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What's the most influential Cleric in Iraq up to during his country's recent descent into sectarian conflict?

Narrative one drops some very bad news:

I no longer have power to save Iraq from civil war, warns Shia leader

The most influential moderate Shia leader in Iraq has abandoned attempts to restrain his followers, admitting that there is nothing he can do to prevent the country sliding towards civil war.

Aides say Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani is angry and disappointed that Shias are ignoring his calls for calm and are switching their allegiance in their thousands to more militant groups which promise protection from Sunni violence and revenge for attacks.
...
Al-Sistani's aides say that he has chosen to stay silent rather than suffer the ignominy of being ignored. Ali al-Jaberi, a spokesman for the cleric in Khadamiyah, said that he was furious that his followers had turned away from him and ignored his calls for moderation.

Asked whether Ayatollah al-Sistani could prevent a civil war, Mr al-Jaberi replied: "Honestly, I think not. He is very angry, very disappointed."

He said a series of snubs had contributed to Ayatollah al-Sistani's decision. "He asked the politicians to ask the Americans to make a timetable for leaving but they disappointed him," he said. "After the war, the politicians were visiting him every month. If they wanted to do something, they visited him. But no one has visited him for two or three months. He is very angry that this is happening now. He sees this as very bad."

Contrast this with the characterization featured in Jackson Deihl's WaPo column today:

Not Wanted: An Exit Strategy

The mostly bad news from Iraq this summer left a lot of people in Washington, including a few in the Bush administration, feeling confused, anxious and doubtful about whether the Iraqi government can deliver on its promise to stabilize the country. As it turns out, some of Iraq's most powerful leaders have had similar feelings as they have watched the news from Washington.

That was the message of a quiet pre-Labor Day visit here by Adel Abdul Mahdi, who has been one of America's key allies in the attempt to replace Saddam Hussein's totalitarianism with a democratic political system. Mahdi is now Iraq's vice president, but he called his meetings with President Bush, Vice President Cheney, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and key senators and congressmen a "private visit."

In fact, he was here to deliver a message, and ask a question, on behalf of Shiite Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani, who remains Iraq's single most influential figure -- and the linchpin of the past 40 months of political reconstruction. Sistani's message to Bush, Mahdi told a group of reporters I joined last week, was that "Iraqis are sticking to the principles of the constitution and democracy." But the ayatollah wanted to know if the United States is still on board as well.
...
Mahdi, Sistani and other Shiite leaders in the government don't share Washington's perception of a downward spiral. They also don't buy the American sense of urgency -- the oft-expressed idea that the new government has only a few months to succeed. Consequently, the many ideas for silver bullets tossed around in the U.S. debate mostly don't interest them.

Which narrative is correct? I'd be careful about uncritically accepting either at face value, especially given that the sourcing about Sistani's wishes in both comes from others than Sistani himself. I also suspect that the last bit about a lack of "urgency" is Deihl's take. But ...

... let's throw an Al Jazeera report of Sistani's meeting with Iraq's prime minister into the mix:

Nuri al-Maliki, Iraq's prime minister, has met with the country's most influential Shia cleric, with discussions focusing on the current security situation.

Al-Maliki met Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani on Saturday in Najaf, 160km south of Baghdad.

According to the cleric's office, al-Sistani said: "If the government does not do its duty in imposing security and order to the people and protecting them, it will give a chance to other powers to do this duty and this is a very dangerous matter."

It may be true that Sistani is losing prestige to Sadr by having publicly put faith in the Iraqi government to stop the violence and deliver justice to its victims. If so, it would be rational for him to drift towards supporting a militia solution to retain credibility and compete with Sadr's waxing influence.

We're not done. From the Kuwait News Agency:

Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki said Saturday after meeting the top spiritual guide of Shiite Iraqis Sayyed Ali Al-Sistani that the top scholar called for barring non-governmental troops from carrying or keeping weapons.

"Al-Sistani called for unifying the nation and restricting arms to government troops," the senior official said at a news conference held in the holy city of Najaf.

The item isn't clear on what is meant by "non-government troops." Is Sistani's meaning focused on occupation troops or non-government militia troops? Both? I suspect it's strictly a reference to militias. If true, it's certainly an attempted affirmation of the government's authority.

And finally, Newsweek buttresses the narrative about Sistani's diminishing authority:

For months, calming statements from the ayatollah held Shiites back from retaliating for killings by Sunni insurgents. But three years of insurgency, sectarian tensions and miserable living conditions have shrunk the space for temperance and given extremists plenty of room to operate. "[Sistani] doesn't have the same degree of influence," says Joost Hilterman, director of the International Crisis Group's Iraq program, based in Jordan. "He may be saying the same things, but fewer people are listening to him." As much as anything, the battle now is about which voices will shape the future of Iraq.

Not too long ago Sistani would have won that contest hands down. When Moqtada al-Sadr, the young radical Shiite leader, laid siege to the Imam Ali shrine and fought U.S. Marines to a standstill in Najaf in the summer and fall of 2004, Sistani put an end to the insurrection in a matter of days upon his return from London, where he was receiving medical treatment. He successfully lobbied to hold elections on an Iraqi timetable and convinced U.S. officials of the need for a referendum on the Iraqi constitution. Sistani's calls for unity after bombings of Shiite shrines worked for a remarkably long time.

But last February, when terrorists struck one of the most important sites in Shia Islam, the Askariya shrine in Samarra, it unleashed a wave of bloodshed that even Sistani couldn't control. "I reiterate my appeal to realize the magnitude of the danger threatening the future of [our] country," he said after the Samarra bombing. Since then the violence has only gotten worse, and Sistani has retreated further into his inner sanctum. "We have noticed that some people feel [Sistani's] calls for restraint aren't protecting them," says Shiite politician Ali al-Dabbagh, who consults with Sistani on a regular basis. "We notice gangs coming out doing revenge. If the violence continues there will be more and more people who won't listen to calls for restraint."

The specifics of Sistani's true role and intent are a bit muddled. Is he actively sending political messages to Washington and meeting with the Iraqi prime minister while issuing public statements backing the Iraqi government, or has he indeed withdrawn to focus exclusively on spiritual matters? Does he want a timetable for US withdrawal, or a recommitment of US support for democracy? (yes, the two are antithetical) Uncertain. I suspect that he's trying like Hell behind the scenes to get the US and Iraqi governments to aggressively commit resources, while cautiously putting a bit more public daylight between his prestige and theirs. But one idea cuts through the clutter: unless the Iraqi government asserts itself with whatever level of US military support required, and unless we're willing to give it to them, the conflict will necessarily worsen as more citizens look to the militias for security, with Shiites disregarding and diminishing Sistani's influence as a discredited backer of the nascent democracy. And before that completely plays out, he'll make greater attempts to distance himself from the government's cause. It's happening.

UPDATE: A commenter under Matthew Yglesias's post makes an interesting point that gels with all of the above angles (not to mention my conclusion):

Color me skeptical. Sistani has a *lot* of "aides," spread throughout the country. During previous crises we typically got conflicting reports of what his position was. He's *always* claimed to be just a religious leader, not a political one. I seriously doubt he's retreated to some quietist stance.

Posted by Bill at September 3, 2006 10:38 PM | TrackBack (1)

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