IPLOS are "International Police Liaison Officers," civilian police officers hired by the State Department to help the military Police Transition Teams get their Iraqi stations on the right track. To the left is Jody Martinez of Leadville, CO, with Tom Gorman, of Stark, FL. The cigars are Dominican. Much more on them and their role with the Fallujah PD later.
For now, check out my first piece for the Washington Examiner, profiling two Navy Corpsmen doing an incredible job.
Power and internet are intermittent, so I'll get the promised pictorials uploaded when possible.
Daybreak in the City of Mosques
Posted by Bill
I just finished my first piece for the Examiner and will link it as soon as it's published. Also on deck is the promised post on my patrol with the Gators and more, much more.
Read More »
January 02, 2007
Where in the ...
Posted by Bill
I just got back from a first mounted patrol/IED hunt in and around Fallujah. It was interesting, long and uneventful in the violent sense, though another patrol was hit by two IED's as we headed back to base. No serious injuries, some rattled nerves and superficial damage to Humvees, thankfully.
But don't let my leading drama monopolize you: it's almost odd how "normal" operations seem here, with folks just doing their jobs, calmly and professionally. The food is good and morale seems high. The number one answer to "How do you like being a Marine?" is "I love it, sir." (Non-random sample size of 4 respondents, the results of this poll should not be considered scientific)
I'll have a pictorial post documenting my day with "the Gators," the Marines of Bravo Company, 2nd Assault Amphibious Battalion, up soon, but a few quick impressions: these Marines are professional, they work really, really hard, and most of them are unusually good-natured and funny; at least half the positive experience of today was listening to them bust each other's balls. Great guys.
I'm pressed for time with the embed schedule, as first thing tomorrow morning I head out for a 3-5 day stint with a Police Transition Team advising the local Fallujah police. I'm coasting in Bill Roggio's wake for my first two embed slots, and hope to augment his superb analysis with some human interest angles and pictorials. Therefore, it may be at least a day or two before any substantive posts.
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UPDATE: Quote modified for accuracy.
"[T]hey want to destroy us:" An Interview with Quais Abdul Raazzaq
Part Two
Posted by Bill
This is the second installment of my interview with Quais Abdul Raazzaq, a 41 year-old Sunni Iraqi journalist. In the previous post we discussed Iraq's deterioration since 2003, the nature of Saddam's rule, political cronyism in the ministries and the shortcomings of the occupation, as well as briefly touching on Raazzaq's assertion that divisions between Shia and Sunni are exaggerated in the public perception of the conflict. In this post I press him on this claim, for if Iraqi Shia and Sunni get along, what has caused 2006's surge of violence along sectarian lines?
His responses started out oblique and gradually became more pointed as he prompted me to fill in some blanks. And his opinion, to the extent it's correct, has difficult implications for Iraq's establishment of a representative central government and American interest in the region.
INDC: What do you think the solution to these problems are now, working within the current framework of the government and the democratic process?
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Razzaq: "I told you, I am happy to see my country grow up and return back, because really we want to be like the Gulf Region and other countries in our neighborhood. We want to live in peace. We don't think because you are Sunni you should be killed or because you are Shia you should be killed, or the Shia kill the Christian ... I work with, within one office, we have Shia, Sunni, Christian, and we all live together and eat together and sleep together ... that means we are like a small family. This means I do not hate our (Shia) friends. I have my friend he is (missing) two days, he is Shia. You can believe me, I called his family every two hours to know exactly about his news, is he ok, is he returned back to his family or not? That means I love my brothers."
INDC: So you've been saying that most Iraqis don't have this rock solid religious identity, where they say 'I am Sunni first,' or 'I am Shia first,' but some apparently do, because there is a great deal of violence based around these divisions, correct?
Razzaq: "My friend, I told the truth because I am a journalist. Under Saddam rule, he did not (attack because of religion), he put in prison those who (stood) up against him. Saddam did not like our neighborhood, he was stupid in his rule because he didn't (get along with his neighbors). The Baath hate Iran, they hate Syria, they hate Kuwait. When he occupied Kuwait, all the Iraqi people (did not) want that, because we suffered with Iran like 8 years and he started war again with Kuwait. All the Iraqi people, not just Christian, Shia; even the Sunni people (did not want war). You know his rule you couldn't go anywhere? I am now 41 years old and I have never gone to any other country - because he was always going to fight, he wouldn't let the young people (travel)."
INDC: Yes, but let me clarify my earlier question - as a secular country, I tend to believe you that Sunni and Shia identity isn't primarily important to all or even most Iraqis - for example, even US troops training the Army say that the two groups get along ok within Army units - but within this year there's been this bloody sectarian conflict going, where people are found beheaded or tortured. And those killed are Shia by Sunni and Sunni by Shia. So assuming most Iraqis don’t have a problem with the other group, what percentage of the population are extremists and what motivates them to kill? Why do they think differently than the harmony that you're talking about?
Razzaq: "I tell you, after the war since two years, 2003, nothing happened like that, nothing happened like that. (But) I think US troops ... asked people to use their eyes to see what was going on around the town."
INDC: US troops asked people to gather intelligence? You blame this?
Razzaq: "Yes, intelligence. And the Coalition Forces arrested many civilian people and the problem with the Iraqi is that they see their brother or cousin killed or detained, they don't just sit and watch. They get revenge. This is the problem."
INDC: But if what you say caused this, that US troops caused this, or even the Iraqi government, why would individuals take revenge on a neighborhood full of Sunnis, kidnap a bunch of people and kill them? I'm talking about the militia activity - the Shiite militias loosely under Sadr have been out of control and committing violence, for example. They're not fighting the US or even Iraqi troops so much as fighting a religious war against other Iraqis. Why?
Razzaq: "The coalition forces arrest some. You know the battle of Fallujah. I don't need to see Al Qaeda with my eyes to know there is Al Qaeda - we know there is Al Qaeda in west and north Iraq. They are called "real Islamic." I am real Islamic. But I am not real Islamic to believe that because you are foreign that means I should beat you. I would like to meet you and shake your hand and to make with you a good relationship, but others, because they really suffered, (because) the coalition forces ... attack their house or kill some civilian people and detain many, many people, that's why it (makes the) people very, very nervous and they started to attack US troops."
INDC: Again, you talk about motivations to attack coalition forces. What I don't understand is why they are attacking other Iraqis...
Razzaq: "Because they think they help the coalition forces. And those who fight now, some of them were old Saddam rule, some old Saddam guards, and some are revenge (killings) because relatives were killed. And that's why I say the Coalition did not come to help our country, they come to destroy it. The coalition forces (bring some) parties who want to be our leaders, (parties who) didn't come to help us, they want to destroy us."
INDC: Who?
Razzaq: "Some (political) parties. I think you know them, yes, you are media. You know them. They didn't come here to control our country, they came to destroy it. I have a friend, yesterday he left his house to meet his friends at our office and say congratulations about our situation (the celebration of Eid), but we don't know (where he is), he's disappeared. But don't be surprised, this is our situation, this is our freedom."
INDC: So how common is a kidnapping like this?
Razzaq: "The problem is I told you, because we don't have security in our ... streets, the insurgents they are around the town running free, the militia make a checkpoint if they want, and they kidnap anyone because if you are Shia they (get revenge for Sunni taking) a Shia, if you are Sunni (they get revenge for Shia taking) a Sunni."
INDC: So how much of the kidnapping is motivated by religion, how much by the insurgency, revenge or just crime, to steal possessions or kidnap for ransom?
Razzaq: "I work with France journalists, I work with Swedish journalists, I work with Canadian journalists. I took them - after the war - to Basra, South Iraq, to the Mosul, North Iraq, without the fear someone would kidnap or arrest me because I took some journalists. Today it's different, because now we see how this country is destroyed. And the people they think all journalists are agents for IA or Coalition forces."
INDC: They suspect collaboration...
Razzaq: "Yes, and they are upset because they didn't change anything for our country."
INDC: So that's one motivation, you are saying people are angry with the government and the occupation forces for failing to improve the situation; but let me ask you about something you might have implied earlier. After the Golden Samarra mosque was blown up at the beginning of the year, the sectarian violence has gotten very bad. Many have reported that Iran is putting money, fighters and weapons into...
Razzaq: "Yeah, yes, that is the first reason the sectarian violence started between the Iraqi people."
INDC: ... because at that point the Shia started fighting back.
Razzaq: "Let me tell you something about the Samarra Mosque. During Saddam's rule and before Saddam's rule, all of the Sunni people (attend) services there prior. It's not just for Shia people, it's for Iraqi, all of the Iraqi people visit it. How can you believe that our sheik or our Imam all the Iraqi people (do not) respect them because those people returned back for our messenger Mohommed. They are like our mirror. Because those are real people who love our God and ..."
INDC: But there are some - and I'm not just talking about Iraq, but Islam in general - there are plenty, Al Qaeda, for example, who (as Sunnis) legitimately hate the Shia and vice versa. For example, when Hezbollah was fighting Israel, Al Qaeda released a statement - and you know how much they hate Israel - that condemned Hezbollah because they are Shia, regarded as false representatives of Islam.
Razzaq: "I told you we can say because if you love your God, you should love Mohommed and love his people ..."
INDC: Yes, yes, but some are extremists.
Razzaq: "In their head, the Shia people love and they respect (Muslims, but) there are bad people - like we call terrorists - they want to make trouble between the Shia and Sunni people to ... start sectarian violence between them. I've never gone to Samarra, but I don't think it's the Sunni people (who) destroyed (it) to make the Shia hate all of the Sunni people."
INDC: Well there are theories that entities with an interest in starting the violence were behind the bombing... perhaps Iran, but perhaps it was Sunni ...
Razzaq: "I cannot tell you exactly '100%, yes that's Iran,' because I don't know, but I (could) see it."
INDC: Well not just Iran. Who else is fomenting this civil conflict when you say that Iraq has traditionally been peaceful between the Shia and the Sunni?
Razzaaq: "My friend, in Saddam society when he fought Iran, in his 35 years he hated Iran. But after 1988 we made a deal with them and our people visit Iran as tourists, they visit Iraq, the (holy sites) in Najaf and Karbala. But there are some parties that came here after the war. But they didn’t do good things ..."
INDC: But who?
Razzaq: "Look at me I do my job. But I don't say just because you come from Iran hate him ..."
INDC: Yes, but who wants this fighting to take place? Who wants this sectarian war? Spell it out for me.
Razzaq: "My friend. After 2003, if (we'd) seen those parties (Iranian backed Shiite parties) let our country grow up and return to natural life, we could have said yes, welcome here in Baghdad, welcome here in Iraq. After 4 years nothing has happened for our country, so what does this mean? That's why the Sunni people in Tikrit and al-Ramadi hate those parties. Because they thought they obey the orders from Iran."
INDC: You mean the ruling parties in the government? (The Sunnis in Tikrit and Ramadi) don't trust the central government.
Razzaq: "Yes, that's right. They don't trust the government. And even those leaders did not make equality between the Iraqi people. So tell me why the pilots under Saddam regime were killed (after the war)? Who killed the leaders who fought during the war with Iran? We have 45 pilots during Saddam’s regime dead. Who killed them?"
INDC: Why don't you tell me.
Razzaq: "Who killed the leaders who fought during the Iran war?"
INDC: Those forced to fight under them, those forced to go to war? For revenge?
Razzaq: "Yes. And even that there are some parties, now they have (purged) the Baath party members, but now (that they are in power), they continue Saddam's society of killing anyone who stands up against them. They should respect the people, and let them live together in peace, not to revenge and kill. Those who were members of the Baath party - I think they have a family, they have a child, they have a big family. So why are they killed? Revenge. And that lets the revenge grow. And (because they are dead) that means they could not help our country. (Those militias who are murdering them) are like the Saddam regime."
INDC: So when you talk about these parties committing revenge - how much of the government right now do you think is controlled by parties with revenge on their mind?
Razzaq: "You tell me. Who is now our leader?"
INDC: Right. al-Maliki.
Razzaq: "Yes. How could you live in peace?"
I argued that al-Malki's ascendance was the result of a popular election, thus representing the will of a significant portion of Iraq, but Razzaq claimed that the elections were unfair. When pressed for the 'how," he outlined and admitted two popularly known items about Iraq: that many Sunni rejected and still reject the Iraqi constitution because they are dissatisfied with the balance of power, and that Sunnis had essentially shot themselves in the foot because they refused to participate in the elections, thus losing representation in Parliament. Of course, Razzaq didn't quite put it that way, but the result of a Sunni refusal to participate had clear consequences.
We also talked about how coalitions work in a representative democracy, and he brought up a good point: since the Kurds are basically champing at the bit for independence, many almost biding their time for a break-up of Iraq, the natural coalition between Sunni and Kurd that would balance Shia dominance is less likely to show up any time soon. It's a tricky situation.
Razzaq was very adamant that Iraqis do not want to split the country. His perception is right: polls consistently show that large majorities in Iraq want the country to remain whole.
Razzaq: "[M]any people do not want to split our country, my friend. Many fight because they know if our country is divided into 3 divisions ... we lose our country."
INDC: But the fighting is actually what's causing policy makers and advisors to consider the possibility of breaking Iraq up. Because they see this civil war and think that it might solve it. Violence makes this more likely to happen, so as plans go, it's not a good one.
He then gestured and spoke to a friend in Arabic.
Razzaq: "He is a Shia and I asked him whether he wanted to (split up Iraq) and he said 'of course not.' Because his brother is wedding a Sunni woman, his uncle took also a Sunni woman. That mean we are always together. The problem is some leaders in our government. They are bringing the insecurity and violence to us.
And there you have it. After an hour of "wink, wink, nudge, nudge, know what I mean, know what I mean," we'd finally built his plainly stated belief that the current Iraqi government is run by Shiite parties backed by foreign influences, which have no interest in stopping the violence. Is this merely the perspective of a Sunni who is nostalgic for Saddam's rule? I'm not sure, because to some extent we know that revenge killings are happening; we know that Americans arrested Iranian agents and were forced to release them by the current Iraqi government, we know that Iranian-trained Sadrist splinter groups are behind many of the murders and that the government has failed to reign them in; we know that Maliki halted a cordon of Sadr City during the search for a missing serviceman.
I certainly don't endorse many of Razzaq's conclusions, especially given his relentless and sometimes contradictory negative argumentation and visceral distrust of American personnel, but he's not exactly out in left field in his concern. And even supposing he is wrong on some things - perhaps the extent to which the government is co-opted by Shia militias - the fact remains that if the perception of government-sanctioned sectarian violence is popular among the Sunni, and perhaps even among the moderate Shia (some of whom sat in the room with us during our discussion), it will be difficult to form a peaceful Republic under a blanket of mistrust.
Next I'll wrap up the discussion with a shorter post which includes Razzaq's contradictory condemnation and passive endorsement of the actions of US troops, my thoughts on his influence with the media, as well as pin down his solution for a better Iraq. Hint: it's not Jeffersonian Democracy.
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January 01, 2007
Where in the ...
Posted by Bill
Headed to a helicopter bound for Anbar, so I'll have the follow-up interview post up within a day or so.
In the meantime, if anyone has any coverage suggestions or burning questions regarding the Iraqi police in Fallujah and their Police Transition Team advisors, feel free to e-mail or comment.
Chipping Away at the Sectarian Story: An Interview with Quais Abdul Raazzaq
Part One
Posted by Bill
The primary intent of my trip is to assess parts of the situation in Anbar, one of the two pivotal political and warfighting theatres of the conflict in Iraq. Of course the other theatre, subject to intense media attention, is Baghdad, the internationally recognized political center of gravity and violent microcosm of the country's larger ethnic divisions. Don't mistake outsized media focus for narrative clarity, however: trying to decipher just what's going on in Baghdad - much less the entirety of Iraq - is a bewilderingly complex task, as ably communicated by Christopher Hitchens in Slate:
Up and down the switchback one goes. At a party in the Green Zone featuring various politicians and intellectuals, I was told of the heartening success of the negotiations on oil revenues, with all parties agreeing in principle to share this national resource among the regions and provinces. On more or less the same day, a move in parliament to create a cross-party bloc of national unity was undone by Shiite hard-liners. In the morning, I was shown a proposal for the opening of an American University of Sulaymaniyah, offering degree courses in a wide range of subjects to students regardless of ethnic or religious origin. By the evening, I was being told of an exodus of qualified Iraqis to Jordan that now almost exceeds the number of educated people fleeing the country under Saddam Hussein.
...
It isn't so much a matter of deciding who or what to believe, because both may be simultaneously correct.
I suggest reading the whole thing, which I offer as a companion to my disclaimer: it's absurd to think that two days and several conversations in Baghdad grant special expertise on such a complex topic. That said, several aspects of Iraq's difficulties are coming into consistent focus.
Yesterday I met with an Iraqi journalist with the intent of acquiring his help in scouring the Green Zone for a cross-section of Iraqi opinion on the execution of Saddam Hussein. Instead we wound up talking for a few hours about Iraq's past, present and future, the roots of the conflict between Shia and Sunni, American motives and shortcomings, and his prescriptions for a better Iraq. The conversation - already difficult through the barrier of my non-existent Arabic and his serviceable if halting English - was at times frustratingly contradictory and surprising; but perhaps the biggest surprise of all was how many of the conventional narratives suspected by amateur analysts in America wound up validated by this man's first-hand opinion.
Quais Abdul Raazzaq is a 41 year-old correspondent for Reporters without Borders (among other outlets) who is well known to Western reporters in Baghdad, one of whom described him as a frank, honest man. All called him likable. I suspect that this status among foreign correspondents lends him significant influence to build the media's narrative about Iraq, as both an information source and a reporter in his own right. He is a Sunni, though he bristles at the popular characterization of this fact, which rigidly demarcates him from his Iraqi "Shia brothers" in the public's perception of a bloody sectarian conflict. Prior to the war, Raazzaq was a cameraman for Iraq Satellite TV, an arm of the government's information ministry, but he stresses that he was "not a member of the Baath."
And while he has significant criticisms of Saddam Hussein's regime, if forced to simply categorize his perspective, I'd label him an educated Sunni who believes Iraq was better off under the former dictator, and one who greatly fears the Iranian and Shiite militia influence in Iraq's politics and current violence. Despite the domestic horrors and wars of aggression stemming from Hussein's rule, Raazzaq's wistful reminiscence for a pre-war Iraq is not exactly irrational, given his frame of reference.
Please note: when Raazzaq refers to "parties" or "members" in the interview, he is often (but not always) referencing Iranian-backed Shiite militant influences in the current Iraqi government.
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INDC: Tell me, what is the overall Iraqi reaction to the execution?
Raazzaq: "Before he was executed, we heard some people talk about there being fighting or demonstrations on the streets, but I don't believe it because ... for our history it's nothing. Saddam is gone. We should see our future and forget about Saddam."
INDC: A colleague had mentioned that you are a Sunni ...
Raazzaq: "I am Sunni. (But) I am Iraqi."
INDC: ... and perhaps a nationalist. So can you tell me: is there a different reaction among the Sunni and the Shia? The story is sometimes portrayed as the Shia celebrating, while some of the Sunni are upset about the execution.
Raazzaq: "Listen my friend, we don't like to talk about the revenge (between) Sunni or Shia, that because I am Sunni I am sad about the execution. In Saddam's rule, even we didn't pay attention (to the difference), (because) we are Islamic. Because I am Islam, I think Islam was a big, big, big mercy for all the world, not only the (Muslim), but the Christian, the Jewish, because there is a rule: I can't see another human - especially Arabic or Islamic - and see him dying and say 'I am happy because he is died.' Or 'should be revenge.' Our God - He can say (that man) is good or is bad. It is up to our God. But I don't want to be ... sad (about the execution) because I am Sunni."
"Saddam was stupid in his rule. We suffered about 35 years in his society and he always make hard relationship with our neighborhood. So it does not mean that because I am Sunni I am sad about him. Saddam, he was our leader and we are very sorry about his execution because we are now happy (during) four days of our Eid (the holiday celebration at the end of the Haj), that lets all of the Iraqis be happy, especially after we have suffered after 2003. And really we need to sometimes feel we are happy and visit with our families and forget about the war. And (for the execution) to kill the special (feeling during) the first day (of Eid) is sad."
INDC: But surely you admit that some are pretty happy about his death ...
Raazzaq: "I tell you, Saddam was stupid about his rule, but this does not mean all the Shia suffered during his rule; Saddam punished everyone who stood up against his society. I am not a member of his Baath Party, but this does not mean I should hate him or love him."
"I swear, you can talk with many people, he didn't kill any Shia people (for being Shia), all the people in Mosul and South Iraq when he visited any town, the people make a demonstration and say 'welcome Saddam' and (are) very happy and sometimes dancing. That mean Saddam not hate all Shia people. Saddam hate anyone who stand up against his society."
"Some parties in Iraq have a bad history here in Iraq. That's why we feel today, now we have more than 50 parties since 2003, and what's happened to us? You see sectarian violence, people killed, ministry killed, the gunman kill, the criminal kill, but where is the law within our country? Saddam give us one thing: he protected all the Iraqis with good security. And during Saddam's rule you could go anywhere. He who live in Basra, he can work in Mosul. He who live in Mosul could work in Baghdad. (Now) you cannot go to Mosul. (Not) because that is 'a place (only) for Sunni,' (but) because there is big trouble."
INDC: But when you say that Saddam only killed those who opposed him - much of it goes a lot farther than that; he killed quite a lot of innocents who weren't politically active ...
Raazzaq: "In Saddam rule there were many parties he stand against ... and killed and put them in prison, like Islamic Party and ... other parties, those also from Sunni, (in addition to) Shia, Christian, and others."
We danced a rhetorical circle around this issue several times, but only after listening to the interview on tape did I grasp our disconnect: while Raazzaq was glossing over some of Saddam's crimes for nostalgia or the sake of expedience, he was also trying to express that Saddam did not persecute and was not in turn hated primarily because of the division between the sects of Islam. Saddam exercised Stalinesque violence against all perceived as a threat, regardless of religious identification. Cutting the other way, it is a mistake to perceive Sunnis as automatically sympathetic towards the dictator, because all ethnic groups suffered to some extent under his rule.
INDC: So do you think that the security was worth (the level of) violence under Saddam, or do you think things may turn out better now, even though security and violence are terrible ...
Raazzaq: "Listen my friend, we don't have choice, we just (have to) see what happens with our eyes. We didn't see anything good for us until this moment. Our leadership today they say 'give us the time, in just one hour or two hours we (will rebuild), with a revolution of construction, we will bring back the electricity.' (But) what's happened now? It's nothing. The example is you can't see the traffic lights on the street, so people have to control (it) themselves."
INDC: So the basic infrastructure of civil society is not working ...
Raazzaq: "Naturally, of course; because our leaders ... from our parties (are) still protected by the big wall of concrete. Protected by US troops in the Green Zone. (A leader) couldn't go around the town or he couldn't go to meet the people and ask them 'why do you still suffer? What is the problem with the electricity?'"
"They bring us (the) electricity minister and he announced in his press conference 'we are trying to repair, we are bring(ing) from Iran seventy-hundred watts of electricity, Syria gives us, Turkey gives us,' but it is still nothing. Saddam, in his rule after 1991... after 6 months he returned the electricity, he returned good construction building for all our ministries, (but) now what's happening?"
Raazzaq went on to describe the problem behind executive inaction: the political patronage of Iraq's new direct democracy had squeezed qualified workers - especially former Baathists and Sunnis - out of ministry jobs. In a country with tragically high unemployment and a politically ascendant underclass, such jobs constitute an irresistible reward system that distorts an effective workforce. Multiple sources, from civilian and military press that I've spoken to who are familiar with the Iraqi ministries, to the Hitchens' piece linked earlier in this post, verify Raazzaq's opinion that Iraq's bureaucratic inertia greatly stems from political patronage standing up unqualified candidates. Compounding the problem is turnover; as one set of bureaucrats fails and is let go en masse, another set of unqualified familial and political patrons takes over, resetting the learning curve required to actually accomplish the functions of the ministry in question. As he put it:
Raazzaq: "All ministries now are split up (and run by political parties) who put only their member and let the others go. It is not good. And when their (party) members are gone, they bring in another (party) and it is nothing."
"Ask the people: even under Saddam rule we have 5 or 6 hours (of) electricity. Now, ask the people: they just have one maybe two hours."
He went on to document many of the same complaints common to news reports and many of the voluminous pre-US election books that catalogued American mistakes after the invasion: the disbanding of the Army, the extent of the Baath purge, inflation in the price of fuel, lack of electricity, the failure to quickly inject reconstruction money and jobs into the economy and, first and foremost, the failure to quickly assert authority and establish security. It's impossible to know if some or all of these observations are part of a feedback loop between a prominent Iraqi source and the popular narrative; It's also impossible to say whether different actions by the Coalition would have brought us to a remarkably better Iraq in 2007, given the country's internal division and meddling neighbors; but Raazzaq made his case with conviction, and he's not exactly lonely in his views.
This ends part one of the interview. In the second installment, we'll talk more about popularly perceived Shia and Sunni divisions (or lack thereof), as well as his perception of the motivation behind the sectarian violence gripping Iraq. After that, I press Raazzaq to look beyond exclusively negative argumentation and offer his vision of a solution to Iraq's problems.
Please support citizen journalism, as you are willing and able.
If you'd prefer to donate via check, please e-mail me and I'll provide you mailing instructions. Thank you for your support.
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