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Appeals for more troops and resources in Iraq have been well-documented on this site, including here, here and here. I wrote about a Pentagon dust-up over underfunding in that last link:

I've been wondering recently about the Administration's practical commitment to winning Iraq, given apparently insufficient troop levels. Do we simply lack the personnel? Has the Administration been unwilling to invest in a requisite build-up?
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One might hope that this underfunding is a long-term component of pre-midterm politicking regarding the deficit (and thus due to expire in November), though I'm not holding my breath.

Did the midterm elections have an impact on the politically sensitive settlement of the question of "phased withdrawal" vs. "stay the course" vs. "double down?" The Guardian is reporting that the Administration will attempt a post-election version of the latter strategy:

US plans last big push in Iraq

President George Bush has told senior advisers that the US and its allies must make "a last big push" to win the war in Iraq and that instead of beginning a troop withdrawal next year, he may increase US forces by up to 20,000 soldiers, according to sources familiar with the administration's internal deliberations.

Mr Bush's refusal to give ground, coming in the teeth of growing calls in the US and Britain for a radical rethink or a swift exit, is having a decisive impact on the policy review being conducted by the Iraq Study Group chaired by Bush family loyalist James Baker, the sources said.

Note that they're only talking 20,000, which again raises the question about how thinly stretched the military really is, and how much the sparse resources in Iraq are a consequence of a practically diminished two war doctrine and a failure to fundamentally retool the military for the current mission. Why didn't the Administration (through Congress) use the past 3-5 years to restructure the composition of the service branches to meet the needs of an occupation, insurgency and massive reconstruction project? The answer for planning in 2001 to late-2003 is simple: they didn't anticipate a long insurgency and occupation. For late-2003 and beyond, I have no idea.

Of course, one argument consistently lays the blame on Donald Rumsfeld and his commitment to a doctrine of flexibility, speed, lethality and technological force multipliers. To wit, read this scathing speech by former Commanding General of US and allied forces in Kuwait and Chief of War Plans in the Pentagon Mitchell Zais:

Let me begin by saying that most of our problems in Iraq stem from a flawed strategy that has been in place since the beginning of the war.
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Our strategy in Iraq has been:

1. fight the war on the cheap;

2. ask the ground forces to perform missions that are more suitably performed by other branches of the American government;

3. inconvenience the American people as little as possible, and

4. continue to fund the Air Force and Navy at the same levels that they have been funded at for the last 30 years while shortchanging the Army and Marines who are doing all of the fighting.

No wonder the war is not going well.

Let me explain how the war is being fought on the cheap.

From the very beginning, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, who thankfully announced his departure yesterday, has striven to minimize the number of soldiers and Marines in Iraq. Instead of employing the Colin Powell doctrine of "use massive force at the beginning to achieve a quick and decisive victory," his goal has been "use no more troops than absolutely necessary so we can spend defense dollars on new technology."
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The Defense Department has fought the war on the cheap because, despite overwhelming evidence that the Army and Marine Corps need a significant increase in their size in order to accomplished their assigned missions, the civilian officials who run the Pentagon have refused to request authorization from Congress to do so. Two Democratic representatives, Mark Udall from Colorado and Ellen Tauscher of California, have introduced a bill into Congress that would add 80,000 troops to the end-strength of the active Army. Currently, this bill has no support from the Defense Department.

Similar critiques of Rumsfeld's dogged attitudes about his brand of military transformation and confidence in a short occupation were featured in a surge of pre-election books on Iraq, like George Packer's ideological yet excellent Assassin's Gate, the dry, analytical Cobra II and Ricks' aggressive (and perhaps suspect) Fiasco. I don't rush to take these negative portraits at face value, but the mounting number of stories about the Pentagon's misjudgments or reliance on a speedy removal of Saddam with few occupation duties or contingency plans has gained critical mass. And certain known quantities - like the fact that Coalition troops didn't have explicit orders to enforce martial law once authority melted in Baghdad, for example - lend credence to the case that serious miscalculations were made in the planning for post-Operation Iraqi Freedom, from the tactical, operational and (primarily) strategic levels.

And the fundamental question remains: given that current military spending as a percentage of GDP is below levels of spending during the first Gulf War, the Reagan defense build-up, Vietnam and Korea, ("The Sustainable Economics of War") why is this Administration not pushing Congress for a level of investment necessary to win out the critical strategic gambles in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as make ready for the next conflict?

Given this persistent question, while I have mixed feelings about the competence and tenure of Donald Rumsfeld, I'm glad to see a change at the Pentagon. I'm also glad to see that the Administration may be looking to boost force levels in Iraq in the short term. But problematically, the extra troops may have been much more useful this last year, as keeping a lid on the sectarian violence which flared after the bombing of Al-Askari Mosque would have perhaps saved enough leaky political capital to ensure the creation of sustainable Iraqi security forces. We'll see if we can still get it done with high-profile members of a Democratic Congress eager for withdrawal.

Note: Any links on a comprehensive look at our current force structure within the context of Afghanistan, Iraq and conflicts TBD are appreciated. E-mail or drop a comment.

UPDATE: Some related links on troop levels:

Doubling Down in Iraq (pro-increase)

Effects of troop numbers in Iraq (neutral - stats analysis)

Troops, Tropes, and Traditions (anti-increase)

I'll address two aspects of the last article, written by Dave Price:

1. Dave writes:

Aside from the point made by General Abizaid yesterday (that a troop increase could be detrimental to ISF training as it disincentivizes them to learn to handle the problem themselves) there are three problems with the assumptions and methods of both these analyses.

At Abizaid's level and position, he is part military commander and part politician/representative of the policy. I would hesitate to take his assessment at face value, though I still find it significant.

2. Dave also writes:

Three, reducing violence is not our primary goal, nor should it be. What is most important is that Iraq's constitutional democracy be defended, and that responsibility for that defense be gradually transitioned to capable, committed Iraqi hands.

On this point (and the bits surrounding it), Dave and I agree. But the goal of reducing violence isn't merely important for the sake of reducing violence, it's also a key lever in our domestic political process. Many insurgents are killing to drive us out of Iraq by influencing American public opinion. Thus, one of the ends of reducing violence is sustaining American political will to create the " capable, committed Iraqi" security forces that Dave cites as the real goal.

Posted by Bill at November 16, 2006 02:45 PM | TrackBack (0)

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Posted by: Babs at November 18, 2006 06:18 PM