Semon: "When we started, it was very slow. We did take the lead, which we never should have done. So what we do now, is when we go on a mission, we're always in the back; the Iraqi Army battalion takes the front. Operational-wise they're very good that way. And the planning, we don't plan too much with them, they plan it and they brief us. And we help by making suggestions - 'do you wanna do this or do that?' We give them some options to help improve their operations."

INDC: I've heard from Police Transition Team Members that the advisory role has put them in a frustrating position, because sometimes they can't get their cops to plan, they can't motivate them like their own leadership could and should if it was stronger. Have you had that same problem with the Iraqi Army?

Semon: "Yes and no. It kind of depends. There's a number of officers that are go-getters, 'go get em', and there are a couple that are just collecting a paycheck. But overall, once we start talking and working with them, then they're able to do the planning."

INDC: What's the quality of the Iraqi soldier, do you think?

Semon: "I think they're very good. They're like any other soldiers - you give them good leaders, and they will do exactly what they're told to do. But it's when some of the leaders are not that well or motivated - let me phrase it this way: they are a reflection of their leaders."

INDC: So give me the good points about them and the bad points about them, if forced to categorize that way.

Semon: "The good point is they want to be trained like US soldiers and they're very motivated by that. But the bad part is when they see their leaders aren't doing anything, then they're not going to do anything."

INDC: I went to Habbaniyah and saw the Iraqi basic training; it's only 5 weeks and a lot of them are illiterate, a lot of them are sloppy and the American as well as Iraqi drill sergeants had a lot of frustration because 5 weeks isn't enough. Is Habbaniyah putting out a lower quality soldier?

Semon:"I can't comment on their basic training because I haven't seen it."

INDC: But when you get them ...

Semon: "But when we get them they seem to be integrated pretty well. Within a matter of a couple of weeks they're fully trained anyway because they're almost, they're thrown into that position. And they become very competent."

INDC: And do they have good esprit de corps?

Semon: "Oh, absolutely."

INDC: I went on a raid the other night with some Iraqi Army units and another MiTT, and they were very aggressive, they were "go-getters" like you said, but they had a tendency to charge down the street after a new target without coordinating with the Americans or their heavy weapons elements. Have you had these problems with your soldiers?

Semon: "Yes, we have, but let me justify that: they're interested in going and getting the targets. They want to do it fast and expedient, and sometimes they don't think about everything that needs to go with them. So that's just more of training issue that we deal with more than anything else."

INDC: You think that's something you can overcome?

Semon: "Absolutely. Absolutely. In fact, we've seen progress over the last 6 months we've been here. We've seen a lot of progress."

INDC: Overall, how do you think the mission is progressing? What do you think you need to get these guys up to speed?

Semon: "Our biggest challenge with the army is logistics, but operationally, they're pretty proficient. So that's what we're trying to concentrate on, how to forecast, how to request supplies that they're going to need on a daily basis. Like every Monday they need to order so much food for the next week, or every fifth Wednesday they need to order so much fuel, so many days out. That's the type of thinking that we need them to go ahead and do."

INDC: What about the pay issue, with officers and MOD bureaucrats pocketing pay and Jundi not getting paid?

Semon: "Yeah that goes on. I can't lie about that, that's just going to be a tough nut to crack. I don't have any solution for that, but we just keep monitoring it and report up everything we see."

INDC: To what extent is the pay issue de-motivating Iraqi soldiers? I've heard that some of them quit, some quit and came back and some of them don't leave because they've got square meals and a cot and nowhere else to go - what's going on?

Semon: "Actually it's a mix of all three. There's some that are motivated because they want to see things get better, so they'll stay even though they're not paid. We have a lieutenant who hasn't been paid in 9 months; he's still there because he believes in what he's doing."

"We had some of the Jundi quit because they have to feed their families, but they want to come back and the whole idea was, once they got on the rolls and started getting paid, they'd come back. They want to be here, they see good things coming out of this. Although it may be a little slow, but they do see."

INDC: Do you think al-Anbar and Fallujah in particular are winnable?

Semon: "Yes, but I think it will probably be a little longer than the rest of the country, just because of the history of al-Anbar and particularly Fallujah itself. It was a rough spot from the beginning of the war, so you've got that going for it, everything from the Blackwater Bridge incident. And with that type of mentality it's going to take some time to win the people over."

INDC: So how would you characterize the attitude of the people in Fallujah towards Americans?

Semon: "It's a completely mixed bag. We've gone on operations where people invite you for breakfast, invite you for Chai, to 'we don't want you here,' so we run the whole gamut. On missions we go to some stores where they are happy to serve us and others where they say, 'No we cannot serve Americans or we'll be shot.'"

INDC: A Fallujan [civil servant] explained to me how the insurgents operate like the mafia out here ...

Semon: "I'm not surprised by that."

INDC: So part of that is a military problem and part of it is a political problem. Do you think that what you guys are doing can ever address that? How do you think this political problem can be solved?

Semon: "More Iraqi Army and police. It's going to be a joint effort between the police and the Iraqi Army, and I've seen more police out on the street. But again, it's a cultural thing, and it's going to take some time."

INDC: How would you assess the state of your mission? And in a perfect world, if you could have everything that you wanted, additional resources, whatever, what would it be?

Semon: "I think it would be more logistic and personnel advisors and influencers, because that's the biggest stumbling block, is how to get supplies down from the MOD (Ministry of Defense) to the battalion. That's the biggest thing: how to account for personnel. They don't see those as priorities and we need to stress that - if you don't have personnel, you can't do a mission. If you don't have fuel or chow, you cant do a mission. And how to properly forecast that instead of all of a sudden, 'we're out of food!' So that would be ideal."

"We've been here for 6 months. And we have seen a lot of success in all the areas. It's slow, but it's a mindset. We're not going to correct this - or I should say 'improve this' - right away; it's going to take some time, and there are all kinds of issues, from incompetence to general mismanagement to stealing. We need to overcome those for it to be successful. And again, I have seen a lot of successes and I think we'll continue to improve."

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UPDATE: Link added and syntax changed in sentence about the defensive posture of the Iraqi police.

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