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« Note to John Kerry and the MSM (UPDATED with Letter from Col. Day) | Main | All Aboard the Crazy Train! » October 11, 2004
"Key Findings" of the Duelfer Report
Posted by Bill What follows are the unedited "Key Findings" from the report issued by Charles Duelfer, Special Advisor to the Director of Central Intelligence on Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction: Regime Strategic Intent Key Findings Saddam Husayn so dominated the Iraqi Regime that its strategic intent was his alone. He wanted to end sanctions while preserving the capability to reconstitute his weapons of mass destruction (WMD) when sanctions were lifted. • Saddam totally dominated the Regime’s strategic decision making. He initiated most of the strategic thinking upon which decisions were made, whether in matters of war and peace (such as invading Kuwait), maintaining WMD as a national strategic goal, or on how Iraq was to position itself in the international community. Loyal dissent was discouraged and constructive variations to the implementation of his wishes on strategic issues were rare. Saddam was the Regime in a strategic sense and his intent became Iraq’s strategic policy. • Saddam’s primary goal from 1991 to 2003 was to have UN sanctions lifted, while maintaining the security of the Regime. He sought to balance the need to cooperate with UN inspections—to gain support for lifting sanctions—with his intention to preserve Iraq’s intellectual capital for WMD with a minimum of foreign intrusiveness and loss of face. Indeed, this remained the goal to the end of the Regime, as the starting of any WMD program, conspicuous or otherwise, risked undoing the progress achieved in eroding sanctions and jeopardizing a political end to the embargo and international monitoring. • The introduction of the Oil-For-Food program (OFF) in late 1996 was a key turning point for the Regime. OFF rescued Baghdad’s economy from a terminal decline created by sanctions. The Regime quickly came to see that OFF could be corrupted to acquire foreign exchange both to further undermine sanctions and to provide the means to enhance dual-use infrastructure and potential WMD-related development. • By 2000-2001, Saddam had managed to mitigate many of the effects of sanctions and undermine their international support. Iraq was within striking distance of a de facto end to the sanctions regime, both in terms of oil exports and the trade embargo, by the end of 1999. Saddam wanted to recreate Iraq’s WMD capability—which was essentially destroyed in 1991—after sanctions were removed and Iraq’s economy stabilized, but probably with a different mix of capabilities to that which previously existed. Saddam aspired to develop a nuclear capability—in an incremental fashion, irrespective of international pressure and the resulting economic risks—but he intended to focus on ballistic missile and tactical chemical warfare (CW) capabilities. • Iran was the pre-eminent motivator of this policy. All senior level Iraqi offi cials considered Iran to be Iraq’s principal enemy in the region. The wish to balance Israel and acquire status and influence in the Arab world were also considerations, but secondary. • Iraq Survey Group (ISG) judges that events in the 1980s and early 1990s shaped Saddam’s belief in the value of WMD. In Saddam’s view, WMD helped to save the Regime multiple times. He believed that during the Iran-Iraq war chemical weapons had halted Iranian ground offensives and that ballistic missile attacks on Tehran had broken its political will. Similarly, during Desert Storm, Saddam believed WMD had deterred Coalition Forces from pressing their attack beyond the goal of freeing Kuwait. WMD had even played a role in crushing the Shi’a revolt in the south following the 1991 cease-fire. • The former Regime had no formal written strategy or plan for the revival of WMD after sanctions. Neither was there an identifiable group of WMD policy makers or planners separate from Saddam. Instead, his lieutenants understood WMD revival was his goal from their long association with Saddam and his infrequent, but firm, verbal comments and directions to them. (Via LGF) Posted by Bill at October 11, 2004 03:36 PM | TrackBack (2) CommentsWow, if I only had the stuff I've been hearing on my TV to go by. I would think that this report said exactly the opposite of what it does. I guess the only thing that doesn't jibe with the terrorist threat from Iraq is the statement that conflict with Iran was the main motivator. Posted by: Dr. DRE at October 11, 2004 04:10 PM Well, and the imminence of the threat, based on the fact that Iraq had no WMD. Posted by: Bill from INDC at October 11, 2004 04:15 PM But in the final analysis wasn't Saddam acting like he had WMD? And under those circumstances, given his past history, wasn't it prudent to assume he had WMDs? Posted by: Dr. DRE at October 11, 2004 04:25 PM And under those circumstances, given his past history, wasn't it prudent to assume he had WMDs? Yes, exactly. Posted by: Bill from INDC at October 11, 2004 04:49 PM Ok, the US doesn't know if Hussein has WMDs or not due to all of his BS since the end of the original Gulf War. Hussein then buys influence at the UN to get what he wants, which was the eventual elimination of the sanctions. If the US had continued to play along with the inspections game then at some point the lack of a WMD find would have provided the pressure to end the sanctions as well as for the US to scale back its military presence. Then within 2 years or so Hussein would have had his WMD arsenal. The Iraq invasion was first and foremost based on the fact that Hussein had never confirmed what he did with his WMDs. He was a serious threat and he needed to be dealt with. Bush made the responsible decision. Otherwise Hussein's friends in the UN would have led the drive to eliminate the sanctions and then he'd be back in business. Posted by: Violent Kitten at October 11, 2004 05:07 PM Or, Posted by: mantis at October 11, 2004 05:42 PM by continuing to pressure him and actually completing the inspections BINGO, This is exactly what Bush did. Or, do you think that Saddam would have bowed to anything other than military pressure? Posted by: Dr. DRE at October 11, 2004 05:49 PM Except Mantis, that Saddam was continually playing games with the inspectors. As for a coup, Saddam routinely had purges, about the only two who could have taken him out were Uday and Qusay. I don't think I'd want either of those in power. You're right tough, democracy at gun point never works. It didn't in Germany, Japan, South Korea. Bush would probably be stupid enough to try and hold elections in Afghanistan too. Posted by: Robert at October 11, 2004 05:49 PM Dre, abruptly ending diplomatic efforts, pulling out inspectors, and invading the country is, yes, completing the inspections in a way, but not the way I meant. Context, friends, context. Posted by: Mantis at October 11, 2004 05:56 PM thereby humiliating and marginalizing Saddam in the region. Mission Accomplished Posted by: Dr. DRE at October 11, 2004 05:59 PM Actually, Robert, I didn't say democracy at gunpoint never works. I thought the Afghanistan war was a good idea and I think that what's happened there this week is fantastic, to Bush's credit. However, Iraq is not Afghanistan, and I don't know if you recall how much money and military presence it took to foster democracy in Japan, Germany, and South Korea. I don't think that it will be the same story in Arabia. Posted by: Mantis at October 11, 2004 06:00 PM If Hussein was "belittled" don't you think he would have stepped up his efforts to get WMDs after sanctions were ended even moreso? France, China, and Russia had a lot riding on Hussein remaining in power. No WMDs found by the inspectors = rehabilitated Saddam. Posted by: Violent Kitten at October 11, 2004 06:00 PM Yes, yes Dre, very nice. See, I meant without all the invading and the billions of dollars and dead US soldiers. Maybe I'm wrong. Posted by: Mantis at October 11, 2004 06:01 PM the Iraqis (possibly the military, who knows) would take control of the country for themselves I think Robert may actually be Colin Powell yanking our chain. Posted by: Dr. DRE at October 11, 2004 06:01 PM I think that two of the biggest arguments for taking Saddam out of power via military force were the facts that rebellion was almost impossible with his multi-tiered security apparatus, and the fact that he had two psycopaths in waiting ready to take the wheel for another generation. Correction: one psycopath, one sociopath. Posted by: Bill from INDC at October 11, 2004 06:03 PM You may be right, VK, I just didn't think it was really worth the risk, especially considering that his neighbors (Iran, maybe) might have had some interest, once they found out he had none, in keeping him from acquiring any WMD. Posted by: Mantis at October 11, 2004 06:06 PM RE: Argument for military force And that everything else had been tried over the course of 12 years. You can't come to a diplomatic solution if your opponent has an extremely high resistance to diplomacy. Posted by: Dr. DRE at October 11, 2004 06:07 PM Actually DR. Dre the " the Iraqis (possibly the military, who knows) would take control of the country for themselves" quote is from Mantis, not me. And, no I'm not Colin. And Yes Mantis, trying to foster democracy in Iraq & the rest of the Middle East is a risk, but not as big a risk as continuing the status quo over there. The only two exports from the Middle East in the 20th Century were oil and terrorists. That's not a recipe for long term stability. It was high time to change the dynamic over there. Posted by: Robert at October 11, 2004 06:40 PM Sorry about the misattribution. Posted by: Dr. DRE at October 11, 2004 06:56 PM No problem. Just the librarian in me. Posted by: Robert at October 11, 2004 07:12 PM Check out the three part (so far) The Shadow Party at www.frontpagemag.com by David Horowitz and Richard Poe. Scary. Posted by: Mark McNeil at October 11, 2004 10:36 PM |
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