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Previously I highlighted a Strategy Page analysis on what is probably the most pressing challenge to a successful Iraqi state:

Corruption and lack of civic spirit continue to be the biggest problems in Iraq. This sort of thing does not make loud noises, so does not get into the mass media much. But what is done about corruption, will have more to do with Iraqs future, than the battle with terrorists.

This echoes my conclusions exactly.

Today's SP analysis achieves consensus again:

The war in Iraq is notable not because it is against guerillas or terrorists, but because of the large number of armed opposition groups that are, for all intents and purposes, criminal gangs. Such organizations have been around here for thousands of years, but Saddam made them more powerful by incorporating the loyal ones into his security organization. Maybe it was something he learned from the Russians (the KGB loved to work with gangsters), but it left post Saddam Iraq awash in criminal gangs. Sunni Arab gangs grew rich, Kurd and Shia gangs got constant heat. Many quickly discovered that there was money to be made by giving yourself a nationalistic or Islamic name and declaring loyalty to the cause of Sunni Arab supremacy. Al Qaeda and Saddam's old allies had cash and cachet that made the gangs more powerful. All they had to do was support the bombing program and attacks on cops and soldiers (local and foreign). Since many of these attacks were paid for, the gangs treated it like another bit of business, even if 90 percent of the attacks on U.S. troops failed. Their paymasters understood.

The whole thing is a must-read if you want to understand the fight in Iraq. And here are some of my previous thoughts on the same topic:

But as noted by Bryan Preston's write-up on the nature of "civil war," as well as my comments on Pundit Review and Mary Madigan's assessment of gangsterism in the larger war on terror, the popular perception of an Islamic civil war in Iraq is partially correct but incomplete, as there are major swaths of Iraqi society that aren't taking sides. In addition to outside players simply looking to sow chaos and destabilize Iraq to expedite an end to American involvement, much of the current violence is best described as splintered gangs vying to fill the power vacuum left after Saddam's deposal. Religion is often either besides the point, or used as a convenient demarcation.

This is an important point to remember when politicians advocating withdrawal characterize the Iraqis as "needing to work out their own problems." It's possible to arrive at this position intelligently, but if it's simply based on the idea that we have no business mediating a broad civil war over Islamic identity, then the view overgeneralizes and is based on incomplete information.

More detail on this power vacuum can be found in this radio interview with Pundit Review.

Latest Strategy Page article via Dave Price, who has further thoughts.

Posted by Bill at July 10, 2007 03:55 PM | TrackBack (0)