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« Interview with JD Johannes | Main | "The Fight for Iraq: A Regional Powerplay" » March 19, 2007
Iraq Not (Quite) a Civil War? (UPDATED)
Posted by Bill Allahpundit digs into the internals of a poll that reveals "49% of [Iraqis] questioned preferred life under Nouri al-Maliki the prime minister, to living under Saddam", and that "only 27% believed they were caught up in a civil war." When I was in Baghdad and Fallujah, conversations with Iraqis, as well as exposure to (some) Shiites and Sunnis intermingling without incident (admittedly anecdotal), led me to suspect that while bloody sectarian conflict is now significant, it's not an accurate overall description of Iraqi society. Essentially, relevant minorities waging attacks over Islamic identity don't necessarily represent the sentiment of the broader population in Baghdad, as many haven't historically and still don't nurse grudges against the other sect of Islam. In addition, it was a fairly popular Iraqi belief that outsiders - Iran, Syria and others - were staging and funding attacks to foment a religious war in Iraqi society, both to expel the US and to "destroy Iraq." As Allahpundit's analysis of the poll's particulars suggest, the Sunni-Shia identification is less common in cosmopolitan Baghdad and more prevalent in traditionally insular areas like the Shia-dominated south and, to a lesser extent, the Sunni-Arab-dominated west: Pages 71-74 break down the sample by ethnicity and sect, so pay closest attention to them. The good news is that 61% of Iraqis still identify as "Muslim." Not "Sunni Muslim" or "Shia Muslim," just "Muslim." More surprisingly, among Arabs, Shiites were much more likely to identify by sect: 29% versus only 7% for Sunnis. Even in a mixed city like Baghdad, where you'd expect sectarian consciousness to be sky high, only 8% of the sample is identifying as "Sunni Muslim." I'm not sure how many Sunnis are still there these days, but my sense is even the remnants are quite a bit more than 8% of the population. So there's some reason for optimism: identification by sect is still a fringe thing - among Sunnis. Compare, however, the numbers on page 72 for "Sunni Muslims" in Anbar to "Shiite Muslims" in the south of the country. Both of those regions are homogeneous by sect, but there are huge differences: only 16% call themselves Sunni in the Sunni community but more than 50% in some southern provinces call themselves Shiite. One thing that's probably influencing the numbers; there has been a mass migration of Sunnis from Baghdad to al-Anbar to escape the violence. But as noted by Bryan Preston's write-up on the nature of "civil war," as well as my comments on Pundit Review and Mary Madigan's assessment of gangsterism in the larger war on terror, the popular perception of an Islamic civil war in Iraq is partially correct but incomplete, as there are major swaths of Iraqi society that aren't taking sides. In addition to outside players simply looking to sow chaos and destabilize Iraq to expedite an end to American involvement, much of the current violence is best described as splintered gangs vying to fill the power vacuum left after Saddam's deposal. Religion is often either besides the point, or used as a convenient demarcation. This is an important point to remember when politicians advocating withdrawal characterize the Iraqis as "needing to work out their own problems." It's possible to arrive at this position intelligently, but if it's simply based on the idea that we have no business mediating a broad civil war over Islamic identity, then the view overgeneralizes and is based on incomplete information. That said, as other portions of the poll suggest, it's possible that sectarian-based conflict is on the verge of becoming more prevalent, and Iraq could slip into a de facto "civil war" with wider participation. This possibility is widely believed to be a strategy of outside players looking to destabilize and/or eventually partition the country, of course. And the surge is specifically designed to stop it. Also check out this video that documents the successful execution of the Patriquin Plan in the Ramadi area: "A few months ago, if you joined the police here, you'd be signing your death warrant. All that's changed." Video also via Hot Air, where Allahpundit is consistently providing some of the best link round-ups and analysis of Iraq. UPDATE: More numbers from Allahpundit. Posted by Bill at March 19, 2007 11:12 AM | TrackBack (6) Trackback PingsTrackBack URL for this entry: Comments"This possibility is widely believed to be a strategy of outside players looking to destabilize and/or eventually partition the country, of course. And the surge is specifically designed to stop it." Now why isn't this as obvious to us over here as it is to the people living in Iraq? (rhetorical question maybe) Posted by: hydralisk at March 20, 2007 06:40 PM Now why isn't this as obvious to us over here as it is to the people living in Iraq? Two things, one that reinforces, one that might temper your (and my inclined) opinion: 1. Iraqis see foreign influences because they have local intelligence, of course. 2. On the other hand, Arabs in the region have a tendency to see foreign influences (ie, conspiracy theories) in many situations that affect their lives negatively. In this case they are probably right, though the exact degree it's local power brokers fighting vs. foreign trouble-makers is unknown to me. But yes, there is definitely foreign foul play. Posted by: Bill from INDC at March 20, 2007 07:13 PM I wonder how accurate that poll is. One came out a couple days ago saying basically the exact opposite. I also wonder how many of those who identify themselves as "Muslim" vice a particular sect "on the record" go back to their homes and quietly curse their sectarian opposites. But, like you say, I'm not inclined to believe the motivation behind most of these attacks are actually religious in nature. More likely is that it's a maypole around which various leaders can rally their followers. Everything in the world is about power and I have yet to see any evidence that the contrary is true here. The U.S. can learn some tough lessons from Iraq. There, but for the grace of God, we go. It's only through a faith in our system of laws and market economy that we don't devolve into a tribal battlefield like Iraq. I could go on, but I won't. I'm glad Gen. Petraeus hired the best and brightest advisors for his staff. He -- and all of us -- will need them to think our way out of this. Just as a stream-of-consciousness/Jack Kerouac thing here, I was reading the other day a story about how agencies within the Dept. of Defense run by civilians differ from those run by uniformed servicemembers. The civilian agencies are more focused on long-term objectives and project management, while the military-run ones lean towards developing leadership within their subordinates. Both great traits but both types of agencies would benefit from learning from the other. It would be interesting to see a "Forbes" or "Fortune" magazine-style analysis of the management of the Iraq war on the level of the three- and four-star generals. Especially regarding project management skills. Sorry for the tangent! Posted by: Matt at March 21, 2007 08:37 AM Good tangent. Posted by: Bill from INDC at March 21, 2007 11:29 AM |
