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« Where's November 28, 2006
Will the Real Anbar Narrative Please Stand Up?
Posted by Bill Thomas Ricks reports a second pessimistic evaluation of the war in Western Iraq, based on a revision of the famously negative intelligence report written by Marine Col. Peter Devlin: The U.S. military is no longer able to defeat a bloody insurgency in western Iraq or counter al-Qaeda's rising popularity there, according to newly disclosed details from a classified Marine Corps intelligence report that set off debate in recent months about the military's mission in Anbar province. I've highlighted the line about Al Qaeda's ostensibly rising popularity because it's seemingly contradicted by multiple reports documenting Al Qaeda's loss of popularity. When the initial report was leaked and analyzed by Ricks in September, Bill Roggio wrote: I've received plenty of questions about the intelligence report that claims Anbar province has been lost. I've talked to several sources in the military and intelligence who have actually seen the entire report (and not been fed excerpts). They are angry over the media's characterization of the report. Basically, the report indicated that the situation in Ramadi is dire, and that the political situation in Anbar as a whole as a result is in danger because of this. I've also spoken to Marines that express doubts about Ricks' characterization of the report; when I travel to Anbar, a goal of my coverage will focus on obtaining attributed commentary - affirmation or rebuttal - regarding this apparently dire intelligence assessment. Below are headlines and excerpts from articles by Michael Fumento, Strategy Page, Bill Roggio, Greyhawk from Mudville and various UK Times correspondents that seem to at least contradict Ricks' angles that A) Anbar is lost and B) Al Qaeda is gaining rather than losing popularity among the local populace. Most of these reports track the evolution of the tribal war against AQ and the wider insurgency: Even the Los Angeles Times--hardly pro-war or pro-Bush--in an October 5 article reported that local tribes are mad as hell about the insurgency and are not going to take it anymore. It observed that Abdul Jabber Hakkam, spokesman for a coalition of 11 tribes in Al Anbar, was saying locals were capturing and executing the anti-Iraqi forces on their own initiative. "People have done this with their own personal weapons," he said. "Now each house that hosts a terrorist, they will force all the residents of the house outside, so they're on the streets." When that is done, he predicted, the insurgents will "have no one to keep them, and they will withdraw." Further, said Hakkam, "we are not just targeting al Qaeda, but terrorists in general, because people miss real stability and freedom." Importantly, he not only urged the locals to work with the tribes, but also said the tribes need to work closely with the government in Baghdad. Anbar: The Abu Soda Tribe vs. al-Qaeda (11/26/06): The 25 tribes of the Anbar Salvation Council and Al-Qaeda in Iraq have been battling it out since the tribes have committed to work with the Iraqi government and U.S. military in western Iraq. Over the weekend, the Abu Soda tribe, one of the members of the Anbar Salvation Council, fought alongside U.S. force against al-Qaeda in Iraq in the Sofia neighborhood of Ramadi. Al Qaeda's Last Stand in Anbar (11/24/2006) Al Qaeda knows it's losing its battle for western Iraq, which is one reason why they have shifted so many resources, especially cash and leadership, to Afghanistan. The al Qaeda defeat in western Iraq has not gotten much attention in the media, but it's there, it's real and it will soon be over. The Anbar Tribes vs. al-Qaeda, Continued (11/22/06): Lost in the current debate over Iraq - civil war or sectarian violence, success or failure, increasing troops or strategic redeployment, victory or defeat - is the sea-change occurring in western Iraq. The U.S. military has coaxed a large majority of the Sunnis of Anbar province, perhaps one of the most sympathetic groups to al-Qaeda in the Middle East, to turn on al-Qaeda. Fighting back: the city determined not to become al-Qaeda's capital (11/20/06): While the world's attention has been focused on Baghdad's slide into sectarian warfare, something remarkable has been happening in Ramadi, a city of 400,000 inhabitants that al-Qaeda and its Iraqi allies have controlled since mid-2004 and would like to make the capital of their cherished Islamic caliphate. That's a glimpse of Iraq rarely seen in western media. The rift between al-Anbar's chieftains (who once welcomed al-Qaeda fighters into their towns) and those now-despised foreigners has been growing for some time - and the strength and resolve of the chieftains has increased too, to the point where statements humiliating the once-feared terrorist leadership are now made in person, before the entire nation, in prime-time. They may pay for that show of courage with their lives, but it may be too late to turn the tide back in favor of their would-be assassins. Anbar Tribes vs. al-Qaeda (9/29/06): Less than two weeks after 25 of the 31 predominately Sunni tribes in Anbar Province pledged to fight al-Qaeda and support the Shiite led government of Prime Minister Maliki, the tribes have taken a shot against al-Qaeda fighters. Reuters reports five al-Qaeda were captured in the city of Ramadi, "including three foreign fighters from Yemen."
The New York Times reported over the weekend that 25 of the province's 31 tribes have organized to oppose the insurgency and al-Qaeda. Arm tribes to fight al-Qaeda, say Sunnis (9/13/06): Resentment of al-Qaeda militants among tribes and other insurgent groups has erupted into violence periodically since spring 2005. Over the past year the anger has led to a permanent rift and constant fighting in the western province that borders Syria, Jordan and Saudi Arabia. “There is a struggle between people of al-Anbar province and some of the [militant] organisations working there, but the Americans are not taking seriously the people’s efforts to make peace,” said Ayad al-Samarrai, the No 2 official in the Islamic Party, the largest Iraqi Sunni party. What to believe? I'm sure that the full Marine intelligence report and the above perspectives can co-exist on the same plane of reality, but the narrative about Al Qaeda losing influence and capability seems dominant vs. the interpretation that AQ's power is waxing or static. Granted, the tribes may not represent the sentiment of the entire populace, but 25 of 31 in an area with almost no tradition of cohesive central governance is certainly significant, and Al Qaeda has a history of quickly wearing out its welcome via a bloody brand of Sharia. To wit, from 2004: Since two of Muthar's brothers and four of his cousins - all members in a family trucking cooperative - were tortured and murdered in the resistance stronghold three weeks ago, he's changed his mind about how the US handled Fallujah. UPDATE: More from Dan Rhiel and Prairie Pundit. UPDATE: Bob Owens: I can't say that this morning's Dafna Linzer/Thomas Ricks article Anbar Picture Grows Clearer, and Bleaker in the Washington Post comes as a surprise considering the overall tone of their reporting on the War in Iraq, but this article, based on an update of selectively-released elements of a previous classified report that many feel was taken out of context, seems to run counter to what many others are seeing in the same area of Iraq. Posted by Bill at November 28, 2006 01:08 AM | TrackBack (4) Trackback PingsTrackBack URL for this entry: CommentsDude, Please get in there and tell us what the F is really up. Posted by: jaymaster at November 28, 2006 09:41 PM |
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