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The NYT runs a bleak op-ed by seven NCO's serving in the 82nd Airborne in Iraq:

Political reconciliation in Iraq will occur, but not at our insistence or in ways that meet our benchmarks. It will happen on Iraqi terms when the reality on the battlefield is congruent with that in the political sphere. There will be no magnanimous solutions that please every party the way we expect, and there will be winners and losers. The choice we have left is to decide which side we will take. Trying to please every party in the conflict - as we do now - will only ensure we are hated by all in the long run.

That's the key graf, I think, but do read the whole thing. I find the negatives in the piece well-phrased and similar to the opinion of some soldiers and marines I met in Iraq. One officer, whose outlook always sharply varied between optimism and exasperation, liked to say, "Iraq doesn't have founding fathers, it has founding Godfathers."

Which brings us to this extremely long but worthy rebuttal by Grim at Blackfive. A key bit:

A COIN strategy of disaggregation relies on fragmenting opposition movements, to make each of them easier to defeat in detail. Here, the fragmentation is already accomplished. There is not a Shi'ite front to -- in the words of the article -- "realize that the best way to regain dignity is to call us what we are - an army of occupation - and force our withdrawal." The Shi'ites are more concerned about each other than about us, or even the Sunnis. The article suggests that the Shi'ites are trying to 'consolidate their hold over Iraq,' but what they really seem to be doing is competing for the right to consolidate the Shi'ite majority.

That, then, is the first point: this particular enemy is divided against itself.

This fragmentation (also mentioned here) adds a key dimension to the strategic elements presented by the NYT op-ed writers and most domestic analysis of the war; namely, the parties vying for power in Iraq are much, much more indistinct than the popular characterization of "the Shia, the Sunni and the Kurds." In addition to a large proportion of non-combatants who don't care about such identifications, the warring parties themselves are a splintered mass of nationalists, former Baathists, jihadi terrorists, Shia militiamen, (relatively) well-intentioned civil servants, criminal gangs, corrupt police and soldiers, (relatively) non-corrupt police and soldiers, etc., all elbowing each other to fill the power vacuum. At one point, many more of these entities shared a common cause against the United States, but at this stage of the game, more have aligned with us and turned on others. In the case of a nationwide flip against the maniacs of al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia, this is fantastic news. The ultimate prize - stabilizing a national government as "the biggest, most respected, non-sectarian and relatively benevolent gang allied with US interests" - remains frustrating.

In light of this splintered opposition, the hands off approach advocated by the NCOs in the NYT would indeed spur resolution in Iraq. But that end state would simply crown the most ruthless players in a crowded field, and leave the door open for other countries besides the United States to continue expressing their interests. One can still intelligently endorse this outcome - determining that American blood and treasure are not worth the effort - but it's important to frankly analyze both the consequences and the fragmented nature of the interested parties in Iraq. For example, if America were to "choose sides" with "the Shia" ... which ones?

Posted by Bill at August 20, 2007 09:41 AM | TrackBack (0)

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Posted by: Brian H at August 24, 2007 01:40 AM