1. Historically, institutionally and culturally, Iraqi society lacks the trust and relative cohesion that characterizes more successful societies.

A practical example: the Police aren't traditionally well-respected in Iraqi society, sometimes viewed as corrupt, low-level civil servants. This has presented impediments to establishing the nascent force in Fallujah as a trusted local foil to the insurgency.

2. This lack of trust and cohesion makes influencing and ultimately revolutionizing Iraqi institutions a difficult, necessarily long process.

A practical example: after a rocky, defensive start, the Fallujah PD began to work well with the Iraqi Army and take the offensive in the first quarter of '07, but hit a sticking point: they couldn't obtain fuel from the provincial government or the Ministry of the Interior in Baghdad. Whether this is primarily due to corruption or the unwillingness of a Shia-influenced national institution to empower a potential competitor (Fallujan cops are Sunni), this lack of trust and cohesion presents a serious impediment to the goal of establishing sustainable security forces in Fallujah.

3. While possible, successful execution of the long process of changing Iraqi society is far less likely because of a lack of commitment across a broad spectrum of American society.

This expounds on the sentiment that "America isn't fighting this war, the US Military is fighting this war." Unfortunately, it's true. And without broad investment in making Iraq work, the loftier ambitions of leaving behind a stable Western-style Democracy are negligible in the short or mid-term, and the possibility of merely leaving behind stability is imperiled by prospects for early withdrawal.

There are success stories in Iraq, and the momentum of the security forces in Fallujah during and after my embed was very positive, but historical and cultural barriers to establishing good governance demand significant American patience and commitment to Iraq. Almost a lighter British colonial model of building and bequeathing institutions and the rule of law, in structure and commitment if not actual rulership, would be ideal. Unfortunately, such time and patience are in limited supply.

Meanwhile, the Marines and soldiers make do with limited resources and an accelerated policy.

Related:

A January assessment of the Fallujah Police Transition Team mission can be found here.

An example of the frustrations of Fallujan civil service and governance were covered here.

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