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« Comments | Main | "DARPA Plays Spot the Suicide Bomber" » August 08, 2007
More Surge Analysis: Pollack, O'Hanlon & the Other Guy, plus Iraqi Reform from the Ground-Up
Posted by Bill Via Greg Sargent, here's an analysis of the Surge and current options in Iraq by Anthony H. Cordesman of the Center for Strategic & International Studies. Cordesman traveled with Michael O'Hanlon and Kenneth Pollack on the same fact-finding trip which prefaced their recent NYT Op-Ed with the hopeful title. War skeptic Sargent linked Cordesman as a contrast to O'Hanlon and Pollack's optimism, and his lede is championed by the opening of the report's summary: Everyone sees Iraq differently. As one leading US official in Iraq put it, "the current situation is like playing three dimensional chess in the dark while someone is shooting at you." It is scarcely surprising that my perceptions of a recent trip to Iraq are different from that of two of my traveling companions and those of several other recent think tank travelers to the country. But the rest of Cordesman's analysis isn't really very different after all (as Sargent acknowledges), and is also quite comparable to the post I put up on the Surge yesterday, right down to the use of the word "tenuous" to describe Iraq's prospects for stability: From my perspective, the US now has only uncertain, high risk options in Iraq. It cannot dictate Iraq’s future, only influence it, and this presents serious problems at a time when the Iraqi political process has failed to move forward in reaching either a new consensus or some form of peaceful coexistence. It is Iraqis that will shape Iraq's ability or inability to rise above its current sectarian and ethnic conflicts, to redefine Iraq's politics and methods of governance, establish some level of stability and security, and move towards a path of economic recovery and development. So far, Iraq's national government has failed to act at the rate necessary to move the country forward or give American military action political meaning. I agree with almost all of this characterization and I also agree with O'Hanlon and Pollack's Op-Ed. Despite the difference in the degree of optimism vs. skepticism which lead the respective reports, the prescription is about the same: strategic patience in Iraq as the new military strategy provides a window for dubious political process. The remainder of his synopsis: These trends are uncertain, and must be considered in the context of a long list of serious political, military, and economic risks that are described in detail. The report also discusses major delays and problems in the original surge strategy. The new US approach to counterinsurgency warfare is making a difference, but it still seems likely from a visit to the scene that the original strategy President Bush announced in January would have failed if it had not been for the Sunni tribal awakening. On the positive side, the Sunni tribal awakening seems to be spreading. Less hopefully, the Federal government is in disarray, and the perception of Maliki's government as a biased arbitor of sectarian interests remains an impediment to reconciliation. Which brings me to this brief analysis by Stuart Koehl of the Center for Transatlantic Relations at Johns Hopkins University-SAIS, where he e-mails Jim Geraghty to criticize the overemphasis on the Iraqi National Government in light of the decentralized nature of Iraqi politics: The error being made- on your part as well as by others - is assuming that progress can only be made at the level of the national government. In fact, under the Iraqi constitution, the national government is rather weak, while traditionally real political power has been wielded on the local and regional level. And it is precisely at the local and regional level that we see real progress being made with regard both to power sharing and national reconciliation. Because of the social and constitutional structure of Iraq, political progress cannot be imposed from the top-down, but must percolate from the bottom up. To some extent, the members of the national assembly and the unity government are merely play-acting, posturing for the cameras until such time as a consensus emerges on the local level that will prompt them to act. The success of our counter-insurgency effort on the political front is not measured in the assembly chamber, but in the tribal councils. And there, we are definitely winning. Mr. Koehl is more than half-right. As I stressed in yesterday's piece, "It's hard to underestimate the importance of developments in Iraq's political climate before the end of the year, especially the participation in and results of upcoming provincial elections." In addition to progress already achieved within traditional political channels (the tribes), the provincial (and any local) elections are important because they take the staggering gains made during the awakenings and channel the energy into Iraq's official politics. A large portion of the Sunni leadership in Iraq boycotted the political process and engaged in or supported the nationalist insurgency. The Sunni nationalist refocus on purging al Qaeda has finally engaged them with the Americans and employment in Iraq's official security forces, and a further engagement in regional politics may be the sublimation needed to keep sheiks from reverting to insurgency once AQ is eradicated from Anbar, Babil and the scenes of other awakenings. This strategy born of limited options was highlighted in the original report by Robert Burns: Despite political setbacks, American commanders are clinging to a hope that stability might be built from the bottom up with local groups joining or aiding U.S. efforts to root out extremists rather than from the top down, where national leaders have failed to act. But where the bottom-up strategy shows its limit is in the power wielded by Iraq's national bureaucracies. This power is expressed in the allocation of pay and logistical resources to provincial governments and local security forces. And here is an anecdotal problem with the way that system operates: 1. National Ministry leadership and staff reflect the Iraqi National government. Problematically, this can lead to sectarian interest, corruption and inexperience, as those with the greatest experience (former Baathists) were locked out of government. I wrote about this in an interview piece from January: Raazzaq went on to describe the problem behind executive inaction: the political patronage of Iraq's new direct democracy had squeezed qualified workers - especially former Baathists and Sunnis - out of ministry jobs. In a country with tragically high unemployment and a politically ascendant underclass, such jobs constitute an irresistible reward system that distorts an effective workforce. Multiple sources, from civilian and military press that I've spoken to who are familiar with the Iraqi ministries, to the Hitchens' piece linked earlier in this post, verify Raazzaq's opinion that Iraq's bureaucratic inertia greatly stems from political patronage standing up unqualified candidates. Compounding the problem is turnover; as one set of bureaucrats fails and is let go en masse, another set of unqualified familial and political patrons takes over, resetting the learning curve required to actually accomplish the functions of the ministry in question. As he put it: Last I was aware, the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (a Shiite party and former resistance group against the Baathists) ran the Ministry of the Interior (MOI). [See last update] The MOI pays and supplies the Iraqi police nationwide. 2. National impact trickles down to the local level when cops in Fallujah can't get fuel to run their patrol vehicles and generators. A lot of this (perhaps most) is due to corruption - at each step down the supply line, someone skims the cream off the top, middle and bottom," as one Marine put it, and those at the end of the supply line suffer. But the degree to which a Shia-dominated ministry witholds resources from Sunni cops probably plays a role as well - though I stress that this is conjecture on my part. And given the prospect of civil war after American withdrawal, it makes sense that those with command of resources wouldn't want to empower future competitors. Thus, while I might agree that bottom-up political progress is more significant than progress by the Federal government, I'm fairly sure that you can't have a successful Iraq without both. National political reconciliation and resource-sharing, dominated and exemplified by haggling over oil, are key to Iraq's success. Political developments in the next three-six months - at both the national and regional level - will be pivotal. UPDATE: Regarding the Ministry of the Interior, see this article by Ned Parker: ... Western diplomats still describe the Interior Ministry building as a "federation of oligarchs." Those who work in the building, like the colonel, liken departments to hostile countries. Survival depends on keeping abreast of shifting factional alliances and turf. How much do you suspect the MOI is interested in supporting Sunni cops in Anbar? The balance of power in such bureaucratic infighting can only be addressed by national political brokerage. UPDATE: Some good news: "Sunni Fighters Find Strategic Benefits in Tentative Alliance With U.S." Posted by Bill at August 8, 2007 10:08 AM | TrackBack (0) CommentsCongratulations to the neocons!! This article seems to describe in detail the current state of the U.S. democracy!! We have finally given Iraq the gift of cronyism,bureacracy,religous influence,political appointment.....Success!! A truc democracy in action!! Posted by: Jon Skinner at August 8, 2007 07:46 PM Your comparison is facile. The US has nothing like the degree of problems in Iraq, unless you mean the US in the 19th Century. Also, your comment makes the assumption that Iraqi bureaucracy didn't function vaguely like this prior to any US involvement. Posted by: Bill from INDC at August 8, 2007 08:38 PM the strategy isn't just born of limited options, it is born of extreme naivete. The Devil is loose now. This thing is between Sunni and Shia and the Sunni are willing to make a temporary deal with the us for weapons in trade for going after the foreign element that they've come to despise anyway. Then, they will turn these weapons on their real enemies. Unfortunately that happens to be the "government". Posted by: SW at August 8, 2007 10:01 PM re: "This thing is between Sunni and Shia and the Sunni are willing to make a temporary deal with the us for weapons in trade for going after the foreign element that they've come to despise anyway. Then, they will turn these weapons on their real enemies." The Sunni are not receiving any class of weapons from us that they do not already possess in abundance (small arms). They are allied with the Americans at the moment because they want the radicals out of their midst, as well as milking supply/logistical/intelligence support. AQ in Iraq cuts off fingers of smokers, Iraqis like to smoke. They butcher families who have satellite dishes, Iraqis like to watch TV. The locals are fed up. Simple as that. Also, the idea that the conflict in Iraq is strictly a religious conflict "between the Sunni and Shia" is narrow, as there are a whole lot of people who don't care about religious identification who are caught in between. Whether the strategy was "naive" or not is a much more debatable point. Posted by: Bill from INDC at August 8, 2007 10:42 PM So let me get this straight. Is this becoming (or is already) a delicate balancing act? Where on one hand they try and foster/support the creation of a 'form of government' that is created from the bottom-up (starting on the provincial/tribal level) while desperately trying to maintain a national governing 'structure' that will remain relevant and operational, but at the same time not dominating the political landscape? All the while being vigilant for that 'key' time period where both the national and local stratum can 'merge' into the much-vaunted 'Iraqi style democracy'? While simultaneously managing the conflict between Sunni and Shia's which permeate and affect the operation and growth of the national governing structure b/c of the legitimate self-interest both parties have if the proverbial sh*t hits the fan and uncontrollable civil war breaks out, thereby rendering the whole process moot anyway? If so, that IS tenuous... Posted by: TTFD at August 8, 2007 11:53 PM Oh, additionally during all of this the American government decides to just tell the citizenry a complete fallacy in terms of what's going on, their 'actual' foreign policy being implemented and in order to continue having the support of the electorate for their stated policy (surge, clear hold..., stay the course etc) lie, obfuscate and spin to buy the public policy the time to allow their true policy time to actually run its course from the bottom up? Posted by: TTFD at August 8, 2007 11:59 PM Comment at 11:53 PM might be a good point, except it's quite a bit better than the alternative, at the moment. Posted by: Bill from INDC at August 9, 2007 12:00 AM With the fusion of corporate and state power now a fait accompli, how can anyone, especially someone from "the left," feign surprise when the media - i.e. Hanlon&Pollak - step n' fetchit for the corporatocracy? I mean, phlueeze! The only sensible thing to do is invest in "defense" stocks and cheer when people die as America flexes its massive muscles. Gary Posted by: Gary at August 9, 2007 01:11 AM Once again its painfully obvious that these backward non-white peoples need American military might and know-how to solve all their problems. Sort of like the Indiana Jones syndrome, where a village of hapless Hindus are starving to death because their precious idol has been stolen, a problem which requires that the telegenic white guy swoop it and restore it. That's us; worked great in Vietnam and Algeria, and its working again. Its helpful that we've had decades now to develop more sophisticated, nuanced arguments in favor of the same old bullshit. Posted by: J DAlessandro at August 9, 2007 11:29 AM You might want to step away from analysis employing rote racial narratives and stereotypes about the "evil empire." The interest of both Iraqis and Americans is not easily served by Star Trek's prime directive. Posted by: Bill from INDC at August 9, 2007 11:40 AM The damned thing was lost before the first vibram sole touched Iraqi sand. Not that "winning" in any recognizable sense was ever the goal. 2 million barrels a day of production remains shut in, oil prices are $20/bbl over pre-war prices, and KBR can't load the cash into the wheelbarrows fast enough. Mission Accomplished. As for prospects of the future, the operating maxim in Iraq is "the enemy of my enemy is my friend." So imagine how long the Anbar 'miracle' will last once the salafis have been dealt with. And never mind Shiite-Sunni conflict, the Brits are bailing from Basra, and the Badr-Mehdi showdown is just getting started. George W. Bush is the most destructive figure in American politics since Jefferson Davis. If there were any justice, he'd be strapped down and forced to watch the carnage with his eyelids propped open a la Clockwork Orange for the rest of his days. Posted by: Tuchman's Ghost at August 9, 2007 03:04 PM Sigh. Posted by: Bill from INDC at August 9, 2007 03:08 PM
yours/ Posted by: peter jackson at August 9, 2007 07:54 PM "The interest of both Iraqis and Americans is not easily served by Star Trek's prime directive." They would be better served by that than by what the bush/cheney administration has been doing. Seriously. Posted by: Susan at August 9, 2007 11:04 PM "They would be better served by that than by what the bush/cheney administration has been doing." You may not like "The bush/cheney administration" but that's not the only group of people attempting to do anything in Iraq, unless you expand your antipathy to the diplomats, contractors, military personnel, analysts and Iraqi Security Forces trying to establish security and stable governance. Posted by: Bill from INDC at August 10, 2007 11:02 AM "We have finally given Iraq the gift of cronyism,bureacracy,religous influence,political appointment....." As opposed to what? You have just described every government known to man.
No, they just need us to kill enough bad guys that they have a shot at solving it themselves. Why do I suspect that you don't think they are capable of doing that? Maybe you think they are more than just backward? Posted by: B Moe at August 10, 2007 09:23 PM ....unless you expand your antipathy to the diplomats, contractors, military personnel, analysts and Iraqi Security Forces trying to establish security and stable governance. Ok, you need start issuing hip wader alerts. Posted by: strumbucket at August 11, 2007 05:01 PM Ok, you need start issuing hip wader alerts. You need to broaden your focus. A lot of people are working very hard to help the Iraqis, and just because one dislikes the war, the policy or the Bush Admin, does not grant carte blanche to condemn any possibility for stable governance in Iraq, nor all of those working for it. Knee-jerk narratives are callous about Iraq's future. Posted by: Bill from INDc at August 12, 2007 04:03 AM The early post-liberation decision I winced at the hardest was the allocation of parliament blocks by sectarian grouping. It was a quickie, lazy pseudo-fairness approach, which most powerfully communicated distrust of their judgment to the Iraqi electorate. And it put paid to any hope of secular parties making a significant impact, much less gaining control. The seculars are, on the whole, pretty much disenfranchised in Iraq right now, and unless this is fixed not much else is going to be. Posted by: Brian H at August 14, 2007 01:19 PM P.S. While it may have been the Founding Fathers' intention to constitutionalize "freedom of religion" to protect religions from government suppression more than vice versa, the later extension of the prohibition against formal participation of church in the affairs of the state has much to recommend it. As we see. Posted by: Brian H at August 14, 2007 01:27 PM Nuance correction/edit: Posted by: Brian H at August 14, 2007 01:33 PM |
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