But, as I pointed out, without a good tactical plan, the strategic goals won't be efficiently met. I do believe that a lot of the problems that we are currently seeing in Iraq is because, tactically, the Bush administration wasn't prepared to deal effectively with the insurgency.

I'm not certain that effectively planning for the post-war in Iraq is even possible, though I'm certain they could have used more troops in the immediate aftermath ... you think of some things (oil fires, humanitarian crisis) and you miss something else (widespread looting).

But those are decisions likely more influenced by the military planners rather than the strategic politicos, especially Bush. Rumsfeld may have pressured them for a lower troop count (because US Military doctrine is to be prepared to fight at least two separate major conflicts at any given time), but I think if Tommy Franks felt that he needed more troops, he would have gotten more troops.

Ditto right now with Abizaid.

No Bill -- it's about "Strateejury"

Um, Heather, I think you mean "operationally", not "tactically"... the latter is an insult to the grunts and doesn't reflect their great performance (even in the current urban warfare, the kill ratios are the lowest by far in history), the former is an indicator that such decisions as the size of the transition force and the decision to disband the Iraqi Army by our military leaders was faulty. But the clintons weren't great operational leaders either -- take for instance the decision on what to send to Somali (Phase II).

Jim, I will be the first to admit I don't know how the military uses the terms.

As I understood the article, Bush II is a strong top level, or strategic, thinker. He sees the long view. Unfortunately, he's surrounded himself with too many people who think like he does.

Clinton's strength was that he could see what steps needed to be made to achieve a goal, or was more tactical in his thinking. Unfortunately, he wasn't too clear on what long-range goals he wanted to achieve, hence the reference to "swatting at flies."

As I see it, the way to handle Iraq would have been to recognize the overall strategy (stabilization in the Middle East, starting with Iraq) from Bush & Co.; have clear, achievable, and flexible tactical plans in place to achieve that goal both before and after the actual fighting (understanding that plans don't survive the first engagement) set up by Rummy and the top generals; then to have let Tommy Franks take it from there.

What actually happened was that Bush had the strategy and Tommy handled the operational part of it admirably, but there was this big disconnect in the middle. As Klein put it, they seemed to have this idea that things would just "work out." They might be, in fact, "working out," but not as well as they would have if there had been more tactical planning before they started.

Good analysis. But here's my thing, as Rummy would say "We don't know what we don't know."

The disconnect is Klein's analysis, and I'd love to see all his sources. It might be dead-on, just sayin' ...

Anyway, good article.

I don't agree with the assumption that, because Afghanistan and Iraq weren't quickly mopped up and all bad guys already dead or locked up, there was no tactical plan. Quite the opposite, I'd assume that there was a tactical plan that is malleable or was just wrongheaded. I think the latest seige of Fallujah bears that out. The tactical plan was to use restraint, identify and avoid structures and areas of religious significance, and wait them out. Turns out they hide in those very buildings because they learned that we don't shoot there. Our tactics have adjusted, and now they are not safe there either.

I perceive the tactical plan in Afghanistan to be: wait them out, Osama and his leadership will make a mistake and then disappear in a red mist.

What Heather said, basically. All this PNAC stuff is well and good, and I basically agree with it, but it's worthless without some concrete idea of what you're going to do. I remember hearing Condi distinguish between strategy and tactics during her 9/11 testimony, and basically saying "we didn't focus on al Qaeda because that was tactical, we were focusing on Iraq, which was strategic." She didn't make it that clear, of course, because what that essentially means is that they had their heads so high up in the clouds that they lost sight of reality. It's no good to say "terrorism is an evil in the Arab world, Baathism is and evil in the Arab world, therefore dealing with one also deals with the other." Clinton's administration may have been the least strategic in recent memory, but Bush's is without a doubt the least tactical, which is why we're in the situation we're in now - dealing with Iraq was basically a good thing, but they fucked up every single detail they could've, which might end of negating that. This is what people mean when they say Bush ignores facts that contradict his predetermined conclusion.

The first maxim of strategy is "Isolate your enemies and multiply your allies."

Bush has failed on both counts.

As for the PNAC dream of converting the 700M worshippers of Islam into good little Westerners: delusional.

The West and Islam have been at loggerhead for over 1000 years and a few swaggering Texans are not going to change that. The best thing we can do is to leave them alone and protect ourselves so that we will be left alone.

We wouldn't even care one whit about that region if it weren't for the oil. Which is fine and dandy, I suppose, but I would much rather see the focus on developing alternative sources of oil, building more nuclear power plants and the like, rather than attempting a doomed 14th Crusade.

Well, it wasn't going to be an overnight thing, it was going to be something the results of which wouldn't be seen for a long, long, time. In any case, it is/was a risky venture, so by screwing it up every step of the way Bush may have doomed it. Oh well.

Incidentally, the neocons aren't as evil as a lot of people like to believe (well, Richard Perle is). But if you look back at, say, Wolfowitz' career, there's some stuff you wouldn't expect, like opposition to Israel getting nuclear weapons, and trying to democratize East Asia (which does not have oil). The neocon tenet that American power can and should be used for good in the world is not, in fact, a coverup of some secret plot to funnel money to big business and gradually slip the US into fascism.

One other thing:
The West and Islam have been at loggerhead for over 1000 years and a few swaggering Texans are not going to change that. The best thing we can do is to leave them alone and protect ourselves so that we will be left alone.
I'd say trying to ignore the outside world is far more delusional than trying to change it.

Blern - exactly, Wolfowitz is a very compassionate, realistic man. A genius.

Jim, I think your idea about isolation ignores the realities of this century. This conflict was coming one way or another - putting your head in the sand isn't going to make it go away.